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India – Bangladesh relations

India was the first country to recognize Bangladesh as a separate and independent state immediately after its independence in December 1971. The relationship between India and Bangladesh is anchored in history, culture, language and shared values of secularism, democracy, and countless other commonalities between the two countries. ([MEA](#))

Recent High Level Visits and Exchanges

PM Modi, Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina and West Bengal CM Mamata Banerjee met in Shantiniketan in May 2018 for the inauguration of the “Bangladesh Bhawan” Tagore museum, and for the Visva Bharati University convocation. However, no formal talks were scheduled.

- PM of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina paid a State Visit to India in April 2017.
 - Joint Statement (April 2017): India and Bangladesh –A *Fraternal* Relationship (A unique phrase used for a unique relationship)
 - During the visit, 36 bilateral documents were concluded in areas such as of Civil Nuclear Energy, Space, Information Technology, Defence, Capacity building etc.
 - A 3rd Line Of Credit (LOC) worth US\$ 4.5 billion was also extended to Bangladesh.
 - The two PMs presided over a commemorative ceremony in honour of Indian martyrs of Liberation War of Bangladesh.
- Prior to this visit, PM Hasina had visited India in October 2016 to participate in the BRICS-BIMSTEC Outreach Summit.
- PM Modi paid a State visit to Bangladesh in June, 2015.
 - Exchange of instrument of ratification for India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) and a 2nd Line of Credit (LOC) worth US\$ 2 billion.

Recently, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister A H Mahmud Ali attended the last rites/funeral of former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

What are India's main objectives in Bangladesh?

- To secure **connectivity to the North East**;
 - Both signed the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement.
- Ensure that it does not become a launch pad for **anti-India activities**, including **terrorism** and **insurgencies**;
- Ensure that it does not fall in the **Chinese embrace**.
- Illegal immigration continues to be a major worry for India.
 - Central Government is vested with powers to deport a foreign national under section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946, under which the powers also been delegated to the State Governments/ UTs and the Bureau of Immigration.
 - The Indo-Bangladesh Border covering 5 states of India including Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Tripura and West Bengal is 4096 km long.
 - Border security infrastructure of fence, roads, floodlights and border out posts (BOPs) in 1/3rd length of the border is yet to be started mainly due to land acquisition issues.
 - **Assam NRC** being updated - Quietly, Delhi kept Dhaka in Assam NRC loop and assured them that there was no talk of “deportation” to prevent a slide in bilateral ties.

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What are Bangladesh's main objectives?

- Secure the flow of river waters, especially of the **Teesta**,
- Maintain an **independent foreign policy**. Some sections in Bangladesh are wary of a formal defence relationship with India for the fear of being drawn too close to Delhi.
- Secure easy and continuing **market access** in India.
 - Trade figures have gone up to \$7 billion, though the adverse trade balance remains an issue. India has tried to offset the [trade imbalance](#) by providing Lines of Credit and grants.
 - A more fundamental solution will be when Indian companies invest in the SEZs and export manufactured products back to India, redressing thereby the adverse trade balance.

Nuclear Energy cooperation - a new area of cooperation ([PIB](#))

- Tripartite agreement between India, Russia and Bangladesh to cooperate for the construction of the [Rooppur Nuclear power Plant](#).
- **Anil Kakodkar** said, it will start a “new chapter of regional cooperation in the field of nuclear energy”.

Two Key long-standing disputes resolved:

- India-Bangladesh [Land Boundary Agreement](#) (LBA) - Exchange of instrument of ratification took place during PM Modi visit in 2015.
- [Maritime boundary](#) dispute in Bay of Bengal - India signed off on the award of an international tribunal.

Yet, some big political obstacles remain.

- **On the Indian side**, West Bengal CM has been reluctant to endorse the **Teesta waters agreement** that has become the touchstone for India's good faith in Bangladesh.
- **On the Bangladesh Side** - Many in Bangladesh are nervous that Dhaka under Sheikh Hasina might be drawing too close to India. They are especially concerned on the expanding defence cooperation between the two countries. Some others see Delhi trying to limit or constrain the unfolding strategic partnership between China and Bangladesh.
 - [Joint Statement](#) on Defence Framework during PM Hasina visit in April 2018: A **\$500 million line of credit (LoC) for defence procurement** by the Bangladesh military forces, the largest such LoC India has extended to any country so far.
 - Bangladesh will not be bound to use it to source its supplies only from Indian companies. This is India's way to reposing confidence in the Hasina government that it will not challenge New Delhi's vital interests.
 - India-Bangladesh joint military exercise SAMPRITI.

What are sets of issues at the [root of the residual political](#)? ([C Raja Mohan](#))

1. Question of size and significance.

- Delhi's insufficient strategic appreciation of the importance of Bangladesh. Dhaka, in turn, has found it hard to stop seeing itself as a small country facing a large and insensitive neighbour.
- The time is now for Delhi and Dhaka to get out of the “**big-brother-small-neighbour**” syndrome.

2. With a border of nearly 4,060 km — India's longest with any country — **Delhi has no reason to see itself in competition with Beijing in Bangladesh.**

- Focus on the geographic imperative between Delhi and Dhaka.

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- The partition of the subcontinent and the inward economic orientation of India and Bangladesh meant the two sides were working against the logic of geography than with it.
- Merits of reconnecting Sonar Bangla, and also India's northeast.

3. Bangladesh's leadership role in the subcontinent and beyond.

- It is Bangladesh that took the lead in promoting South Asian regionalism.
- Dhaka also has the central role in shaping the future of sub-regional cooperation with Bhutan, Burma, India and Nepal.
- It is also a land bridge to East Asia and the fulcrum of a future 'Bay of Bengal community'.

Growing mutual trust and political comfort between Delhi and Dhaka, **backed by Kolkata**, will have one long-term consequence. It will restore the centrality of Bengal and its hinterlands that once decisively shaped the history of Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Amb. Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty: India-Bangladesh ties have entered an era of consolidation and expansion.

A kind of **trilateral** between **India, Bangladesh and Myanmar** in the Bay of Bengal region could be worked out. Later it could be expanded to include Thailand and Indonesia. We will have to think about the **maritime domain** in a far more holistic and detailed manner. MoD and MEA would need to work in collaboration in this aspect.

Source Channel

Vivek Katju:

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

- Unlike the past, Bangladesh under Hasina has cooperated with India on security issues. It has also proceeded to incrementally expand connectivity. It is combating fundamentalist Islamic forces that are reflexively pro-Pakistan.
- Thus, From India's perspective, a positive political future for Hasina is a positive for bilateral ties. In this context, the Teesta issue gains even more significance and can queer the pitch. Modi's political and diplomatic skills will be put to test, especially when China is enlarging its presence in India's neighbourhood.

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The Teesta water dispute: Geopolitics, myth and economics

Teesta's catchment area supports 8.5% of Bangladesh's population — roughly 10 million people — and 14% of crop production.

Bangladesh wants 50% of the river's water supply, especially in the months between December and May annually, while India claims a share of 55%. According to the FAO of the UN, the ratio of Bangladesh's external dependency for water is over 90%. A fair amount of that water comes through India.

Of the Teesta's catchment area, 83% lies in India; the remaining 17% is in Bangladesh. Negotiations have been on since 1983, when a preliminary arrangement had allocated 39% for India and 36% for Bangladesh. A lesser share for Bangladesh takes into account a groundwater recharge that takes place between the two barrages on the Teesta — at Gazaldoba in Jalpaiguri on the Indian side and at Dalia in Lalmonirhat in Bangladesh. The remaining 25% was left unallocated for a later decision, especially because the regular flow of a small quantity of water (in the case of the Teesta, 450 cusecs) is imperative for the life of a river.

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In 2011 when Delhi and Dhaka reached another agreement — an interim arrangement for 15 years — where India would get 42.5% and Bangladesh, 37.5% of the Teesta's waters during the dry season. Given that the TMC was a key coalition partner of the central government at the time, and that water is a state subject under the Indian Constitution, there was no way to ink the deal without the chief minister's stamp of approval.

Concerns of West Bengal

- Dependence of 6 districts of North Bengal.

Concerns of Sikkim:

- Environmental concerns - The Lepchas of Sikkim sat on hunger strike for over 900 days against the construction of a hydel project.

Delhi and Dhaka have the advantage of a **Joint River Commission (JRC)**, set up in 1972 after Bangladesh won independence precisely for the purpose of water management.

- JRC has not met since 2011.

Joint Statement (April 2017) on Teesta and other Water sharing issues:

- Conclusion of the Interim Agreement on Sharing of the Water of **Teesta** as agreed upon by both governments in January 2011 is due. Meanwhile discussions on various aspects relating to sharing of waters of the **Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla** and **Dudhkumar rivers** are also going on.

Conclusion: Over 21% of the global population lives in Asia, but it is home to only a little over 8% of the world's water resources.

- Use the institutional mechanism at its disposal – the Joint Rivers Commission – to create a set of norms and guidelines to regulate the use of not just the Teesta but all transboundary rivers shared with Bangladesh; and
- Promote sustainable conservation, develop better ways to combat pollution, and manage existing water supply and resources better.

PM's Modi said that "rivers should nurture the India-Bangladesh relationship and not become a source of discord" actually comes to life.

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Rohingya issue

Rohingyas are minority Muslim community in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar reside mainly in the **Rakhine** province (also known as the **Arakan** region).

2012: Major **Buddhist-Rohingya riots**; large no. of Rohingyas **fled to Bangladesh**.

The **roots of the problem** go back to more than a century (didn't begin therefore in 2012). The **Burmese ethnic group** has always been sensitive and find it difficult to accept any outside migrants in their community (for e.g. Rohingyas). The **Rohingyas were not given statehood**, not considered a nationality unlike the Shans, Wa etc. This is not peculiar to Rohingyas only, as **even the Indians who have settled in Myanmar (about 400,000 in number) have also not been given nationality in Myanmar.**

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The issue is thus **cultural** (ethnicity), **religious** (Buddhist Sangh is militant and Islam worldwide is becoming militant); Rohingyas themselves used militancy at one point as in 1942 they were the instruments of oppression against the Burmans mobilized by British) and **political**.

There are **news of a new allegedly Islamic insurgent group named 'harakat al-yaqeen'** comprising of Rohingya Muslims having links in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Dubai and Bangladesh and possibly India. This could become a security issue for India as well.

Muslim nations, human rights organisations, the western media, the UNHRC, and elements within Myanmar have combined to project how the icon of democracy, Suu Kyi, failed to stop and condemn the atrocities committed by security forces against Muslims in **Rakhine state**.

Prof. Baladas Ghosal: The main issue is the issue of legitimacy. **Rohingyas are not really an ethnic group, it is a political construction.** There were Muslims living in that region from 9th century and there was no problem in the period ruled under Arakan Kingdom. The major part of migration took place from Bangladesh area (then undivided Bengal) in the 20th century along with colonial powers under the British Burma during that period. So, they **are mainly Muslims of Bengali origin**. Infact it is difficult to give them a single identity.

So, if they claim themselves to be as Muslims, then there of course wouldn't be any problem. But the problem is that they are claiming themselves as an ethnic group and as we know Burma is patterned along ethnic sort of identities (states in Burma are known by their ethnic names). Now, if Rohingyas are recognised as an ethnic group, then they would also claim an ethnic state and this is the real fear of the Rakhine Buddhists.

Actually, the repeated mention of them as 'Rohingyas' by the International Media validates the narrative of essentialising a Muslim identity in Rakhine state and that is what the Rakhine Buddhists are afraid of. That is why the Myanmar government calls them 'Bengalis'.

Amb. Preet Malik: "The 'Rohingyas' nomenclature will have to disappear, but that is not going to be easy to do."

Amb. Vivek Katju says he is somewhat **pessimistic about any early resolution** of this issue for two reasons:

- i. Myanmar Army, is not an easy army to change, and
- ii. Buddhist Sangh in Myanmar is a very aggressive Sangh.

Amb. Rajiv Bhatia: That the Rohingyas have been subjected to brutal suppression cannot be contested, but critics tend to ignore the complexity of a problem that has defied solution for decades. The NLD did not create it nor is its government directly **in charge of security and border affairs, which is handled by the military** under the constitutional power-sharing formula. To expect Suu Kyi to play the role of the government's public critic, while serving in office, is unrealistic. Her endeavour has been to urge restraint so that conditions become conducive to devising practical solutions. She set up the **Kofi Annan Commission** to study the problem in depth and suggest long-term solutions. She has also spoken of the need to stop violence in the region. This is a practical approach, especially as **much of the Bamar majority community is under the sway of anti-Muslim sentiments today**.

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Amb. M K Bhadrakumar: The stability of Bangladesh as a moderate Muslim country rooted in eclectic values of secularism and democracy is of supreme importance for India. On the contrary, if Bangladesh gets infiltrated by 'jihadism', the virus will inevitably take India down at some point. Rakhine could be the incubator for creating the virus.

If **Aung San Suu Kyi** she gets discredited, Myanmar gets weakened and the legitimacy of state power to effectively counter terrorism will suffer. India should stand beside her and give her all the support she needs.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta on Rohingya Refugee Crisis: The Indian government's stance on the Rohingya refugees from Rakhine state in Myanmar is from a security point of view, imprudent; from a historical point of view, myopic; and from a moral point of view, untenable.

The problem with our current strategy is not that it is placing security over humanitarianism. It is that it is doing so in a way that is imprudent and likely to be self-defeating.

Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty: The Rohingyas have become the world's most unwanted people and the future looks quite bleak. Myanmar is unlikely to take back most of the refugees and Bangladesh will have to resettle them in new refugee camps and hope other countries will ease the burden by accepting some refugees.

Bangladesh, Myanmar sign deal (Jan. 2018): Bangladesh and Myanmar have agreed to repatriate 650,000 Rohingya refugees, who fled Myanmar's crisis-hit Rakhine province, in two years, according to an agreement signed between the two countries.

India's dilemma comes from the fact that it needs to have good relations with both Bangladesh as well as Myanmar for our own strategic reasons and thus cannot tilt to one side among the two. It is the test of India's diplomacy.

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Internal Political Situation in Bangladesh (Pinak Chakravarty)

General Elections, 2018

- The Bangladeshi general election is expected to be held between October 2018 - December 2018.
- The previous general elections, which took place in 2014, were boycotted by the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by three-time former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.

In February 2018, a special court in Bangladesh sentenced **former PM Khaleda Zia to jail over corruption** charges. Her son, Tarique Rahman, the acting head of BNP has also been convicted in the case.

There's little doubt that the Khaleda-Tarique combine headed a corrupt and extortionist government (2002-2006). Tarique and his younger brother (the late Arafat Rahman 'Koko') ran an extortion racket and a parallel government during Khaleda Zia's tenure.

During Khaleda Zia's premiership, Bangladesh and Pakistan joined hands to subvert India's interests.

- Support to Indian insurgent groups in the Northeast,
- Several Islamic extremist groups came into prominence. Tarique wanted to use these extremists to target the AL leadership and workers, while Pakistan wanted to use them against India.

In 2004, PM Hasina escaped a grenade attack at a rally in which several AL leaders and workers were killed, including the wife of the former president. Tarique is an accused in this case too.

Way forward for India: India has backed Sheikh Hasina and must continue to do so, given the track record of the Khaleda-Tarique regime. But in Bangladesh, there is a growing perception of misrule by the Awami League government even though Hasina has done a lot for the economic and infrastructure development of the nation. So India must be prepared to deal with a BNP-Jamaat (BNP's electoral ally) government in future and hope they would not commit the same mistakes vis-à-vis India once again.

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Bangladesh road-safety protests (29 July to 8 August 2018)

A series of public protests in Bangladesh advocating improved road safety were held from 29 July to 8 August 2018. They were sparked by the deaths of two high-school students in Dhaka struck by a bus operated by an unlicensed driver. The incident impelled students to demand safer roads and stricter traffic laws, and the demonstrations rapidly spread throughout Bangladesh.

The protests were peaceful until when police attempted to disperse the demonstrators with tear gas and people believed to be members of Bangladesh ***Chhatra League*** (student wing of Awami League) attacked protesters and journalists.

Following a live interview about the protests with Al Jazeera, photographer **Shahidul Alam** was detained by police. Alam was charged under **Section 57** of the **Information and Communication Technology Act**.

- The Act authorizes prosecution of any person who publishes in electronic form, material that is “fake and obscene; defamatory; may cause, ‘deterioration in law and order’; prejudices the image of the state or a person; or ‘causes or may cause hurt to religious belief.’”
- The Act is poorly drafted as it is very vague and broad.
- Seen as a **tool to muzzle the press and freedom of expression**. The maximum jail term is 14 years. And law enforcers were empowered to make arrests without a warrant.
- The Indian Supreme Court in March 2015 struck down almost a similar section, terming it unconstitutional - section 66A of the Information Technology Act.

Was the student protest aimed only at ensuring road safety? Or is it an outburst of people's frustrations against the government?

- Poor governance and law and order situation under AL government led by Sheikh Hasina.
- Government's intolerance of criticism; anybody who raises their voice is crushed with force.
- Government's tendency to use violence to put down protests. Similar to August 2018, previous protesters have been attacked by masked groups. It was the same for the students and job seekers protesting against government job quotas in April 2018.
- Attacks on the media are also common in Bangladesh. The disappearances of journalists and bloggers, their family members being followed, and so on are common and seldom reported.
- Issues of the infamous ICT Act.

The protest might be said to be an example of the frustration and anger present in society.

Video - Dissent in Bangladesh (Watch for clarity on internal politics in Bangladesh).

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India - Bangladesh Relations

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Background

India's relation with Bangladesh have been a roller-coaster ride, with periods of mutual bonhomie and deep distrust since the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation-state in 1971, while the relationship is marked by acute structural-assymetry, shared geography and history combine to make it a crucially important relation for both states.

Historical Background

Mujib Era (1971-1975) : India's decisive military intervention in Bangladesh, played a critical role in the birth of Bangladesh. This laid the ground for evolution of a closer India - Bangladesh relations which resulted in the signing of India - Bangladesh Friendship Treaty of 1972.



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However issues like Ganga water sharing , maritime boundary disputes remained as irritants in relationship . The Indira - Mujib Era this was marked by certain proximity within India - Bangladesh relations.

Era (1975 - 1982) : The relations between New Delhi and Dhaka plummeted following Mujib-ur-Rehman's association as India criticized the military corp that followed and resulted in rise of Zia-ur-Rehman as president .

Zia sought to consciously distance himself from India and returned to the islamic roots of Bangladesh's identity cultivating ties with Pakistan , China and the West .

Issues such as migration from Bangladesh and its reluctance to address illegal border trade further alienated her . Bangladesh became vocal and started internationalizing the contentious water sharing issues .



Era (1982 - 1990) : General Ershad came to power in 1982 after a coup and assumed position of president in 1983 after suspending the constitution.

He broadly continued the direction of President Zia's foreign policy. Ershad proposed the idea of South - Asia regional cooperation as an entity.

The principal motive why Dhaka pursued the idea of SAARC was with an apparently negative mindset of containing the "hegemony" of India in South Asia.

Era (1992 - 1996) : Khaleda Zia's BNP (Bangladesh National Party) formed the government in 1992 after Ershad's removal in 1990.

BNP's election campaign talked about standing up to India's hegemony and following an autonomous foreign policy.

BNP recurrently argued that election of Awami League (AL) would lead to erosion of sovereignty and emergence of Bangladesh as a client state of India.



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due to Awami Leagues "Subservient - Foreign Policy."

1992 - during PM Khaleda Zia visit to India in 1992 an agreement on Teen Bigha Corridor was finalized. India formally granted perpetual lease over the 1.5 hectare Teen Bigha Corridor that had left a larger Bangladeshi enclave in India unconnected from their homeland.

Despite the leasing of the Teen Bigha Corridor, given BNP's fundamental mistrust of India, the overall relations remained frozen.

1996 - 2001 : The AL era under Sheikh Hasina saw an improvement in India - Bangladeshi relations as both sides agreed to an equitable water sharing agreement on Ganga river for a three decade period 1996 onwards i.e. (1996 - 2026) thus removing a major irritant in the bilateral relationship.



Key Issues in India - Bangladesh Relationship

Land Boundary Issues :

- India shares its largest land boundary with Bangladesh 4096 km long.
- The Radcliffe Line drawn during Partition period in 1947 left behind landholdings called enclaves. (territory nationally belonging to one side, but totally surrounded by territory of other), with India having 111 enclaves (17,000 acres) in Bangladesh and Bangladesh having 55 in India. (7000 acres)
- By 2009, the problem of enclaves had become complicated as the population increased, turning over 50,000 people on both sides virtually "stateless".
- Moreover, the problem of enclaves further fuelled the issue of illegal migration & frequent violations of international boundary were noted.



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- After much delay, a framework agreement between Dhaka - Delhi on land boundary was signed in 2011 while Dhaka gained constitutional ratification for deal in 2011, the final ratification by Delhi was delayed by four years till 2015 due to domestic opposition by West Bengal.
- Though delayed, the final settlement of border question removed an unnecessary friction in the relationship and also strengthened the domestic position of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh.

Illegal Migration & Issue of Demographic Change

- Illegal migration refers to the phenomenon of the unauthorized, unregulated migration. In the context of India - Bangladesh relations, the push factor for fuelling the illegal migration has been the lack of adequate employment opportunities in the border districts of Bangladesh while the construction sector in India's north eastern states is the pull



factor that generates demands for such workers willing to work at relatively low wages.

However the issue of illegal migration into India from Bangladesh got deeply enmeshed with the two wave of refugees that came to India, firstly in 1947 during the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971. Estimates said that almost 10 million refugees came to Indian North Eastern States and Bengal during 1971 war.

- Some 6.8 million refugees returned to Bangladesh soon after the war & the rest by 1972.

However illegal migration into India from Bangladesh, particularly in Assam which triggered the non-violent, highly visible, Assam agitation (1979-1985) spearheaded by All Assam Students Union (AASU).

That agitation resulted in Assam Accord of 1985 which did set the cut-off date for March 24, 1971 & stated that anybody settled after it would not be a citizen but an illegal migrant.



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- This provision of the Assam Accord has not been strongly implemented & hence has failed to change the nature of Bangladeshi immigration into Assam.

The Sinha report of 1998 pointed out "the silent & invidious demographic inversion of Assam."

- Moreover, similar demographic inversion has been noted in Tripura as well.
- Assam has been repeated incidents of ethnic violence due to the illegal migration including the Kokrajhar riots of 2012.

Also, the rapid rise of Islamist ideology across South Asia including in Bangladesh has fuelled considerable religious extremism.

- While estimates vary, currently estimates say that upto 15 million illegal migrants have entered into India from Bangladesh.



According to S. Behera, Bangladeshi migration has been securitized by the "developing nexus between Muslim immigrants and thriving separatist insurgent groups like ULFA & Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups like HUJI [Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami] & others."

- Moreover, the problem of illegal migration has been further worsened by the vote bank politics in the region as these illegal migrants have managed to obtain voter-ID cards, ration cards etc.
- While some observers have argued that illegal migration from Bangladesh into bordering Indian states represents its "mexico problem." However, such a comparison may not be completely accurate given the strong security dimension of the issue in India's core.
- Pushpita Das of IDSA points out that the multitude of steps taken by GOI including increasing deployment of BSF troops, increasing the number of Border Surveillance outposts and fencing of some 3000 km of India Bangladesh border have been taken. Namrata Goswami from IDSA & Veena Sikri, India's former



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ambassador to Bangladesh have argued for issuing "Work Permits" to migrant workers for ensuring an orderly tracking entry and exit of workers from Bangladesh to India.

Fencing of border has historically generated a strongly negative response from Dhaka. Moreover the possibility of deportation of "illegal migrants" to Bangladesh if & when identified by India is unlikely as Dhaka has consistently refused to recognize the scale of the issue and given the possible negative implication in domestic politics of Bangladesh such a settlement is unlikely.

Water Sharing Issue

India and Bangladesh share 54 trans boundary rivers including major areas such as Ganga, Teesta, Barak & Brahmaputra.

- Bangladesh is a lower riparian wrt India over all these major river systems coupled with the



structural asymmetry of power between the two actors. These two factors alongwith the domestic politics in both countries have heavily influenced any resolution of water - sharing issues.

- With an equitable water sharing of Ganga water between the two sides agreed upon, even during the lean season the Ganga water sharing Treaty of 1996 valid for a period of three decades removed a major irritant in the bilateral relationship.
- Even though the Ganga Water Sharing issue has been largely resolved to the mutual satisfactions of both parties, the proposed construction of Tipaimukh dam on Barak river since 2011 has produced much controversy including strong reservations by Bangladesh fearing the flooding of Sylhet district in particular.

Since then, New Delhi has repeatedly reiterated that India would not take steps on Tipaimukh project that would adversely impact Bangladesh. India's official position emphasized that the Tipaimukh Dam would be a hydroelectric dam



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with provisions for flood controls” and would “not involve diversion of water on account of irrigation”.

Moreover, local climate changes in India are expected to have higher adverse consequences in Bangladesh & this would trigger environmental refugees into India. However, no institutional & legal agreement at the bilateral level / adequate policies exist to reduce vulnerability of people, posing the significant risk for stake-holders in the process.

The teesta river is a major source of irrigation and water supply for both West Bengal & Bangladesh. The sharing of water becomes Problematic specially during the lean season. Negotiations on Teesta water sharing have been ongoing since 1983. A 2011 interim deal, that was supposed to last 15 years gave India 42.5% of Teesta water & Bangladesh 37.5%.



West Bengal opposed this deal at the last minute & thus the deal remains unsigned.

- While Bangladesh want 50% of the Teesta's water between Dec - May every year (Pre-Monsoon years), India claims 55% of the river's water.
- With the advent of coalition era in India since 1991, the claims of bordering provinces/state have assumed much greater significance for India.

Simple Delhi - Dhaka negotiations do not always work, under federal grievances are accommodated, there is little scope for a genuine breakthrough on the issue Indian Foreign Policy is yet to develop the means to incorporate federal concerns in its dealings with neighbouring states.

Moreover, such set backs strengthen anti-India sentiments & weaken the legitimacy of secular political forces in Bangladesh.

Tariq Karim, the former high commissioner of Bangladesh to India argued in 2017 that for Dhaka the Teesta river issues "remains a litmus test for India - Bangladesh relations."



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Moreover, in future, the India - Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC) functional since 1972 which held its 37th meeting (last) in 2010 needs to be revived from slumber. Also, the idea of integrated river basin management, joint development of hydro-power projects joint dredging of rivers needs to be explored & taken forward.

Trade and Transit Issues

- The structural asymmetry between India & Bangladesh is also reflected in their economic relations.

The Bilateral trade relationship was estimated at 8.8 Billion & in 2017 with the balance of trade largely in favour of India. This stood at 7.2 Billion & for 2017 (Indian exports : 8 billion, Bangladesh export 0.8 billion).

- Though this has previously been an important bone of contention between Delhi and Dhaka, most commentators recognize the structural inevitability of this imbalance, Dhaka has a huge trade deficit Beijing as well.



- Addressing Dhaka's trade concerns unilaterally, India removed 47 items during Sheikh Hasina's visit to India in 2010 & 46 textile items during Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka in 2011 with this practically all items in which Bangladesh has an export interest to Indian market have been removed from negative list.
- On the issue of Transit, Bangladesh has the potential to serve as a vital connecting link between West Bengal and India's North Eastern States decreasing the overwhelming dependence on the siliguri corridor for transit of goods and people.
- Moreover, granting such transit rights would be mutually beneficial for Delhi - Dhaka as the transit time and cost for Indian goods would drop by $\frac{1}{3}$ rd to $\frac{1}{2}$ (i.e. by 30 - 50% as the 500 km route through Bangladesh would be much faster than the 1700 km route through the Siliguri Corridor).
- It would yield economic gains for Dhaka in form of transit fees and grant credit times for upgradation of infrastructure from Delhi. Also, it would help to build positive inter-dependence between the two neighbours.



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- A positive movement to build transit links between the two was made during the Sheikh Hasina visit during 2010, an MoU between both sides on Akhaura - Agartala rail link was signed in 2013 (15 km rail link Akhaura in Bangladesh to Agartala).
- Protocol on Inland water Transit was linked between Delhi - Dhaka in 2015 in pursuance of which North East India would be connected through National Waterway 1 running through Bangladesh to mainland India.
 - A key element of this National Waterway 1 would involve the Ashugang - Kolkata Port Link.
- While positive momentum on building connectivity links has been built up since 2010, much more needs to be done. Also the Bandhan and Maitree express between Kolkata - Dhaka have also added



to improving the connectivity links between the two.

- However any radical boost to connectivity between the two is more likely to be withered if the existing concerns of Dhaka on trade and connectivity are addressed at the earliest.

Role Of China Factor & India - Bangladesh Relations

In contrast to the absence of domestic political consensus in Bangladesh over the course of foreign policy with India, there is a striking consensus for pursuing closer relations with China.

Though historically, China had opposed the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 & tilted towards Pakistan, this has not come in the way of normalization of ties between the two.

- In 2002 - China & Bangladesh signed a defence cooperation agreement during Khaleda Zia's visit in BNP era which provided for military training to troops, defence acquisitions etc.



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So P.K. Singh argues that

“The fact that Bangladesh opted for a defence pact with China rather than USA means a conscious desire on Dhaka's part to invest in anti-India coalitions in South Asia, since America's relationship with India has metamorphosed fundamentally in the new millennium.”

- China's increased engagement in South Asia including in Bangladesh has been increasingly visible since 2016 visit of Xi Jinping upgraded the Beijing - Bangladesh relationship to a strategic partnership level..

This was the first visit by a Chinese premier to Bangladesh in 30 years (3 decades) China during Xi's visit promised to give a major push to the infrastructural projects as it offered 24.5 Billion \$ in investments on 34 projects. This would largely be in consonance with China's BRI (Belt and Road Initiative).



- Recently in 2017, China has surpassed India as Bangladesh's largest trading partner with Bilateral trade reaching 10 Billion \$ annually, however the trade relationship is largely tilted in favour of China (Chinese exports \approx 9 Billions \$ Bangladesh's exports \approx 1 Billion).
 - Most Bangladeshi defence platforms have been historically processed from China including two-wing class submarines procured in 2017, which raised ~~in~~ much concerns in India.
- [also see C. Raja Mohan's views on China - Bangladesh relation & its implications for India.]

India's Recent Engagement in Bangladesh

- The Modi era since 2014 has seen a renewed push by Delhi in increasing its engagement with Dhaka. This included bring a settlement to a much delayed land boundary agreement issue in 2015, the extension of a 4.5 Billion \$ line of credit to Bangladesh during Sheikh Hasina's visit to New Delhi in 2017.



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- Also a framework for closer defence cooperation was signed between New Delhi & Dhaka under which Dhaka could procure defence platform from India under a separate line of credit amounting to 500 million \$.
- In economic and trade arena India continue to be a major trade partner for Bangladesh with Bilateral trade at (> 8 Billion \$) in 2017.
- P.M. Modi's 2015 visit saw additional transmission lines being opened from Tripura to supply 500 MW of electricity to Bangladesh in addition to 660 MW already being exported through West Bengal .
- Moreover India has signed a triplate agreement with Russia & Bangladesh for a 2400 MW Rooppur Nuclear Power Project while Russia would supply the reactors, India would assist in installation of power plants framing of Bangladeshi officials in operationalizing the project .



C. Raja Mohan Views

- He argues that in context of India - Bangladesh relations, three sets of issues are at the root of political opposition in both countries that need to be addressed.

First, question relates to the issue of size and significance. It is time for Dhaka - Delhi "to get out of big brother, small brother syndrome."

While Delhi needs to engage Dhaka in a more sustained & purposeful manner, Dhaka must demonstrate greater self assurance in engaging India for enlightened self interest time is now for Dhaka - Delhi "to get out of big brother - small brother syndrome."

Second, with a border of merely 4060 km, India's largest with any country, Delhi has no reason to see itself in competition with Beijing in Bangladesh.

China has become a major partner for Bangladesh is partly due to Beijing's emergence as the World's 2nd largest economy. But it is mostly about



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Delhi's past neglect of its neighbours.

- The partition of subcontinent & the inward looking economic orientation of India & Bangladesh meant that the two sides were working against the logic of geography, rather than with it.

Third, set of issues relate to Bangladesh's leadership role of in the subcontinent & beyond Dhaka has an important role in shaping the future of sub-regional cooperation between Burma, Bhutan, India & Nepal. It has the potential to serve as a land bridge for East Asia.

Muchkund Dubey

Points out that the subcontinent suffers from the big brother small brother syndrome. Moreover, the big brother has the habit of ignoring the small neighbours which feel ignored.



- Dubey argued about the lack of scale in India-Bangladesh engagement and also the considerable delays in engagement. For example :
 - the 1 Billion \$ line of credit announced during the Manmohan era in 2010 was completely utilized only in 2016.
 - though India has committed 5 Billion \$ in line of credit in 2017 it needs to think bigger.
 - Dubey argues that if China can commit 46 Billion \$ to Kashar Corridor, India can commit 10 Billion \$ to Bangladesh in 4-5 years that can dramatically change relations.

Shibhasis Chatterjee : wrote on India - Bangladesh relations in the book "Engaging the World :- Indian Foreign Policy since 1947", the domestic politics is a key driver of India - Bangladesh relations.

- He argues that in Bangladesh, the deep political divide between secular Awami League & BNP with its focus on political Islam & religious identity



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explains much of the inconsistency in India - Bangladesh relations.

Increasingly domestic politics within India has also come to influence India's relations with Bangladesh as India has moved away from a one-party dominant system to coalition based politics.

- Moreover the rise of regional forces / parties in many cases has resulted in local concerns / issues driving national choices.

India-Bhutan relations

India and Bhutan enjoy unique ties of friendship and cooperation, which are characterized by [utmost trust and mutual understanding](#).

Diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan were established in 1968 with the establishment of a special office of India in Thimphu. Before this our relations with Bhutan were looked after by our Political Officer in Sikkim. The basic framework of India- Bhutan bilateral relations was the **Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1949** between the two countries, which was **revised in February 2007**.

- 1949 Treaty: Gave India an advantageous role of "guide" of Bhutan's foreign policy and defence matters.
- Protests from Bhutan about continuation of a "guide" for foreign and defence matters of a sovereign nation, the treaty was partially modified in 2007 to remove this role. Nevertheless Bhutan's policies are by and large pegged with Indian policy. The 2007 pact was signed after the Himalayan kingdom introduced major political reforms to emerge as the world's newest democracy.
- The 2007 Bhutan-India friendship treaty states that the two neighbors "shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other."

The Golden Jubilee of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between India and Bhutan is being celebrated in the year 2018. ([MEA](#))

PM Modi paid his **first state visit abroad** after assumption of office to Bhutan in June, 2014. The special relationship has been sustained by the tradition of regular visits and high level dialogues between the two countries. The latest official visit has been that of PM Tshering Tobgay to New Delhi in July, 2018. Bhutan's King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuk attended the funeral of former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee on 17th August 2018.

Bilateral Trade

India is Bhutan's largest trading partner. Among the total trade of Bhutan with other countries, [84%](#) is with India. [94% of Bhutanese exports goes to India](#). In 2016, total bilateral trade between the two countries stood at Rs. 8,723 crore. 90% of Bhutan's total exports to India is through sale of electricity (~Rs. 2900 crores)

The trade between the two countries is governed by the India-Bhutan Trade and Transit Agreement 1972 which was last renewed in November 2016. The Agreement established a free-trade regime and trade is to be transacted in Bhutanese Ngultrums and INR. The Agreement also provides for duty free transit of Bhutanese exports to third countries. Bhutan is dependent on India for its external trade as it is a land-locked nation.

[Suhasini Haider](#) - India also needs to focus on policing cross-border trade better. The **GST** still hurts Bhutanese exporters, and **demonetisation** has left lasting scars on the banking system.

Bilateral Mechanisms in areas such as security, border management, trade, transit, economic, hydro-power, development cooperation, water resources.

Hydropower Cooperation

- So far, Government of India has constructed three Hydroelectric Projects (HEPs) in Bhutan totaling 1416 MW, which are operational and exporting surplus power to India. About three-fourth of the power generated is exported and rest is used for domestic consumption.
- India has agreed to assist Bhutan in developing a minimum of 10,000 MW of hydropower and import the surplus electricity from this to India by the year 2020. Currently, there are three Inter-Governmental (IG) model HEPs (Punatsangchhu-I, Punatsangchhu-II and Mangdechhu) under implementation.
- **Issues** ([Suhasini Haider](#)): Delays in constructing and commissioning hydropower projects in Bhutan by Indian companies have led to the country's burgeoning national debt.
 - India's power-surplus status and the advent of other renewable energies like wind and solar power will make it more difficult for Bhutan to ensure that its hydropower sector becomes profitable. And unless India finds ways to help, it will be accused of the same sort of "debt-trapping" that China is accused of today.

Bhutan is also the **recipient of highest aid/loan from India** for its developmental projects. Bhutan is about to be graduated to a middle income country, the first from South Asia.

Educational and Cultural Cooperation, Under Graduate and Post –Graduate Scholarships, Nehru-Wangchuck Scholarships, Ambassador's Scholarship, Aid-to-Bhutan ICCR Scholarship, ITEC Training Programme Scheme are some other important areas of cooperation.

The China Question

Doklam stand-off at Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction:



China has long camouflaged offense as defense, in keeping with the ancient theorist **Sun Tzu's** advice that **all warfare is "based on deception."** Still, the fact that the world's fourth largest country in area, after Russia, Canada and the US, is seeking to nibble away at the territory of a tiny nation speaks volumes about China's aggressive strategy of expansion.

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Suhasini Haider (July 2017): China appears to be back in the eastern great game that Bhutan has become, or an “egg between two rocks”, as a senior Bhutanese commentator described it. By triggering a situation where Indian soldiers occupy land that isn’t India’s for a prolonged period, Beijing may have actually planned to show up India’s intentions in an unfavourable light to the people of Bhutan.

- The government must see that Bhutan’s sovereignty is no trivial matter.
- New Delhi would do well to refrain from differentiating between political factions inside Bhutan.
- India must also be aware that other neighbours are watching the Doklam stand-off closely. Nepal, Myanmar and Pakistan too have tri-junctions (at least on the map) with both countries.

Shyam Saran (July 2017): China’s encroachment on **Doklam** is often characterised as a security threat to India, particularly to the narrow Siliguri corridor linking India’s North-East to the rest of the country. But it is also a threat to Bhutan whose main communication links south also traverse the same Siliguri corridor. The action taken by Indian forces in Doklam is in response to a serious security threat to both countries. Any notion that India has drawn a reluctant Bhutan into a crisis which is specific to India’s security interest alone, ignores this ground reality.

It is also important to keep Bhutan’s interests foremost while talking about the legal basis for the Sikkim-Tibet border. Bhutan was not a party to the 1890 Anglo-Chinese convention, nor to the subsequent 1906 convention.

This is not a case of big brother India coming to the rescue of a ‘tiny’ neighbour. The 2007 treaty was between two sovereign and independent nations which celebrated their longstanding relationship of mutual trust and close friendship and acknowledged the need to cooperate closely in upholding their shared security concerns. It is this spirit which must prevail as we continue to grapple with the challenge both our nations confront on our sensitive borders.

Just as China has tried to sow discord among ASEAN members through intimidation and blandishments, it is seeking to do the same in our neighbourhood. Both Bhutan and India understand this strategy very well even if some others in our region do not.

Source Channel

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

Suhasini Haider (August 2018)

Experts point out that China’s actions since last June, to build a permanent military presence above the stand-off point, mean that Bhutan has a much reduced advantage in any forthcoming negotiations on the issue. “We will continue to discuss Doklam de jure, but the situation has changed drastically de facto,” said one Bhutanese expert.

After Mr. Modi’s Wuhan outreach and several meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Bhutan too has decided that there is little point in avoiding engagement with China. China’s Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou’s July visit to Thimphu was an outcome of this stance.

Interestingly, these issues are reminiscent of the situation in September 1958 when PM Nehru undertook the arduous three-week journey by yak across the Chumbi Valley to meet Bhutan’s third king, Jigme Wangchuck. The trip took place amidst rising tensions with China, even as it gave special clearance for the delegation to cross into Doklam.

As **former Foreign Secretary Jagat S. Mehta** wrote in his book, *“Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems Through Diplomacy”*: “The running anxiety during the 1960s for Bhutan was to steer its

external relations with China by giving neither provocation nor the impression of getting into a bear hug of dependence with India. Both could jeopardise [Bhutan's] autonomy."

How does BIMSTEC help Bhutan?

Constantino Xavier: "With one of the highest trade-to-GDP ratios in the region (82 percent) Bhutan's developmental goals will hinge on its ability to moderate its landlocked position by developing connectivity with the Bay of Bengal region."

Bhutan concerns on the 'BBIN' Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) (April-May 2017)

The Bhutanese government requested the other BBIN members to proceed with the agreement and also clarified that it would attempt to ratify the MVA after the country held general elections in 2018. Due to strained relations between Bhutan and Nepal, the Tshering Tobgay-led government feared that permitting Nepalese trucks to enter Bhutan would upset the electorate.

- The **main concern** expressed by Bhutanese citizen groups and politicians is over **increased vehicular and air pollution** in a country that prides itself on **ecological consciousness**.

India described Bhutan's decision as a "setback" and not a "rejection" of the agreement stating that it was natural that all members could not proceed at the same pace, and that India would continue its engagement with Bhutan on the issue.

Background of strained relations between Bhutan and Nepal

Bhutan's government ordered the expulsion of Bhutanese citizens of Nepali origin in the 1990s in the name of preserving Bhutan's unique national identity ("[One Nation, One People](#)" policy) which it boasts today.

The Nepali citizens were regarded as a cultural threat to Bhutan. About 108,000 of these stateless Bhutanese are still living in seven refugee camps in Nepal, although many have been resettled in Western nations.

Bhutanese National Assembly election, 2018

The National Assembly election is scheduled to be held in Bhutan on 15 September and 18 October 2018. The elections will mark 10 years of democracy in Bhutan.

Suhasini Haider (Aug 2018) - Given concerns over Indian influence, New Delhi must exercise caution in the run-up to Bhutan's elections.

Sovereignty and self-sufficiency

- The People's Democratic Party, led by incumbent PM Tshering Tobgay, enters the elections with a visible edge, even if it may not be able to better its landslide victory in 2013.
- Attacking Mr. Tobgay over a perceived "pro-India" stance will be part of the Opposition's messaging. At its first rally, on July 29, the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT) party president, Pema Gyamtsho, said that "sovereignty, security and self-sufficiency" were the DPT's top priorities. Mr. Gyamtsho's statement advocates a Bhutanese foreign policy that is less dependent on India.

Given this, India must step lightly and thoughtfully around the upcoming election. The Manmohan Singh-led UPA government's decision to cut cooking gas subsidy just before the 2013 elections in Bhutan has often been shown as proof of Indian interference, especially by the DPT party that lost that election.

Climate Change, PARIS Agreement

The [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change \(UNFCCC\)](#) is an international environmental treaty adopted on 9 May 1992 and opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. It then entered into force on 21 March 1994, after a sufficient number of countries had ratified it. The UNFCCC objective is to "stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".

The framework sets non-binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries and contains no enforcement mechanisms. Instead, the framework outlines how specific international treaties (called "protocols" or "Agreements" e.g. Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement) may be negotiated to specify further action towards the objective of the UNFCCC

The UNFCCC has 197 parties. The convention enjoys broad legitimacy, largely due to its nearly universal membership. The parties to the convention have met annually from 1995 in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change.

[Kyoto Protocol](#) (1997): The Protocol is based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). The Kyoto Protocol implemented the objective of the UNFCCC to fight global warming by reducing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to "a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Article 2). The Protocol's first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012.

A second commitment period was agreed on in 2012 (for period 2012-2020), known as the [Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol \(2012\)](#), in which 37 countries have binding targets: Australia, the EU (and its 28 member states), etc. Japan, New Zealand and Russia have participated in Kyoto's first-round but have not taken on new targets in the second commitment period. Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2012 and the US has not ratified.

- A total of 144 instruments of acceptance are required for the entry into force of the amendment. As of 29 August 2018, 115 Parties have deposited their instrument of acceptance. Thus, it is **yet to enter into force**.

[Bali Action Plan](#) (2007): Agreement on a timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework (the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) was achieved. The Bali Road Map as a two-year process to finalizing a binding agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen.

[Copenhagen Accord](#) (2009): The conference did not achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. A 13-paragraph 'political accord' was negotiated by approximately 25 parties including US and China, but it was only 'noted' by the COP as it is considered an external document, not negotiated within the UNFCCC process.

The Accord, drafted by, on the one hand, the US and on the other, in a united position as the BASIC countries, was not legally binding and did not commit countries to agree to a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol, whose round ended in 2012.

The [Cancun Agreements](#) (2010) established a Green Climate Fund, a Technology Mechanism and an Adaptation Framework, fulfilling the promise of the Copenhagen Accord.

Durban (2011) - Decisions to implement the Cancun Agreements, operationalise the Green Climate Fund (goal of mobilising \$100 billion per year by 2020), extend the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period, and launch a new process to negotiate a future climate regime (by 2015, which eventually turned out to be the Paris Agreement). This was a "package deal", in that without an agreement to negotiate a future climate regime, the EU would not have agreed to a Kyoto second commitment period.

- The **Durban Platform** decision does not contain a reference to "equity" or "common but differentiated responsibilities".
- Developed countries were unanimous in their insistence that any such reference must be qualified with a statement that this principle must be interpreted in the light of "contemporary economic realities". They were also insistent that the future regime must be "applicable to all". India, among other developing countries, argued in response that this would tantamount to amending the Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The **Doha Amendment** (2012) to the Kyoto Protocol (to be accepted before entering into force) featuring a second commitment period running from 2012 until 2020 limited in scope to 15% of the global carbon dioxide emissions due to the lack of commitments of Japan, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, New Zealand (nor the United States and Canada, who are not parties to the Protocol in that period) and due to the fact that developing countries like China (the world's largest emitter), India and Brazil are not subject to emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.

Warsaw (2013) - The parties agreed to develop informational requirements and to initiate domestic preparations for their "intended nationally determined contributions, without prejudice to the legal nature of the contributions" of the Paris Agreement.

- The word "intended" suggests that the intended contribution could be revised by the party itself or as the result of an international assessment process.
- The term "nationally determined", much to the dismay of small island states, endorses a bottom-up approach, leaving the framing of contributions, at least in the first instance, solely to the nations.
- The term "contributions" leaves their nature — whether they are commitments, or actions, or commitments for some and actions for others — open. Fourth, the decision leaves the legal form of the contributions unresolved. On a positive note, since the term "contributions" is not qualified by "mitigation", contributions could be in the form of adaptation, finance, technology transfer or capacity building.

Lima (2014) - **Lima Call for Climate Action** - States arrived at the elements of the negotiating text for the 2015 agreement. Lima decision provides guidance, albeit not as robust as desired, to states as they prepare to submit their "INDCs" next year in 2015.

- Background: **US-China bilateral deal on Climate change (Nov. 2014)**. China had chosen 2030 as its peaking year.
- In contrast to working together with the BASIC countries to negotiate the Copenhagen accord with the US, Beijing made a deal with Washington on climate change before the Paris climate agreement. The most important relationship for China is its "great power relationship" with the US, the world's pre-eminent power; relations with other major powers are now of secondary importance. ([Shyam Saran](#))

[Lavanya Rajamani](#) - **Negotiating challenges for India** (Oct. 2015)

- **Differentiation**
 - The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) that legitimizes differentiation between developed and developing countries.
 - The principle of progression, that Parties nationally determined mitigation efforts should reflect a progression beyond previous efforts.
- **Parity between mitigation, adaptation and finance**
 - India has also long argued to treat mitigation, adaptation and finance on par with each other.
 - Many developing countries are keen to ensure that if their mitigation commitments are ratcheted up, so should the financial obligations of developed countries. While mitigation provisions are couched in actionable language (Parties shall/should... etc.), thus clearly identifying actors and actions, several adaptation and finance provisions are couched in non-actionable language (Parties recognize/acknowledge...etc.), providing considerable discretion to Parties in their implementation of these provisions.
 - Both the adaptation and finance provisions of the text will need to be considerably strengthened to meet India's needs.
- **Design of the Review Mechanism**
 - Bottom-up approach rather than a top-down review mechanism.

[Shyam Saran](#) (Nov. 2015) - India is targeted as a “spoiler”, an “obstructionist” or, more mildly, as a “challenge”, because of its ability to spell out to sister developing countries the negative implications of what the developed world is proposing and mobilising opposition to such attempts.

Paris Agreement (2015)

The agreement strikes a delicate balance between the collective ambition of global efforts to lower greenhouse gas emissions, differentiation between developed and developing countries, and mobilisation of the financial resources needed for support

- The Paris Agreement resolves to hold global temperature rise to “well below 2 degrees Celsius” above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts towards a 1.5 degrees C temperature limit.
- This goal is complemented by a binding obligation to submit mitigation contributions every five years and to pursue domestic measures to achieve them. For every five-year cycle, states must put forward contributions more ambitious than their last.
- States will provide information on the implementation of their contributions, which is then subject to a technical expert review process. In addition, the agreement envisages a “global stocktake” every five years to assess collective progress towards long-term goals.

The outcome document consist of two parts: A decision of the CoP to the UNFCCC, which is non-binding, and a Paris Agreement, which when signed and ratified will constitute a legally binding agreement.

What is “legally binding” in the Paris Agreement?

- It institutionalises a “pledge and review” system, whereby countries are committed to offering voluntary climate change actions that would then be subject to periodic (in this case, five yearly) reviews, but with no penalties for not achieving these voluntary targets.

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Criticism of Paris agreement:

- The INDCs pledges do not, at all, add up to the scale and urgency of the threat posed by global climate change.
- The modest target of \$100 billion in climate finance promised by 2020 is projected as being close to realisation by lumping together overseas development assistance as well as commercial financial flows.
- The **focus** has been on 'production side' of CO₂ emissions and **NOT** the '**Consumption side**' as to '**lifestyle changes**' that people in developed countries particularly should need to go further into.
- Paris agreement doesn't talk about "**Water crisis**".
- Criticisms vis-a-vis departure from UNFCCC convention ([Shyam Saran](#)):
 - There is no legal distinction between developed and developing countries as Annex I and non-Annex I countries, respectively, as under the UNFCCC convention.
 - Differentiation is also time bound in the sense that the Paris Agreement expects all countries to peak their emissions as soon as possible and then undertake economy-wide reductions, though developing countries are allowed to peak later than developed countries. In the convention, only the latter were expected to do so, not developing countries.

India and Paris Agreement:

- The Paris Agreement is firmly grounded in the principle of CBDR-RC. Further, the agreement recognises that the global temperature goal must be achieved in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and that developed countries should lead in mitigation efforts and continue to provide financial resources to developing countries.
- The agreement places contributions on mitigation, adaptation and support on an even keel.
 - Thus the obligation to put forward increasingly ambitious contributions applies not just to mitigation contributions but also to financial contributions by developed countries.
 - The global stocktake, too, will assess progress not just on mitigation contributions but also the finance ones.
 - To set a new collective quantified target from a floor of \$100 billion per year from 2025, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries.
- [Navroz Dubash](#) (Dec. 2015): The Paris Agreement preserves space for greater energy use, but with the caveat that India's actions will be subject to scrutiny. We should use these mechanisms to hold others to account.
- [Shyam Saran](#) (Former foreign secretary, was the PM's special envoy on climate change from 2007-10)
 - For India, Paris was a holding operation, to stop the attrition process in play since Copenhagen in 2009, which led, through successive annual CoPs, to the virtual hollowing out of the convention.
 - The **Paris Agreement is a pale shadow of the convention**, but our negotiators at least salvaged some key principles such as equity and differentiation that were in danger of being obliterated along with the notion of "historical responsibility".
 - The focus will now shift to the several mechanisms and procedures that have to be put in place to give effect to the Paris Agreement. We must ensure that this follow-up exercise does not undermine some of the few gains we have managed to salvage at Paris.
 - This will include the methodology for measuring net emissions during the five-year review and the nature of the flexibility that is available to developing countries in this regard.

- The issues of finance and technology transfers remain unresolved. The formulations in the Paris Agreement on them are mostly in the nature of exhortations rather than substantive.

The Paris Agreement was open for signature by states and regional economic integration organizations that are parties to the UNFCCC (the Convention) from 22 April 2016 to 21 April 2017 at the UN Headquarters in New York.

The agreement stated that it would enter into force (and thus become fully effective) only if 55 countries that produce at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions ratify, accept, approve or accede to the agreement. The Agreement entered into force as of 4 November 2016 (just before the US Presidential election on 8th Nov. 2016, thus placing the Agreement on a firm footing, Brexit or Trump).

India ratified the Paris Agreement on 2nd October, 2016 (Mahatma Gandhi's birthday). As of July 2018, 195 UNFCCC members have signed the agreement, and 180 have become party to it. [India's ratification](#) (official ratification document's link attached) of the Paris Agreement is accompanied by the **following declaration:**

- 'The Government of India declares its understanding that, as per its **national laws**; keeping in view its **development agenda**, particularly the eradication of poverty and provision of basic needs for all its citizens, coupled with its commitment to following the low carbon path to progress, and on the **assumption of unencumbered availability of cleaner sources of energy and technologies and financial resources** from around the world; and based on a fair and ambitious assessment of global commitment to combating climate change, it is ratifying the Paris Agreement.'

[Lavanya Rajamani - Significance of India's Ratification of the Paris Agreement](#) (October 2016)

Many of the elements highlighted in the declaration - national laws, development agenda, access to cleaner energy sources - form part of **India's 'national circumstances'**, which is a notion firmly embedded in the Paris Agreement. This is in evidence in the 'nationally determined' nature of contributions from Parties, as well as the fact that the Agreement for the most part contains legally binding obligations of conduct rather than result.

- In deference to the different national circumstances of states, the Paris Agreement **does not oblige India to *achieve* its national contribution**.
- Parties are **legally bound to:**
 - prepare, maintain and communicate contributions,
 - take domestic mitigation measures (Article 4.2) to achieve these contributions.
 - provide the information necessary to track progress in achieving their contributions. The information will be subject to a 'technical expert review' and a 'multilateral consideration of progress'.
- In addition, the context for implementation of the 'well below 2°C/ 1.5°C temperature goal, as well as the net zero goal contained in the Paris Agreement, is sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty (Articles 2 and 4). There are also numerous references to equity and the principle of CBDR-RC, in light of different national circumstances, in the Paris Agreement, including in the overarching 'purpose' of the Agreement.
- The **global stocktake**, to be conducted every five years, the first in 2023, is intended to assess collective progress towards long-term goals.
 - The stocktake assesses not just mitigation actions but also adaptation and support (finance, technology and capacity building) actions taken by states. The stocktake will provide a clear

picture of 'global commitment to combatting climate change.' The stocktake is to be conducted in the light of equity, as yet undefined.

- India can help define and operationalise the notion of 'equity' in the global stocktake.

India's contribution - Measures and Policies for Tackling Climate Change (PIB)

- India pledges to
 - i. reduce the **emissions intensity** of India's GDP by **33-35% from 2005 levels by 2030**,
 - ii. increase the **share of non-fossil-fuel-based electricity to 40%** cumulative electric power installed capacity, and
 - iii. to significantly increase India's **forest and tree cover** (2.5 billion (Giga) tonnes CO₂ capture by forest and tree cover)
- Every successive contribution is expected to reflect '**progression**' and '**highest possible ambition**', and must go further than this initial contribution.
 - The Paris Agreement is unclear on how progression and ambition is to be measured, and by whom. In practice, this may be self-determined.
- **Challenges: Radical restructuring of Electricity production.**
 - India's renewables target of 175 GW would then lead to Coal based production simultaneously go up and down to balance the same. This may require some coal based plants to close down.
 - If India actually meets the target of 175 GW in renewables, then the huge proposed investments in Coal Based Power Plants of the amount of USD 50 bn \$ is a big question mark!
 - How do we meet the volatile electricity demand (depending on seasons of summer and winter) at affordable prices (Solar and Wind power related storage technologies are much costlier).

Cost of Climate Change for India - World Bank report says that rising temperatures and changing monsoon rainfall patterns from climate change could cost India **2.8% of GDP**, and depress the living standards of nearly half the country's population by 2050.

- If no measures are taken, average temperatures in India are predicted to increase by 1.5-3°C by 2050. If preventive measures are taken along the lines of the Paris Agreement, avg. temp would rise by 1-2°C by 2050.

Carbon Imperialism Vs Economic Cost of Renewable Energy Vs Social Cost of Thermal Powerplants

CEA **Arvind Subramanian** says we should not blindly imitate the renewable energy obsession of the first world, and must resist carbon imperialism. The Economic survey 2016-17 Vol.2 chapter 5 points out that though coal has social / environmental costs, we can't substitute it with renewable energy. Even NITI Ayog's 3 Year Action Plan makes recommendations to increase coal production.

Q. "While India believes in low carbon economy, it can't be subservient to carbon imperialism".

Substantiate in context of Paris Agreement.

- Carbon Imperialism - Developed nations are trying to enforce their views about energy-consumption upon the developing nations, with two primary motives:
 - To sell their nuclear fuel and technology.
 - To portray the third world in bad light for using coal power and thereby reducing their own culpability for global warming.
- India's initiatives and commitments regarding clean energy:
 - **INDC** commitments

- Carbon tax - a fairly high cess of Rs 400 a tonne on coal that goes into a Clean Energy Fund to finance renewable energy projects and energy efficiency projects.
- Schemes, Missions, Initiatives - NAPCC, Green Corridor Program, FAME India programme on Hybrid and Electric vehicles, RBI included renewable energy projects under the PSL norms, SEBI notified framework for issuing green bonds and listing them on stock exchange for better public participation etc.
- Why we can't blindly imitate first world's clean energy obsession.
 - Historical injustice in the industrialization age, principle of equity, etc.
 - Coal offers the cheapest source of energy. Alternatives are neither cheap, competitive nor convenient because:
 - **Hydel** energy requires construction of large dams. Implications: displacement of people and ecological concerns.
 - **Nuclear** energy has issues related to safety of humans and environment, availability of fuel and technology.
 - The land requirement for Solar Powerplants is 10 times that of thermal power plant. This has implications on project cost and food security.
 - A 180 degree shift to renewables **will render thermal plants idle**, leading to unemployment and further aggravation of the NPA & twin balance sheet problem.
 - **Wind and solar power** are non-dispatchable, i.e. energy can be generated only when there is wind blowing or there is appropriate sunshine. This imposes additional cost of storage and backup system.

Adoption of renewable energy is a prerequisite in the fight against global warming. But energy access to all, is also a prerequisite in the fight against poverty and low human development. While India understand the significance of both, but disagrees with developed nations' priority that the former (Renewables) should take precedence over the latter (HDI).

Conclusion on India's post-Paris negotiations:

- If India engages meaningfully in the post-Paris negotiations, it can address all the concerns underpinning its declaration. The negotiations in the coming years are therefore critical.
 - Recognition of national circumstances, eradication of poverty, provision of basic needs, equity, support and global commitment.
- The post-Paris negotiations have crucial gap filling work to do --- **rule-making processes**. India should ensure that transparency and other processes adequately recognise its needs and constraints, and that equity is operationalised through the Paris rulebook. As one of the nations that brought the Paris Agreement into force, it can do so with greater moral authority than ever.

US announces to withdraw from Paris Agreement

In June 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw his country from the agreement. The Agreement only permits a state to withdraw three years after the Agreement enters into force for that state, and the withdrawal takes effect a year later.

Under the agreement, the earliest effective date of withdrawal for the U.S. is November 2020, shortly before the end of President Trump's current term. In practice, changes in United States policy that are contrary to the Paris Agreement have already been put in place

The lingering threat of US withdrawal had fostered unlikely alliances and a strong sense of solidarity among other nations. The **BASIC** (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) countries reiterated their

“unwavering commitment” to the Paris Agreement in April 2017, as did the other G-7 countries last week. The **EU** and **China** have also committed to forging ahead to implement the Paris Agreement.

Shyam Saran: On Climate Change, the **US Needs to Be Isolated, Not Appeased**. As Trump knocks down the Paris pact, the Modi government should **push India’s BASIC strategy again**.

Trump seeking renegotiations in order to make it reflect US interests better.

- Fresh negotiations is unlikely (especially when this was arrived after tortuous negotiations).
- Furthermore, the agreement implicitly recognises the principle of “no backsliding”: nations can make their commitments progressively more ambitious but not dilute them. The stated intent of the US – to reduce its commitments – would violate this principle.

Global total emissions:

- **India** total emissions are less than 5% in total; per capita emissions: less than 2 tonnes (half of the global average).
- **China’s** per capita emissions: **8 tonnes**,
- **US’s** per capita emissions: **20 tonnes**, ten times that of India.
- China’s per capita emissions by 2030 will likely be 14 tonnes while India’s will be about 7 tonnes even under the most generous assumptions of the country’s growth trajectory.

Trump said a country like India was demanding billions of dollars as a condition for fulfilling its commitments under the agreement. This is **a lie plain and simple**.

- While India’s submission did raise the expectation of international support, virtually all its measures announced and being implemented, are domestically financed. This is true of the ambitious National Solar Mission and more importantly, India is the only emerging economy to put a fairly high cess of Rs 400 a tonne on coal that goes into a Clean Energy Fund to finance renewable energy projects and energy efficiency projects. It is another matter that the funds are underutilised.
- Despite its low level of per capita energy consumption, half of the global average, India is doing much more than most developed countries to meet the challenge of climate change.

Shyam Saran - What should India’s climate change strategy be in the light of Trump’s decision to exit the agreement?

1. India should continue its adherence to the agreement. Since it is a framework agreement which remains to be fleshed out in subsequent negotiations, there should be a determined effort to operationalise principles of equity, of CBDR-RC principle, of transparency in evaluating performance in achieving targets but equally in the level of financial and technological support provided by developed countries to developing countries.
 - With the absence of the US in the post-Paris deliberations, the opposition to these measures is likely to diminish. It is the US which has pressed for “equal commitments” as against the CBDR principle and for intrusive evaluation without the flexibilities recognised under the agreement.
2. **India must reject any demand for re-negotiation** in order to keep the US within the agreement’s fold. It is better for the US to be isolated in this case; the argument that as the world’s leading economy and second largest emitter, the US should be kept within the tent should be rejected. Every such effort, since the Bali Action Plan was adopted in 2007, led to a race to the bottom in terms of the nature of commitments and strict compliance procedures originally envisaged under the original UNFCCC. A further dilution to an already anaemic agreement would make it a complete farce.

3. India should explore opportunities to revive a coalition of emerging economies, including China (e.g. **BASIC**), to ensure that the ongoing multilateral negotiations to impart substantive content and to spell out specific measures elaborating the general provisions of the agreement, adhere to the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC.
- BASIC in the run-up to the Copenhagen Climate Summit (2009) had succeeded in forestalling the US and Western attempts to eviscerate the UNFCCC and shift the burden of tackling climate change on to the shoulders of the developing countries.
 - However, subsequently China began cutting bilateral deals with the US rather than working together with other emerging economies. Now that the US has abandoned ship, perhaps the Chinese may see merit in reviving the BASIC coalition to ensure that the Paris agreement remains aligned with the UNFCCC and that the principle of equity remains the bedrock of international efforts to combat climate change.

Source Channel

[Navroz Dubash - Trumping the climactic exit](#) (June 2017)

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

In practical terms, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement is an enormous setback to effective climate action.

- As the largest historical emitter and the second-largest current emitter of greenhouse gases, the U.S. has a huge role to play in reducing emissions. Meeting a two degree temperature limit target just got much harder.
- The US also has obligations to provide finance and technology support to developing countries, from which it will now walk away.
- Other, smaller countries, less responsible for the problem, could justifiably now wonder why they should act when the U.S. has chosen to abdicate responsibility.

Three silver linings:

- i. This was the second-worst, not the worst, outcome. More damaging would have been the other option Mr. Trump was reportedly considering: stay in the Paris Agreement, but substantially lower the U.S. pledge.
 - Sanctifying a weaker U.S. pledge would have violated the principle of 'progression' that lies at the heart of the Paris Agreement. While countries may also mimic the U.S. in walking away, the political cost of doing so is much higher than lowering a pledge, and so a domino effect is less likely.
- ii. The U.S. exit reduces the likelihood that the Americans will play a destructive role in the further elaboration of the agreement's mechanisms.
- iii. The U.S. exit makes more transparent the political stakes on climate change in the U.S., and is more likely to force a national conversation in that country on where its interests lie.

Post-Paris Conference of Parties (CoP)

- i. **COP 22 - Marrakesh (2016)**: A focal issue - Water scarcity, water cleanliness, and water-related sustainability.
 - The ways in which the Paris Agreement will be applied, as well as the agenda for negotiations, were on the agenda for COP22.
- ii. **COP 23 - Bonn, Germany (2017)**
 - Although COP23 focused primarily on technical details of the Paris Agreement, it was the first conference of the parties take place after President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the agreement.
 - COP23 concluded with what was called the 'Fiji Momentum for Implementation,' which outlined the steps that need to be taken in 2018 to make the Paris Agreement operational

and launched the [Talanoa Dialogue](#) - a process designed to help countries enhance and implement their NDCs by 2020.

- The Pacific concept of “Talanoa” - storytelling that leads to consensus-building and decision-making. To allow for participants to share their stories in an open and inclusive environment, devoid of blame, in the hopes that that others can learn and benefit from their ideas and experiences.

iii. **COP 24 - Katowice, Poland (2018) - to be held on 3-14 December 2018.**

Conclusion

Routine engagement of the States is crucial to India’s climate action commitments.

- Meeting national climate targets demands that, both national and State plans be periodically reassessed and reviewed. A transparent framework for review, audit and monitoring of GHG emissions is needed. As State capacities vary significantly, the principle of CBDR should be applied to allocate mitigation targets in different States, based on the principle of equity.
- States have enormous mitigation potential, but the evidence pertaining to its effectiveness is still scarce. Therefore, India must look towards creating knowledge action networks and partnerships under both national and State action plan frameworks.
- Kerala has taken the lead to build such a knowledge network funded by the National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change.

Shyam Saran - Is There A Need For A Paris Agreement Between Governments And Citizens?

We need a Citizens’ Charter on Climate Change in which participants voluntarily pledge practical actions for their part as citizens, families, localities and civil society groups, to promote a more sustainable lifestyle.

Modern societies treat nature as a dark force to be conquered and subjugated through technology to serve our material needs and aspirations. It is this value system and mindset that lie at the heart of the climate change challenge.

- The products we design, produce and consume reflect our **preference for disposability over durability.**
- We **rate novelty higher than reliability.**
- Our consumer markets are based on **use and discard.**
- Our **production processes are linear** and once-through, using raw materials to produce finished goods with **huge waste inherent in the system.**
- Affluence is associated with excess. **Our development model must be resource-frugal.**

Vice President Venkaiah Naidu Speech - In "***Prithvi Suktam***", the hymn to the Mother Earth, the ancient Indian seers have said:

"May whatever is decided in assemblies of men, in villages and towns, be in accordance with your rules, not contrary to them, O Mother;

May we have the good sense to perform only those actions that will keep the waters of the earth pure and unpolluted;

May we, the children of Mother Earth, have the wisdom to speak to each other pleasantly and in a manner that is understood well, in spite of our different tongues and cultures;

May our interaction among ourselves and Mother Earth be harmonious."

CONCEPTS IN IP

II CONCEPT OF POWER

Qn: Discuss the determinants of power. What is the difference between determinants of power & elements of power.

Introduction:

o IP has been dominated by REALIST paradigm.

For Realists, IP can be described/defined as struggle for power.

Acc-to. Morgenthau - "whatever be the ultimate end,

Power is always the immediate end"

o Thus POWER is the more central concept in IP.

Power is traditionally defined as Ability of states to influence other states. Power is always a Relational concept, Relative concept and Compelling in nature.

⇒ The Elements of Power can be discussed as following:

① GEOGRAPHY

- Most static element

- We can change our friends but not our neighbours

- we can change history but not Geography

a) Size - always big is not must Ex: JAPAN

b) Location - It is said that USA is what it is not because of who they are but because of WHERE they are.

- c) Topography
- d) Resources
- e) Demography

(2) POLITICAL FACTORS

If a country is politically stable, there is a domestic consensus on FP, it becomes the element of strength.

(3) SOCIAL FACTORS / STRUCTURE

It is easier to make FP decisions if social composition is HOMOGENOUS.

If society is heterogenous, it becomes difficult:

Ex: India couldnot have a sound policy towards ISRAEL for long because of domestic compulsions, the sentiments of minorities.

(4) LEADERSHIP FACTOR

Though structural realists eliminate the Personality Factor, yet leadership does play a role.

KAUTILYA, one of the earliest scholars on GEO-POLITICS, gave the theory of ELEMENTS OF STATE called Saptanga Theory.

✓ He calls king as 'Nabi' or 'Centre'. A strong king can convert even the weak elements of Sovereignty into elements of strength. (Give ex of strong leaders & decisions)

⑤ INTELLIGENCE FACTOR

Strength of countries like

* USA * RUSSIA * ISRAEL * BRITAIN

Comes from highly professional Intelligence bodies.

Ex: CIA, KGB

⑥ TECHNOLOGY FACTOR

Technology itself has become determinant of power.


To some extent technology has reduced the importance of Geography.

⑦ ECONOMIC STATUS

⑧ MILITARY STATUS

⇒ Determinants of Power:

Elements of power become determinants of power only when countries can make skillful use of elements.



⇒ Measurement of Power:

Since countries do not disclose their Real status in case of military capabilities, it is difficult to calculate the amount of power exactly.

However, it does make sense for countries to measure their own power & power of others. (Eco-GDP, ...)

On basis of Amount of Power, Countries are categorised as:

Super Power

It is extraordinary power. Ex: USA

Other countries, even in combination cannot defeat Superpower.

Great Power

Ex: RUSSIA ; CHINA ; BRITAIN ; FRANCE (UNSC)

The countries which are capable of defending their interests on their own.



Middle Powers

Ex: INDIA ; ISRAEL ; VIETNAM ; PAKISTAN ; IRAN ; ITALY ; NK

Countries which can defend themselves in coalition with others.

Small Powers

All countries are called as powers out of Respect.

Ex: BHUTAN ; MALDIVES ; SRI LANKA . .

TYPES OF POWERS

Qn: which type of power has greater significance in 21st Century.

There are 2 forms of Power:

* HARD POWER ^{Eto} Carrots & ^{Mil} Sticks — Concrete

* SOFT POWER Cultural & Ideological — Frangible

Comparison btwn Hard & Soft Power

i) Materialistic; Resource Intense	i) Non-materialistic
ii) Concrete	ii) Frangible
iii) Compelling in nature	iii) Relies on consent
iv) At disposal of state (use it any time)	iv) It is dispersed among civil society institutions (x as & when req.)
v) Can be acquired in short time	v) Takes long time to build.



Traditionally, REALISTS — more weightage to Hard power.

However LIBERALS like Joseph Nye held that importance of hard power has declined considerable in 21st century because of COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE.

One of the reasons for USA's hegemony decline is greater reliance on hard power.

However, later on, NYE modified his views and accepted that Soft power alone may not work.

He gave concept of Smart Power, popularised by H. CLINTON.

HILLARY CLINTON

We cannot work with 19th Century concepts now.

There is a need for skillful use of Eco, Military, Cultural and diplomatic powers.

OBAMA

His FP was based on 3Ds

3Ds — Defence ; Diplomacy ; Development.

NYE defined Smart power as an approach which underscores the necessity of strong Military power but invest heavily in Institutions, Partnerships & ALLIANCES.

J.NYE is concerned about rise of SHARP POWER as an alternative to Soft Power.

Sharp power → represents power of:

- Authoritarian states
- Propaganda

It aims to attack the credibility of western liberal democracies.

JOHN CHIPMAN

* He has given concept of FAST POWER.

→ Acc. to him, SPEED has become the determinant of power.

→ What matters in 21st Century is not the HEFT but how much a country is AGILE, ADAPTIVE.

→ The rule of the present world is not 'Survival of the Fittest' rather 'Survival of Fastest'

Ex: INDIA NEA - "Fast Track Diplomacy"

Polarity of Power Thesis

It is given by STRUCTURAL REALISTS like:

- * Kenneth Waltz
- * Mearsheimer

What is the thesis?

Acc. to them, BIPOLAR WO { Most stable
Least Dangerous.

What does Polarity denote?

Distribution of power across the Globe.

So far we have seen 3 Models:

⇒ Multipolar: — Most unstable; Frequent wars; Worst

- In a situation of multipolarity, greater confusion prevails, more fingers are on the trigger button.

- Difficult to keep watch.

- Greater chances of even accidental war (Nuclear)

⇒ Unipolarity: — Most unstable; and Worst (1991-2001)

- Single hegemon will overstretch

- Free riders (like China) will take the advantage

- There will be relatively decline of power of hegemon.

Why unipolarity will go?

When there is a single super power, the country may suffer from MEGALOMANIA (i.e.) will think that there are no limitations on its power & will itself destroy the order, which it has built, by taking unilateral actions. Ex: USA undermined UNSC in case of 2nd war in Iraq, in 2003.

⇒ Bipolarity: — Most stable; Best

- ✓ Strategic balance between the 2 super powers.

- ✓ It is easy to keep watch on actions.

✓ the & super powers will contain Anarchy in their own zone of Influence.

Qn: Does India support Multipolar world Order? YES
why India supports it, if so?

i) India believes that it can exercise Strategic Autonomy.

ii) what does Multipolar world means?

Decline of USA;

Primarily rise of CHINA; then rise of RUSSIA, IRAN, INDIA.

It is questionable as to why India supports the rise of CHINA despite the fact that China is the biggest security threat & presently US & INDIA are strategic partners.

BOOK

India on High Table of Diplomacy.

Does India support Multipolar South Asia?

NO. India favours Indian hegemony in South Asia.
It does not want China in South Asia.

Y India wants China out of SAARC?
Foolish. atleast w/ China it will work.

CONCEPT OF BALANCE OF POWER

Qm: Discuss the relevance of concept of B.O.P in 21st century.

Oldest concept.

Treated as MAXIM (i.e) on par with fundamental law.

David Hume called it COMMON SENSE

Acc. to him, BOP will remain relevant so long as common sense is relevant.

Feature of Westphalian WO.

Militaristic concept.

The 1st formal recognition of BOP was in 1713 in Treaty of Utrecht. The famous historian A.P. Taylor mentions 1848-1914 as 'GOLDEN AGE OF BOP'

European countries formally adopted concept in 1815, Vienna Congress which has given rise to CONCERT OF EUROPE where countries of Europe gave guarantees to ensure BOP so that Peace is maintained. The concert of Europe gave ~100 years of Peace to Europe (Till 1914).

BRITISHERS were the masters in the art of BOP. It was the Hallmark of British FP.

Hegemony - USA
BOP - BRITAIN

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MAIN ASSUMPTIONS OF BOP

- (i) It is based on the working of Westphalian World Order (WWO).
- (ii) SOVEREIGNTY is the sacred concept of WWO, defined in terms of TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. Since land is a source of wealth, acquiring the land of neighbours is a conventional wisdom among nations.
- (iii) In WWO, the structure of IP is ANARCHICAL.
- (iv) Anarchy compels states to acquire POWER.
- (v) The means to acquire power is:
 - ARMS RACE or ◦ ALLIANCES
- (vi) War is a Recurrent feature in BOP system, one of the reasons why WOODROW WILSON wanted to find alternatives to BOP.
- (vii) WAR in itself is a technique of BOP.
- (viii) The rule of the game is whenever any state tries to gain Preponderance (extra-ordinary) - like FRANCE under Napoleon - all states will have to come together to balance the state so that it does not establish Hegemony. WAR is the ultimate way to maintain the Balance.
- (ix) In BOP system, no actor is ousted from the system. The defeated state is brought back in the system.


BOP

- Exclusively MILITARISTIC
- Feature of WWO
- Murky concept.

Qn1: Relevance - 21st Cen

Qn2: Ambiguity.

BOP - MAXIM (Law)



(x) BOP shows that there are NO PERMANENT FRIENDS / ENEMIES.

⇒ the techniques of BOP include:

- ARMS RACE
- DISARMAMENT
- PARTITIONING the Territory (Size matters, Big state - Big aspirations)
- Establishment of BUFFER STATES, so that the 2 major powers do not come in direct confrontation against each other.
- Disarmament of defeated country & imposition of Reparations to weaken it further.

⇒ BOP despite being recognised as the Fundamental Law, is seen as Murky concept. There is a vagueness in the way Balance is explained. Sometimes $A = B$ is called Balance.

◦ Sometimes $A - B = \text{Remaining}$ is called Balance.

> Similarly there are different ways in which scholars describe BOP.

* MORGENTHAU

He summarized 4 Meanings of BOP:

- ① A policy aimed at establishing a certain state of affairs.
- ② An actual state of Affairs.
- ③ An approximately equal distribution of power.
- ④ Any distribution of power.

* ERNST HAAS

He has given 8 MEANINGS of BOP

- ① Equilibrium resulting from equal distribution of power among states.
- ② Equilibrium resulting from unequal distribution of power among states.
- ③ Equilibrium resulting from the Domination of one state, which acts as Balancer. For ex: BRITAIN.
- ④ A system providing for Relative STABILITY & Peace.
- ⑤ A system characterized by INSTABILITY & War.
- ⑥ A way of describing POWER POLITICS.
- ⑦ A universal law of History.
- ⑧ A guide for FP makers.

RELEVANCE OF BOP IN 21st CENTURY

Why there is a question mark on the relevance when it is seen as the most fundamental law?

II The relevance of BOP is called into question 1st by the LIBERALS / IDEALISTS like Woodrow Wilson. Acc. to him, BOP is prone to war. BOP can convert any local war between 2 countries into World War because countries are linked in alliances. Hence, it is said that 'BOP gives protection against Measles but create conditions for Plague' - a bigger epidemic.

Even Pt. NEHRU was a critic of BOP. He described BOP as 'Nervous State of Peace' (i.e) there is always a fear of war as countries possess Nuclear weapon.

Hence W. Wilson wanted to end the reliance of countries on BOP and gave the concept of COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

Even Nehru had huge faith on collective security.

However Collective security could never emerge as a viable alternative to BOP so that states leave their reliance on power politics.

[2] Theoretical Modifications:

BOP, as a concept has been either modified or challenged by the scholars of different schools of thought because of its Inadequacy.

i) Modification by REALISTS

* STEPHAN WALT gave concept of 'Balance of Threat'.

→ Acc. to him countries actually balance not power but threat. The extent to which country will go for building its power will rely on its Threat perception.

→ He suggested 4 conditions which may determine Threat Perception.

- i) Aggregate power of enemy country
- ii) Geographical proximity
- iii) offensive Capacity
- iv) offensive Intentions

= Thucydides trap

* KENNETH ORGANSKI has given 'Power Transition Theory'

Acc. to this, War happens more not when there is BOP rather when Power transitions take place. When a new country start acquiring power, it makes other countries insecure.

Normally war is started by countries which are more INSECURE & WEAKER.

ii) Modification by SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS

Social Constructivists suggests that BOP theory overlooks the role played by NORMS & VALUES. They overemphasize on Material structure - Here the material structure is Anarchy, but it is the result of norms & values that anarchy is interpreted on specific way giving rise to POWER POLITICS.

As suggested by ALEXANDER WENDT - "Anarchy is what states make of it"

iii) Contemporary Modifications

In contemporary times, scholars have given the concept of 'ASYMMETRICAL BALANCING'.

The traditional BOP theory only includes states as actors. In present times TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS have to be included as security threats. Since there is an asymmetry btwn state & non-state actors, this concept has been added.

iv) Soft Balancing by Realists

Realist scholars have also added the concept of SOFT BALANCING to traditional concept of Hard Balancing - Denotes Militaristic approach while Soft Balancing denotes Political approach.

When there is a single super power, other countries can't check super power militarily but from platforms like UNSC, they can form a coalition of like minded countries to check the actions of single super power.

v) Theoretically, Nuclear weapons also challenged the need of BOP.

* BERNARD BROODIE

Acc.to him, states should try to gain 'NUCLEAR DETERRANCE' rather than BOP.

[3] Cease of Ideal Conditions

BOP has been questioned because the Ideal conditions of operation of BOP has ceased to exist.
What are ideal conditions?

(i) Westphalian World Order rather than Anarchical society or complex Interdependence.

(ii) BOP as a concept makes sense in Regional situations, Politics at present has become not only International but Global.

GEO CENTRIC
GLOBAL POLITICS

Between nations
across world

ind. Non state
actors also

It would not be possible to imagine the working of BOP Globally.

- (iii) BOP operates on MULTIPOLAR situations, it neither operates on the state of UNIPOLARITY nor BIPOLARITY.
- (iv) BOP is based on CONVENTIONAL warfare. The NUCLEAR weapons and the technological warfare may cause the BOP go into irrelevance. The emergence of nuclear weapon has been a serious challenge to BOP.
- (v) In some regions like WESTERN EUROPE, BOP has become Redundant because of emergence of security community.
- (vi) Since, in present times, the challenge to the security of states comes from NON-STATE ACTORS, the non-state actors can act from any state, failed states being the most fertile soil for them, if attack comes from non-state actors capturing a country which is friendly, it would not be easy to initiate war because that sovereign may not be responsible for it as it is the NSA & also it will affect the friendly relation with that nation.

However it does not mean that BOP, as a concept altogether is irrelevant.

DAVID HUME rightly held that BOP is a COMMON SENSE. He held that so long common sense remains relevant, BOP will remain relevant.

It is to be noted that non-state actors are actually the predators. It is true that nuclear weapons have challenged the importance of conventional weapons but it is also true that nuclear weapons are not to be used. Hence, the importance of conventional weapons will never go out of relevance. Even in 21st century, we can observe nations exercising the Game of BOP.

In which region do we see BOP game?

i) We can see the game of BOP going on in Asia-Pacific.

It is because of the game, the centre of gravity of IP has shifted towards Asia-Pacific. The rise of CHINA has forced USA to go for ASIA REBALANCE/ ASIA-PIVOT POLICY.

→ As a part of this policy, there is a greater deployment of US Marines in this region.

→ The neighbours of CHINA → India • Japan • Australia are going for the formation of Alliances & Quasi-alliances. - EX: QUAD

→ Acc. to scholars, there is a high probability of CONVENTIONAL WAR between India & China as part of USA's policy of:
• Buck passing (or) • Bait & Bleed.

→ All major countries are acquiring conventional weapons, most also have NFU policy.

ii) Similarly EASTERN & SOUTHERN EUROPE, in neighbourhood of Russia may also emerge as a Theatre of war.

US-CHINA war is also predicted on basis of Power Transition & Thucydides Trap.

→ The countries are going for military exercises on a big way. However, in Europe 'DETERRENCE' as a concept will have greater relevance considering neither Russia nor NATO has NFU approach.

(Middle East - Cob web / complex Interdep - Non state actors -

US Hegemony - So no BOP issue - Ideally only in S. ASIA PACIFIC, US even renamed FP as ASIA REBALANCE)

[2] CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

⇒ collective security is an alternative to BOP.

It is a LIBERAL approach.

Though it is alternative to BOP, it is based on idea of BOP.

Both BOP & collective security are methods of MANAGEMENT OF POWER.

Both concepts are based on the view that ^{greater} power is ANTIDOTE to Power.

In both concepts, sovereignty of states is treated as sacred and war is seen as a means to ensure sovereignty.

We can say collective security as 'INSTITUTIONALISED FORM OF BOP'.

BOP acts in the state of Anarchy whereas collective security can come into existence only when some International organisation exist. It is operated through International organisation like ION or UN.

⇒ BOP is an Ad-Hoc concept, whereas

collective security is Institutionalised concept.

There is uncertainty on BOP but there is Theoretical certainty in collective security. Ex: when Napoleon was destroying the WWO, BOP as a principle did not emerge automatically. It took long time for countries to check rise of Napoleon. Hence there is uncertainty as to whether BOP will emerge or not.

⇒ BOP may be more relevant for Great powers but collective security is highly useful for smaller & poorer countries.

They can escape from Arms race on necessity to form alliances.

Collective Security is Conducive for peace because it reduces Arms Race.

Collective security as a concept continues to be seen as too idealistic. Neither under LON nor under UN, it could be operationalised successfully.

It has not been successful in ending the arms race. Lack of faith in collective security let countries to go for NUCLEAR DETERRANCE.

Collective Security should not be confused with Collective Defence.

Ex: NATO → } Collective Defence Institution
Warsaw Pact → } Only Members ; Defined enemy
(Defunct) CSTO → } + SEATO, CENTO

LON → } Collective Security Institutions
UN → } Universal ; Neutral - enemy not defined.
SCO → }

UN-1945
USSR - Nov-1949
So UN's purpose
lost: US lost
interest

Collective Security

- Universal
- Neutral - Enemy is not defined.

Any country can approach UN.

Collective Defence

- Regional. Meant only for members
- Enemy is known in advance.

Views of India:

- India always opposed Collective Defence pacts (Hence, NAM)
- But India always supported Collective Security.
- For India, collective Defence pacts undermine the faith in Collective security.

Views Of USA

There is no contradiction because Collective Defence is the practical way to operationalise collective security.

It does not contradict UN charter which allows countries the Right to self Defence.

WORKING OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Under LON:

It could not be operationalised because of following reasons,

- US was out
- Russia was out
- Britain & France had No Faith
- Countries followed Policy of Appeasement of Fascist powers as they considered Communism as a bigger threat.
- collective Security was a new concept & there were flaws in the way it was conceptualised.
- In LON, all countries had Veto power. It was practically not possible to get consensus of all countries.
- collective security as such is based on false suggestions. It assumes as if International Peace is the aim of states. It forgets that National Interest is aim of states.
- Just because one state committed aggression on other state, it does not mean all countries will commit their forces or forget their long term interests.

Under UN:

> UN charter does make some improvement in the procedure of operationalisation. Under UN, consent of only 5 states [P5] is needed. However, the practical experience show even that is not possible.

> Collective security under UN remained paralysed because of 'EAST-WEST CONFLICT' (US vs Russia) countries continued to give primacy towards National Interest over Justice, Peace, Order.

> There are only 2 occasions when collective security could be operationalised under UN:

a) 1950 - KOREAN CRISIS

→ Even in here, it was not operationalised in ideal sense. How? Korean crisis itself was the reflection of Cold war.

→ NK was aggressor

→ NK was supported by CHINA & RUSSIA

→ SK was under the influence of USA. USA was supposed to punish the aggression by NK.

→ USA was successful in getting the permission of collective security from UN only because Russian representative was absent. Russia was boycotting UNSC on issue of Permanent seat for Communist China. (Taiwan was at seat). The moment Russian rep. came to know about resolution, it came back & vetoed. It had stopped collective security. However, USA innovated a new concept - 'Acheson Plan' (or) 'Uniting for Peace Resolution' (UPR)

UPR → In case there is a deadlock in UNSC, GA can authorise collective security by $2/3^{\text{rd}}$ majority.

Russia never accepted the legality of UPR because it has not been the part of UN charter.

Later on, USA could never get support for most of the Resolutions and hence even this route could not work.

It was the failure of collective security that the then SG of UN proposed 'Peace keeping' - Dag Hammarskjöld - to keep the role of UN relevant in its primary purpose. ^{award - India too recipient}
(Peace keeping is not a part of UN charter)

Note: Peace keeping is not a part of UN charter but an extra-constitutional growth.

Difference — Collective Security Vs Peace keeping (Blue helmets)

Part of UN charter

≈ Army → offensive

Authorised by UNSC

Militaristic attack

Extra-constitutional

≈ Policing → Defensive (keep watch)

Authorised by UNSC, but only

with consent of parties in conflict.

Maintain ceasefire till UNSC decides

PK force → Defensive.

[Rajiv Gandhi → Don't pk in SL, LTTE should've gone for multilateral approach]

Poorly implemented PKF mission

Not militaristic

17/11/18

cl-108

IR-4

8-10

11-1-30

> Peace keepers are sent only with consent of parties in conflict, there is no such requirement in case of collective security operations.

> Peace keepers can use force only in SELF-DEFENCE

The main objective of UN is to PREVENT WARS. UNSC could not fulfill the obligation. Hence the only way UN's role remains relevant was through Peace keeping [PK]

INDIA It is to be noted that India has made unparalleled contributions to PK under UN.

India's contribution in PK efforts is one of the strongest basis to demand permanent seat in UNSC. It needs to be emphasized that if any country, whose actions kept UN relevant in UN's core objectives, it is INDIA. Hence, it is a paradox if India is not a permanent member of UNSC.

INDIA'S EFFORTS IN UN Peace keeping:

Note: MEA website → India & UN - update official positions.

India is a founding member of UN.

It has contributed towards PK since beginning.

In 1950 KOREAN CRISIS, India had sent a medical unit & later on provided custodian force for the neutral nations Repatriation Commission meant for exchange of Prisoners of War.

Between 1945-1970, India contributed for:

INDO-CHINA (Vietnam) supervisory Commission deployed in Cambodia, Laos & Vietnam.

India made further contribution in following operations:

UN Emergency Force in GAZA STRIP in 1956.

In CONGO GUINIS 1962-64

In CYPRUS in 1964

After end of Cold War, India continued to provide Armed contingents, Military observers, Medical missions, AF attack helicopters to UN missions.

It has unique achievement of sending ALL WOMEN CONTINGENT in LIBERIA.

Indian Peace keepers have been awarded with
Dag Hammarskjöld Award for their supreme sacrifices.
India's role is primarily as TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRY.
India also provides TRAINING To UN Pks.

The image of Indian Pks is that they have acted in an extremely professional manner.

They are known for Competency & Ability to establish rapport with local populations.

However, in recent times. PK has become not only COMPLEX but also CONTROVERSIAL.

Complexity arise because peace keepers are supposed to work in highly dangerous environment. Post Cold war has witnessed the emergence of civil wars. Non-state actors do not observe norms. Casualties of peace keepers have increased. Hence, some countries are now reluctant to contribute troops.

Controversy arise because of following reasons:

Reluctance on part of developed countries to contribute troops.

Allegation by fund contributing countries against the troop contributing countries w.r.t. Misappropriation of funds.

Some developing countries look at PK as a means to earn Foreign, they have failed to act in a responsible manner. At present, BANGLADESH & PAK have become the leading countries.

PK operations are authorised by UNSC. However, permanent members of UN do not go for involving the troop contributing countries in the consultation process.

What should be India's approach towards PK?

At present India does not show the earlier enthusiasm. The reason being, so far India's contribution did not get the due acknowledgement which it deserves. It is a paradox that India is not a permanent member on UNSC despite making supreme sacrifices.

As peace keeping is becoming more dangerous, developed countries are reluctant to give funds. Hence India does not find strong motivation.

Very recently, CHINA has started playing prominent role in PK operations. It may result into sidelining of India in global affairs.

India is already reluctant to participate in COMBAT operations abroad. Hence India needs to rethink about its growing lukewarm attitude towards PK. It should not happen that over a period of time Indian contributions get diluted & we fail to capitalise on efforts & sacrifices we had already made.

PK also strengthens India's SOFT POWER. India should utilise its growing weight in international affairs to force countries to take adequate reforms as PK is needed more than ever.

Earlier, under OBAMA admin., US has shown interest in PK and proposed INDIA-US partnership in PK operations in AFRICA.

However, TRUMP Govt's approach towards MULTILATERALISM differs from OBAMA administration.

Note: Difference - PK vs RTP (Responsibility To Protect)
w/o consent of parties on basis of HR violations

RTP is a Military operation & comes close to CSO (Collective Security Operation) rather than PK operations.

(UN charter — does not permit action w/h states, only b/w states)

Changing Trends in PK:

PK itself is an evolving concept.

Initially, PK was limited to maintaining CEASEFIRE between parties in conflict.

Ex: UN Military Observer Group for INDIA + PAK.

Since CONGO crisis, PKs are also involved in civil wars.

Over a period of time, PK has also involved PEACE BUILDING efforts (i.e) Reconstruction, Rehabilitation.

PK missions are also becoming MULTI-DISCIPLINARY.

Now members of civil society are also involved bcos they have major role in Reconstruction.

Developed countries have proposed ROBUST PK

Robust Peace keeping

Since attacks against PKs are increasing, developed countries have proposed that PKs should also be allowed to keep offensive arms & to use force in situations other than self defense.

There is an objection to the idea that it will end the distinction & developed countries will send their forces in disguise as PKs.

INDIA'S POSITIONS ON REFORMS IN PK

- (i) Consultation with troop contributing countries
- (ii) More funds & their timely release.
- (iii) Zero Tolerance towards any sort of irresponsible behaviour such as sexual violence, corruption, etc. by PKs.

On: Which is the best example of CSO (collective Sec. Operation) in the history of UN?

GULF WAR I, 1989

When IRAQ invaded KUWAIT. This was the time when UNSC could give effect to the Resolution w/o use of veto by USSR. More than 30 countries participated in the UN operation under the leadership of USA.

The CSO itself symbolised the end of cold war.

After this CSO, there has been no operation which can be called as a CSO.

Overall assessment of Collective Security

Collective Security continues to remain an utopian ideal. So long countries will continue to give priority to their narrow National Interests, it would be difficult to expect the operationalization of CS. It means there will be no End to Arms Race.

[3] CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Qn: Discuss the changing concept of Security & what should be approach of security in 21st century

Qn: Discuss diff. Theories of Security.

Importance of Security

Acc. to HOBBS, Security of life is the most fundamental value as all other values are dependent on it.

Security is also the core concept in theory of IP. We can call IR theories as Security Theories.

Security community

Regional co-op concept
Not related here.

Overt Defence - IRAN
no basis.

BOSNIA

UN protection zones.

There are diff. schools of Security & basic debate among schools is on:

- (i) whose security is important - Territorial or Human
- (ii) security from whom - own state or external/non-state actors.
- (iii) Security of what - life, env, social, cultural...

Types of Security Theories:

1) INSTRUMENTALIST

- o LIBERALS.
 - o MARXIST
 - o REALIST
- } All are instrumentalist theories.

REALISTS → Security can be achieved by acquiring power

LIBERALS → Support Economic Interdependence

MARXISTS → Support End of Capitalism.

2) REFLECTIVIST

They focus on ideas norms o Values o Culture as a means of acquiring security

- > FEMINIST
- > CRITICAL SCHOOL
- > SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST
- > COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

PROMINENT THEORIES OF SECURITY

REALIST THEORY

- ? whose → state centric
- ? whom → From other states (source of insecurity)
- ? Methods → BOP • Diplomacy • Deterrence

LIBERAL THEORY

- ? whose → Both - states & Persons
- ? whom → Reasons of insecurity
 - Anarchy
 - Protectionist policies
 - Limited Interaction
 - Militaristic state
 - Absence of Democracy.
- ? Methods → Liberal Institutionalism
 - Functionalism
 - Security Community
 - Trading state
 - Democratic Peace

MARXIST THEORY

whose → Human

whom Capitalism

Method Revolution against Capitalism

FEMINIST THEORY

whose Human

whom Patriarchy

Method Empowerment of ♀

Bringing women perspective

Bringing Ethics into Politics.

CRITICAL SCHOOL / EMANCIPATORY SCHOOL

Andrew Linklater

whose Human

whom State & Capitalism

Methods End foruterial boundaries

Promote Moral boundaries

Grass roots democracy.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS

whose Both-Human & State

whom From way we think

Methods Communications

changing norms

COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

Bary Buzan - Read his articles

→ Acc. to him, Security is a SPEECH ACT.

Any issue is a matter of security or not depends on "How we talk about it"

Ex 1: General Impression on India is that

TERRORISM is the biggest security threat.

However, even so held that every year more no. of ppl loose their lives on Road Accidents.

Thus terrorism is the biggest security threat is the SECURITISATION by policy makers in India.

Ex 2: TRUMP in his election speeches tried to

Securitize Muslims as a security threat.

Since end of CW, ethnic relations have been Securitized on most of the countries causing INTRA-STATE conflicts.

→ Thus, in most of the situations, govt, trying to divert the attention of people from real issues, Securitize some issues.

⇒ BUZAN suggests that while concluding about Security concerns, we should focus upon:

- (i) who is speaking
- (ii) what are they speaking about
- (iii) whom are they speaking to.

Securitisation

Post-modernism

Security is a Speech Act

"How we talk about it"

Terrorism Vs Corruption

SC: more ppl died in road accidents than in Terrorism.

Any issue can be a non-issue unless it is talked about.

Govt. can securitize any topic - social construction.

→ To divert attention any issue can be made into security issue by Speech Act.

→ Thus, Copenhagen school comes near to the views of SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS that 'Anarchy is what states make of it'?

→ Buzan has also suggested approach of security policies in 21st Century:

⇒ Security has become a MULTI-DIMENSIONAL concept. Now we cannot compartmentalise • State security from Human security
• Economic " from Ecological "
• National " from Regional/Global "

⇒ Any Security Policy should have 5 PILLARS.

- ① Military
- ② Political
- ③ Economic
- ④ Social
- ⑤ Ecological

Further Reference

- > Shanghai dialogue
- > Munich Sec. Conference
 - ↳ Annual report on sec. situation
 - update with these -
 - ✓ Middle East
 - ✓ US-RUSSIA relations.

[4] CONCEPT OF DETERRRANCE

Qn: Discuss the logic behind theory of deterrence, the types of deterrence doctrines & relevance of deterrence in 21st century.

* Deterrence

The term comes from latin word 'De terre' which means 'To frighten' the potential adversary from attacking.
What requisites for Deterrence?

Deterrence is a PSYCHOLOGICAL concept.

It assumes that actors are RATIONAL.

It will work only when the adversary believes in the credibility of Deterrence.

Adversary needs to be communicated that, if it prefers to attack or start war, the victory will come at the cost which is not worth paying (in case victory comes), thus preventing the adversary from taking action.

Deterrence is an old concept,
Traditionally used for conventional weapons.

Now, it is associated with Nu. weapons.
Hence, no. of times Deterrence is seen as an alternative to BOP.

PAK-IND	
Bad Guy	Good Guy
↑ Bargaining power	Can't threaten with Nukes
child with loaded gun	Responsible actor

The concept of deterrence is developed by GAME THEORISTS. Prominent scholars supporting deterrence include:

- * Bernard Brodie
- * Herman Kahn
- * Mearsheimer
- * Thomas Schelling

Theory of Deterrence has developed with changing postures of Superpowers esp. USA in context of its security.

It was realised that USA's security cannot be simply dependent on conventional weapons. Conventional weapons can convert local wars into world wars. If Nu. Deterrence is developed, it can ensure that major war is avoided.

USA's Security Policy during CW was based on Deterrence. The only way to avoid war with USSR was to achieve 'MAD'

MAD can be called as

It is also called BALANCE OF TERROR.

Cold war

US vs USSR

Vietnam

MAD - 2nd strike

NUTS - 1st strike

↳ NND - offensive
- Very expensive
primarily US-MAD

↳ Massive retaliation

NU-TRIAD
{

 Air
Land
Sea

}

EISENHOWER-MAD

KENNEDY - FR

MAD - Strategic

FR - Tactical also

→ short distance also

→ long distance
+ civilians

Extended Deterrence

Initially - Conventional

Now - Nukes

NUTS - actually not possible - no country can entirely destroy other in 1st strike

✓ NFU?

US, even, is not capable of it

MAD was dependent on the capacity of a country to convince the other that starting a war is suicide.

The idea of MAD is based on developing 2nd strike capability. (i.e) Surviving the attack & RETALIATING and inflict unacceptable damage (killing civilians)

MAD requires the development of TRIAD.

Some scholars in USA suggested to pursue the policy of NUTS - Nuclear Utilisation Target Selection.

It also denotes developing 1st strike capacity. But, it requires huge investments & may push countries towards the dangerous arms race.

During CW, we've also seen that USA under KENNEDY shifted towards FR - Flexible Response (i.e) Ability to respond in both manners:

STRATEGICAL → Long Range weapons, on civilians

TACTICAL → Short Range Nu-war heads, in battle field

At present PAK is developing tactical weapons HATEF Missile

PAKISTAN - HATEF Missile

INDIA - PRAHAR Missile.

Countries can have :

> DIRECT Deterrence

> EXTENDED Deterrence

↳ JAPAN & KOREA - under USA's extended Deterrence

Relevance of Deterrence in 21st Century

why a qm. mark on relevance?

The emergence of COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE (weakens scope for hard power)

Main security threat comes from NON-STATE actors.

Realists however never accept that Nu-weapons have lost relevance.

2:45-5 K. WALTZ believes that Nu-weapon is the factor that made cold war remain cold.

He & Mearsheimer support SELECTIVE PROLIFERATION (i.e.) Proliferation among western countries will add to their security as they are Democracies - (i.e.) they will heed to public opinion - Ist GEN.

On other hand IInd GENERATION Nu-states cannot maintain Nu-safety and security & may not be accountable to public's opinion.

LIBERALS however believes that Nu. weapon needs to be eliminated. the urgency has increased because of fear of proliferation into hands of Non-state actors.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST scholar Noma Tannenwald suggests that Nuclear Taboo has come into existence. According to her, main reason USA could not use Nu. against VIETNAM was bco of development of taboo against the use of Nu. weapons. Hence, it is not possible for countries to use Nu. weapons. Hence, those countries which do not have Nukes should not feel insecure rather should support the construction of NORMS which STRENGTHEN NU. TABOO further.

Henry Kissinger also does not support reliance on Nu. deterrence because deterrence will apply only in case of national actors. According to him, countries should find other means to reduce the security threats.

Though it is widely believed that the relevance of Nu. weapons have declined in post CW situation, yet major countries like USA, RUSSIA, FRANCE continue to rely on Nu. deterrence in their security policy.

USA coming out of

ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty

INF (Intermediate

indicate New Arms Race.

The Nu-Posture Review ^{refer} released by Trump admin. in Feb Jan, 2018 clearly show that US continue to rely on N. weapons for its security as well as security of its allies

Refer to: article "Nuclear deterrence is over-rated" by Ramesh Thakur - "THE HINDU".

→ Article by Rakesh Sood - 16/11/18

[5] CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST (NI)

Qn: Discuss Morgenthau's theory of NI & to what extent it is appropriate to suggest that NI is pseudo theory.

FP is dominated by REALIST school of thought. US's core NI

Acc. to Morgenthau, father of realism:

NI is the prime motivation of FP.

NI is a highly dynamic concept.

POWER is a means to secure the NI.

NI itself can be described in terms of Power.

- Peace in Mid. East
- Freedom of Nav. in Asia-Pacific

2 Types of NI - Morgenthau:

He has categorised NI into 2 Types:

① CORE NI

② VARIABLE NI

Fundamental;

Continuity with change in FP.

Don't change

Continuity in FP

Scholars like ROBINSON have given classification

PRIMARY

SECONDARY

PERMANENT

VARIABLE

GENERAL

SPECIFIC

He has also given the ways in which countries protect their NI:

BOP

Deterrence

Diplomacy

Int'l law & Organisations

Propaganda

Intelligence

Ideology

Incentives

Note: INDIAN Version of NI:

6 Fold Policy

4 Fold policy

⇒ Though NI is a core concept, yet it is called as PSEUDO theory.

> The prime reason is - it is highly SUBJECTIVE concept.

* NI, as a concept has been criticised by MARXIST scholars.

(i) The 1st theoretical analysis of NI from Marxist perspective was done by: CHARLES BEARD. In his words:

"If citizens have to support the govt. which prosecutes them, soldiers are to die for it, FPs have to conform to it, what better term it can be other than NI"

(ii) NI is a pseudo theory → 1st declared by Raymond Aron. He called NI pseudo because it is:

- Vague
- Subjective - meaning changes acc. to context
- Ambiguity in concept hinders the formulation of acceptable theory of NI.

(iii) Joseph Frankel: Any search for theory of NI is useless. It is used in variety of ways for variety of purposes, there is no single meaning & content.

(iv) BURCHILL SCOTT

Despite the wide use of concept, theory lacks any substance.

(v) MOHAMMED YUNUS

NI is a means to promote the interest of Elites. In his Book: On Theory of NI, he has shown how army in PAK describes its interests as NI.

CONCEPT OF SECURITY DILEMMA

One of the core concepts of REALISM which is based on WWO. This concept has been developed by following scholars:

JOHN HERZ

He used the HOBBSIAN theory of SON to develop security dilemma, a vicious cycle of INSECURITY which makes power politics a permanent feature.

ROBERT SERVIS

He has developed 'offence Defence Theory' to explain the severity of security dilemma.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISTS

They believe Security Dilemma is because of Anarchy being interpreted on a specific way.

They suggest COMMUNICATION can address security dilemma.

GEORGE SORENSON

He has given the concept of Insecurity Dilemma. → It suggests that, in 21st century nations suffer from INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS - Civil war, ethnic conflicts, (mout.s) Non state actors, failure of states (failed states)

ANITAV ACHARYA

He also believe that security dilemma may not be a relevant concept for 3rd world states - (sub-altern Realism)

HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY

* ROBERT GILPIN

* Charles Kindleberger

Thesme: Justification of Hegemony

Why hegemony is justified? To maintain Peace & Order in the International society. It is based on the assumptions that peace requires some global policeman. (i.e) Some state which can establish:

(i) Rule of law → By establishing the norms. It basically means establishing LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER.

(ii) Actor should have willingness & capacity to ensure that other actors observe the norms. It should be in a position to punish those who destroy liberal world order.

(iii). 2 Qualities of Hegemon

✓ CAPACITY ✓ WILLINGNESS

Ex: Till WW-II, USA did not have willingness, though it had capacity.

Examples of Hegemons

a) Up till WW-II — G. Britain 'Pax Britannica'

b) After WW-II — USA 'Pax Americana'

The term 'PAX' denotes → DICTATED PEACE.

the country which control the Ocean controls the world
— Both are Island nations (kind of) ~ WITH NAVAL POWER
Both are Liberal Capitalist nations

Span of Hegemony

Normally it continues for 100 years, after which it starts declining because:

Hegemon overstretches

Free rider takes advantage

Why countries will accept the Hegemon?

Hegemon provides Order & security.

Why hegemon would accept to become one?

Since hegemon dictates the rules, it is going to benefit by the system.

Thus, Hegemony denotes LEADERSHIP.

Hegemonic stability theory is a REALIST theory which accepts the liberal int'l order.

The REALIST THEORY (RT) of Hegemony is different from the GRAMSCIAN theory (GT)

GT looks Ideology & Culture as bases of Hegemony
RT include military & Economic power.

ROLE OF TRANS-NATIONAL ACTORS

TYPES OF ACTORS

- ① State Actors
- ② International Actors
- ③ Trans-national actors.

NGOs, MNCs, Terrorist organisations

TRANS NATIONAL ACTORS are NSA (Non-state Actors) having operations beyond borders.

Do they have a role in IP? Matter of Debate.

REALISTS

Realism → state centric view.

For them, even Terr. orgs are proxies.

LIBERALS MARXISTS FEMINISTS

they recognise the role but there is diff of opinion.

LIBERALS → see the +ve role on bringing development

MARXISTS → look @ MNCs as exploiters

FEMINISTS → also consider MNCs as exploiters

why there is a role of NSA?

- Growth of Society Centric World

- Growth of Interdependence

which models recognise the role of NSA?

- ✓ Cob web Model

- ✓ Complex Interdependence

- ✓ 3-D chess model

ANALYSIS ON ROLE OF MNCs

Realists do not recognise their role.

Liberals appreciate their role but consider it as a relatively recent phenomenon.

Marxists & outsize realist approach. When realists do not recognise MNCs as actors, they are actually diverting our attentions from the activities of MNC.

Similarly, liberals promote FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS.

MNCs have resulted into continuation of DRA

Drain of wealth

Development of Underdevelopment

They didnot adopt SUSTAINABLE dev.t approach.

Sometimes, MNCs carry forward the interest of their states & sometimes states carry forward the interest of their MNCs.

MNCs have contributed towards the failure of Democracy by SABOTAGE. They've toppled the democratically elected govt. in LATIN AMERICA, MIDDLE EAST and installed puppet regimes.

Now, even developing countries like INDIA & CHINA are having their own MNCs which may not follow sustainable path in AFRICA & LATIN AMERICA resulting into huge Resentment.

MNCs are extremely powerful forces. The budget of some of MNCs is bigger than GDP of many small countries.

MARXISTS trace the role of MNCs till 17th Century.

Ex: EIC can be seen as an example, which est. its own Empire.

ANALYSIS ON ROLE OF NGOS

REALISTS

Don't give importance

LIBERALS

Recognise as +ve agents

UN CHARTER

Recognise as consultative bodies attached to

ECOSOC - Article 72 of UN charter

Like MNCs, even the annual budget of some of the trans-national NGOs is many times bigger than GDP of many small countries.

MARXISTS

their role is not new. Along with EIC, came CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES. The role of missionaries was to build the SOFT POWER.

NGOs & MNCs work in close Nexus.

MNCs - channelise the CSR fund to these NGOs.

Along with MNCs, NGOs have been accused of attempting Regime change.

Ex: Recently RUSSIA has ousted USAID from its territory.

ANALYSIS ON ROLE OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS (TO)

There is a role of TO in WW-I which started with Assassination of Prince of AUSTRIA by SERBIAN extremists.

Since the creation of ISRAEL & Failure of Arab nations in direct war, there has been the growth of TO attempting Proxy wars.

PLO (Palestine Liberation Orgⁿ) was initially a terrorist organisation.

Initially MIDDLE EAST was affected by TO but now it has become a GLOBAL PHENOMENA.

Sponsoring TO has become a part of FP of many nations.

NOAM CHOMSKY

He calls USA as 1st terrorist state in the world.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

He predicted a bigger role of ASYMMETRICAL actors in the post CW-WO as he suggested that USA has killed the python (USSR) but has given rise to numerous poisonous snakes. How does he describe security scenario for USA in a post CW-WO? MORE CHALLENGING - Because

Security threat has become DIFFUSED & thus more DIFFICULT to control.

— END OF IR Theory —

Europe – France, Germany, UK, Commonwealth, Nordics, GDPR, India-EU BTIA, BREXIT, EU challenges, NATO

1. India-France Relations

Broad overview of the India-France relations ([Amb. Rakesh Sood](#), Former Ambassador to France)

A shared world view

- As a country that has prided itself on its 'exceptionalism', France has always been sympathetic to similar Indian claims based on its ancient civilisation. This is why both countries were quick to voice support for global multi-polarity once the Cold War ended. French discomfort with the U.S.'s unipolar moment in the 1990s was evident when it described it as a 'hyperpower'.
- In January 1998, President Jacques Chirac declared that India's exclusion from the global nuclear order was an anomaly that needed to be rectified.
- After the nuclear tests in May 1998 when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state, France was the first major power to open dialogue and displayed a far greater understanding of India's security compulsions compared to other countries. It was the first P-5 country to support India's claim for a permanent seat in an expanded and reformed UNSC.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited India in March 2018. Links for the key documents signed during the visit:

- [MEA Joint Statement](#)
- [List of MoUs/Agreements signed](#)
- [India-France Joint Vision for Space Cooperation](#)
- [Joint Strategic Vision of India-France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region](#)

With the establishment of a Strategic Dialogue, cooperation in defence, civil nuclear, space, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism has grown.

- **Defence cooperation** with France began in the 1950s when India acquired the Ouragan aircraft and continued with the Mystères, Jaguar (Anglo-French), Mirage 2000, Alizé planes and the Alouette helicopter. Joint naval exercises, later christened *Varuna*, date back to 1983.
 - An agreement for building six Scorpène submarines in India with French help was signed in 2005.
 - Technology sharing and acquisitions of short range missiles and radar equipment.
 - G2G agreement for 36 Rafale aircraft in a flyaway condition. The ambitious offset target of 50% (nearly ₹25,000 crore), properly implemented, can help in building up India's budding aerospace industry.
- Cooperation in the **space sector** has continued since the 1960s when France helped India set up the Sriharikota launch site, followed by liquid engine development and hosting of payloads. '[Joint Vision for Space Cooperation \(2018\)](#)' lists out some key areas:
 - Joint missions for space situational awareness,
 - High resolution earth observation missions with applications in meteorology, oceanography and cartography
 - Inter-planetary exploration and space transportation systems
- In the **nuclear field**, an agreement was signed about a decade ago for building six EPR nuclear power reactors with a total capacity of 2 9.6 GW for which negotiations have been ongoing between the NPCIL and Areva, and now EdF.
 - Work at Jaitapur will commence before the end of 2018.

- **Counter-terrorism:** Terror strikes in France in recent years by home-grown terrorists have enlarged the scope of counter-terrorism cooperation to include cyber security and discussions on radicalisation.
- **Climate change** and renewable energy resources, particularly solar, soon emerged as a new plank, reflected in the multilateral initiative of the [International Solar Alliance](#).
- **Trade** has grown in recent years but at \$10 billion is half of the trade with Germany.
 - In the past, Indian companies saw the U.K. as the entry point for Europe; now with **Brexit** approaching, Mr. Macron has cleverly pitched that India should look at France as its entry point for Europe and Francophonie!
 - **Smart Cities** - Chandigarh, Nagpur and Puducherry (electric mobility, water supply, waste management and smart grids).
- **Educational links** - Recent focus on youth and student exchanges. Currently about 2,500 Indians go to France annually to pursue higher education, compared to more than 250,000 from China. A target has been set to raise it to 10,000 by 2020.
- **Tourism** - France receives over 80 million tourists a year and India just around nine million.

Indian and France Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region

Like India, France has expressed concern about China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. During President Macron's visit to India in March 2018, a [Joint Strategic Vision in the Indian Ocean Region \(2018\)](#) was signed.

To deepen their cooperation in three important areas: mutual logistical support, shared maritime domain awareness and collaboration with third countries.

The [agreement on logistical support \(similar to LEMOA with the US\)](#) gives India and France access to each other's military facilities and extends the reach of both navies in the Indian Ocean.

French presence in the Indo-Pacific:

- Islands of **Réunion** and **Mayotte** (Mozambique channel) in the Indian Ocean and **New Caledonia** and **French Polynesia** in the South Pacific.
- France the largest EEZ in the world (11 million sq. km.)—62 % of which is in the Pacific and 24 % in the Indian Ocean.
- Military presence in **Djibouti** and **Abu Dhabi**.

C Raja Mohan: As middle powers face an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment, both India and France are eager to deepen their security partnership and strengthen their positions in the Indian Ocean.

- It would help India overcome the legacy of military isolationism and lend credibility to its claims as a “net security provider” in the Indo-Pacific and to its aspiration of being a “leading power.”
- For France, India lends extraordinary political and strategic depth to the French position in the Indo-Pacific and helps sustain its role as a great maritime power in the East.

C Raja Mohan argues that France could be India's new Russia. Alliance with Paris promises stability in Eurasia and Indo-Pacific as Delhi recalibrates ties with Moscow.

- An alliance with Paris, in pursuit of stability and security in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, does not mean Delhi abandons its engagement with Moscow and devalues its strategic partnership with Washington. A recalibration of India's ties with Russia has been unfolding, slowly but surely, since the end of the Cold War.

- The US, on its part, can only be pleased that India and France are ready to take larger responsibilities and share the burden for maintaining regional and global order.

The India-France Strategic Partnership launched in 1998 seems finally to have come of age.

2. India-Germany relations

India and Germany have a 'Strategic Partnership' since 2001, which has been further strengthened with the Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) at the level of Head of Governments which allows for a comprehensive review of cooperation and identification of fresh areas of engagement. India is amongst a select group of countries with which Germany has such a dialogue mechanism.

During 2017, PM Modi visited Germany twice: the first was a bilateral visit on May 29-30, 2017 to Berlin for the 4th IGC and followed by a visit on July 6-8, 2017 to Hamburg to attend the G20 Summit.

Indo-German Strategic Partnership is based on common values of democracy, free trade and a rule-based international order.

Promoting Security, Stability, and Sustainability contributing to a Rules Based Global Order

- G20 - Challenges to global economic stability and growth.
- Support for NSG
- G-4 - Reform of the UNSC, discussions towards initiation of text-based negotiations.
- Freedom of navigation in international waters, the right of passage and other maritime rights and obligations in accordance with the UNCLOS and other principles of international law.
- Defence cooperation - To conclude negotiations on a binding agreement concerning enhanced cooperation in the defence field including in defence industry cooperation.
- Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism.
- Joint Declaration of Intent on German-Indian Cooperation on Cyber Policy.
- Exploring the possibilities to cooperate in their assistance to African Countries.
- Climate Change - Implementation of the Paris Agreement with a timely transformation to low-carbon inclusive sustainable economies.
- Trade & Economy - Negotiation on EU-India BTIA

Economic & Commercial Relations: Germany is India's largest trading partner in Europe. India was ranked 24th in Germany's global trade during 2016. Bilateral trade in 2016 was valued at €17.42 billion.

Defence & Security

Germany's military is principally structured to defend Eastern Europe and to supporting NATO operations in the Western European theatre of operations. Unlike UK and France, Germany not only does not have any sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific region but is also incapable of power projection.

- India and Germany maintain an ongoing dialogue in the areas of commercial maritime security and cooperate in the field of anti-terrorism. The Indian Navy and the German Navy conduct joint-exercises since 2008.
- Manpower limitations and armament restrictions imposed upon Germany through the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany prevent it from developing expeditionary forces and blue-water assets.

Hostile public sentiment in Germany towards overseas combat operations and the inability of Germany to independently sustain high-intensity long-range military deployments are obstacles to a meaningful strategic defence and security relationship.

Shyam Saran: Europe continues to be an important source of **capital and technology** which India needs for its own development. Focusing attention on relations with Germany which is the most powerful and now increasingly assertive player in European affairs has been a good move on the part of the Modi government.

C Raja Mohan: The current uncertainty in the relations between America, China and Russia demands that India move closer to the European middle powers — France and Germany. Delhi must also devote more attention to other parts of the continent, from Spain to Sweden and Portugal to Poland, that have so much to offer India.

After the Cold War, and the historic rapprochement between the West and Russia, India did announce the intent to construct bilateral strategic partnerships with Germany and France and collectively with the European Union. Although these partnerships have grown, they have hardly flourished. Europe has been preoccupied with its own integration, India on its neighbourhood and the major powers. Europe and India have remained loveless after the Cold War.

C Raja Mohan - Delhi has ignored Central Europe and neglected the EU. It's time to correct the imbalance. (Dec. 2017)

If the Great Himalayan barrier and post-Partition geography have made it hard for India to develop connectivity with inner Asia, Delhi has been reluctant to walk through the open door in Europe. Focused as it is on bilateral relations with France, Germany and Russia, Delhi has neglected the European Union and ignored Central Europe. Correcting this imbalance is the first step towards a more purposeful Indian engagement with Eurasia.

3. India-UK relations

India and Britain share a very long historical, cultural, economic and political relationship. After Independence, India remain part of Commonwealth and it has played a crucial role in shaping India-Britain relationship.

- **Trade:** Bilateral trade at \$14 billion falls far short of their \$30 billion goal announced in 2010. After Brexit India and UK held talks on the possibility of inking a separate U.K.-India FTA
- **Diaspora:** Currently more than a million Indian lives in UK contributing a great part of Indian diaspora there. Indian students especially in undergraduate courses forms a major chunk of our diaspora. But recent visa restrictions to non-EU countries caused apprehensions in the minds of Indian investors. In 2010 UK imposed strict immigration laws which has reduced the number of students in UK up to 25%.
- **Multilateral cooperation:** India and UK cooperate at the EU, G-20 and UN. UK supports India's inclusion in UNSC as a permanent member.

Indian High Commissioner Y.K. Sinha: There was an “undue focus” on the FTA with India, and with the few FTAs India had signed globally, expecting one in the immediate aftermath of Brexit might be “expecting too much.” Other **issues on terrorism, security and beyond also had to be confronted.**

Some irritants in the relationship:

- i. **Britain's willingness to tolerate "anti-India activity."**
 - Some examples:
 - Rally to commemorate the first death anniversary of Burhan Wani.
 - Pro-Khalistan rallies - We are back where we were in the 1980s where the issue of Sikh militants was one of the biggest impediments to stronger relations.
 - The argument that Britain was an open society that had to allow such activity to take place didn't work, as India was a "robust democracy" but didn't interfere in internal affairs of friends and allies.
- ii. Britain had become a **"haven for fugitives from justice"**. Vijay Mallya, Lalit Modi, Nirav Modi and many others.
- iii. **Playing Pakistan's apologist.**
 - Vivek Katju: British have always sought to absolve Pakistani official institutions and agencies of using terrorism as an instrument of state policy even while weakly urging them to do more to contain the actions of the jihadi groups.
 - The British have to be told that the game that they have played for the past seven decades of equating India and Pakistan has to come to an end and that they should focus on stopping Pakistani support of terrorism and not be that country's apologists.
- iv. **Visa issues.** e.g. U.K. excludes India from relaxed student visa rules. UK needs to make it easier for Indians to come to Britain.

British concerns

- Demands around opening up of financial and legal services in India, and its opposition to India's visa and mobility demands as part of any agreement.

Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 2018

Commonwealth is a 53-nation forum. The post-Brexit environment presents an opportunity for Indian-UK cooperation to remap the Commonwealth for the two countries' mutual benefit. Britain seems to be looking to the Commonwealth as an alternative channel for safeguarding its economic and trade interests. According to reports, the UK is interested in building a stronger partnership with India.

- **Charles, the Prince of Wales** visited India in **November, 2017**.
- **CHOGM 2018** (April 2018) - **Prince of Wales will be the next Head of the Commonwealth after the Queen.**
- PM Modi attended the CHOGM 2018, first time since CHOGM 2011 that a PM of India has attended the summit. Indian PM didn't attend the CHOGM in 2013 and 2015.

C Raja Mohan - Commonwealth in the time of Brexit - **India could play a key role in its revival** (Nov. 2017)

- For a Britain that is reinventing itself politically after Brexit, the Commonwealth has become an important forum to recalibrate London's international relations.
- For a rising India, the Commonwealth is the most natural theatre to demonstrate its credibility as a "leading power". With a globally dispersed membership — from the Caribbean to the South Pacific and Southern Africa to East Asia — the Commonwealth can easily reinforce India's expanding international footprint.

Central to a new Indo-British partnership would be an equitable framework for bilateral burden-sharing.

In moving towards greater engagement with the Commonwealth, **Delhi must, however, steer clear of four pitfalls.**

- i. Fallacy of a reformed Commonwealth as “Empire 2.0”.
 - Negotiating favourable terms is far more important for Delhi than proclaiming that the Commonwealth is a colonial relic. The debate on the Commonwealth can’t be about its past. It must be about its future.
- ii. The pretense that reform and renewal of the Commonwealth are only about tinkering with the status quo.
 - Avoid roles that are of little strategic consequence today. E.g. pushing democracy and human rights down the throats of other states.
 - Focus on bringing greater economic prosperity through an enhanced trade and investment relationship.
 - Direct its aid and assistance to a few major priority areas rather than spreading its resources on a range of issues.
- iii. Allure of leadership.
 - Delhi’s emphasis, instead, must be on strengthening India’s contribution to the Commonwealth.
 - India can significantly increase its levels of economic assistance, give more to the maintenance of the Secretariat, boost the current efforts on capacity building, and above all, open its economy to facilitate trade liberalisation across the Commonwealth.
- iv. Reviving the Commonwealth is not about India taking over from Britain. It is about reordering the relationship between Delhi and London.
 - Britain is yet to do what most other Western powers have done. It is to recognise that India’s rise is in their own national interests. Britain has remained somewhat hesitant to align with India on the regional issues in the Subcontinent and beyond.

Prof. CSR Murthy: India and the Commonwealth: Redirecting the Relationship (April 2018)

- The Commonwealth could be redesigned to work at the level of viable regions and with multispeed mechanisms. e.g. Subgroup of Asia Pacific countries. There are eighteen such countries.
- The Commonwealth could provide a discrete, viable platform to bring together Asian and South Pacific countries on security and economic issues. The advantage of forging such a subgrouping is that it would not include the United States, whose presence may otherwise send alarm bells ringing in Beijing.

Former foreign secretary Krishnan Srinivasan once argued that India should be more invested in the Commonwealth because “above all, in the Commonwealth, when India speaks, everyone listens,” unlike in the Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations.

Harsh Pant - Modi and CHOGM 2018: Reimagining the Commonwealth (April 2018)

As a nation that is seeking to play the role of a “leading power” in the global arena, New Delhi should not shirk this responsibility as the Commonwealth will be one platform where Chinese presence will not hinder Indian ambitions.

Vivek Katju: Denying Democracy to itself (April 2018)

- The Commonwealth is and will remain, at its core, a British enterprise. The fact that its leadership of the organisation, even if it will be symbolic, will remain with the British Royal family points in

that direction. For India in 2018, *Parivaarvad* should be as unacceptable as in modern international organisations.

- Some commentators have mentioned that commonwealth is of special importance to India as China is not part of the group. China's shadow looms over many member states of the organisation. It offers a different model of political practice and development and as it is eager to foster an international constituency it is leveraging its financial clout through assistance packages. Unless the larger Commonwealth countries can match China, its embrace will increase.
- The cement that truly binds small states to major powers is material assistance not the attraction of democratic practices.

Meghnad Desai: An obsolete structure (April 2018)

The UK ought to surrender the idea of monarchic succession to the headship of the Commonwealth. To make it a genuine global organisation, it should create a council of five with one member from each continent. The headship can rotate. As a first step, Prince Charles should renounce his claim.

India forced a change in the Commonwealth back then; let it lead the new structure now.

4. Nordic Countries

Joint Press Statement from the Summit between India and the Nordic Countries (April 2018)

Some of the key areas for practical cooperation as also outlined in the joint statement are.

- **Technological Innovation** - Learning from the Nordic approach of a strong collaboration between public sector, private sector and academia, synergies with India's rich pool of talent and skills could be identified.
 - Nordic solutions in maritime sector, port modernisation, food processing, health, life-sciences and agriculture.
- **Social Sector/Efficient welfare state** - can be important partner for India's experiments to strengthen its social sector through technological and policy innovation.
- Nordic Sustainable Cities Project aimed at supporting the **Smart Cities Program** of the GoI. Urban waste management.
- Climate change (for the implementation of Paris agreement) – Clean technologies, Renewable energy, urban waste management.
- **Trade and investment** - Sweden's investment in India through 'Invest India' and Indian investment in Sweden through 'Business Sweden'.
- Women's skills development and empowerment.
- Space and Science - particularly in Earth observation, planetary exploration and satellite ground station activities.

Strategic convergence in areas like:

- **Defence** cooperation - **Sweden** might be neutral but it always had strong defence industry. It can help lay the foundation for a strong defence industrial cooperation. E.g. aerospace partnership around the sale of **Gripen** fighter aircraft.
- Support for India's application for membership of the **NSG**.
- India's candidature for a permanent seat in a reformed **UNSC** expanded with both permanent and non-permanent members.

C Raja Mohan: Nordic cool (April 2018)

PM Modi's meeting with the region's leaders could end India's neglect of a part of the world that has punched above its weight in diplomacy.

India's political discovery of the Norden this week should also be the first step towards a more substantive outreach to different sub-regions of a very diverse continent — from the Baltics to the Balkans to Iberia to Mitteleuropa.

Amb. **Vivek Katju** says that mature countries set troublesome issues like **Bofors** aside while continuing to foster international ties in areas that are in their interest. It is only if a country acts in a dubious manner, as **Denmark** did in the **Kim Davy** matter (Purulia arms drop case 1995) that comprehensive negative steps need to be taken.

5. EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

EU's GDPR came into force across Europe in May 2018. The objective of the GDPR is "to harmonise data privacy laws.

Source Channel

About EU's GDPR:

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

- GDPR ensures data protection and privacy for all those living within the EU, and also prevents the export of personal data outside its territories.
- It deals with 3 primary areas: personal data, consent for its use, and privacy by design.
- GDPR's push for the right of access gives users in EU the ability to ask for what information a company has about them. This can be followed through with requests for correction or even erasure.

India, EU and the privacy challenge - In 2016-17, nearly a quarter of India's IT-enabled exports went to the EU.

- Provision of these services often requires the collection of data from EU citizens. The EU regulation makes exporting harder by making data transfers more difficult.
- Data transfers to a non-EU country will henceforth be permitted only if the latter enacts a national privacy law equivalent to the EU law.
- The risk is that such prematurely stringent privacy laws could hamper the development of domestic markets of EU because operating costs would increase.

Way forward:

- A Model: To safeguard transatlantic data flows, the EU and the US negotiated an agreement called the "**Privacy Shield**" framework.
- Under this agreement, US firms promise to protect the privacy of European citizens to EU standards in return for unrestricted data flows. The firms' commitment is monitored and enforced by US institutions, notably the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce.
- Under WTO law on services trade, the EU is required to offer other countries an opportunity to negotiate comparable arrangements.

Such an arrangement would have big advantages over existing options.

- Indian firms serving the EU market would not be required to establish a presence in the EU or accept rules and contracts that are costly and time-consuming. The assessment of conformity with EU standards would take place at home by domestic regulators.

- India would not need to pass a national privacy law whose stringency is determined by foreign norms. It would be free to create domestic standards to meet domestic needs, while following foreign standards for specific export markets.

This would thus avoid a conflict between two vital development goals — preserving access to foreign services markets for its exporters and improving access to services for its citizens.

Given that EU hasn't accorded '**Data secure country**' status of India, operations b/w Indian & European firms may get difficult. This also has implications for India-EU BTIA (Board-based Trade and Investment Agreement).

6. India-EU Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA)

The 13th India-EU Summit held after a gap of four years in March 2016 in Brussels, was the spotlight of India-EU bilateral relations. The EU as a bloc of 28 countries is India's largest regional trading partner while India was the EU's 9th largest trading partner.

India and the EU are in the process of negotiating a bilateral Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) since 2007. Even after a decade of negotiations, India and EU have failed to resolve certain issues which have led to a deadlock. As of late, both sides are discussing the modalities of resumption of BTIA talks on a fast track.

There are Joint Workings Groups on Textiles and Clothing, Agriculture and Marine Products, Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Issues, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology (SPS/TBT) as well as Food Processing Industries to enhance sector-specific cooperation.

A Macroeconomic Dialogue at Secretary Level along with a Dialogue on Financial Services Regulations have also been instituted and take place annually.

Deadlock in BTIA:

- India's pitch for a 'data secure' status (important for India's IT sector specially in lieu of new GDPR regulations) as well as to ease norms on temporary movement of skilled workers.
- EU's demands on elimination of India's duties on goods such as automobiles and wines and spirits.
- EU is keen on finalization of an India-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) before the re-launch of the FTA talks.
- EU wants India to liberalise accountancy and legal services.
- India wants to make 'investment protection' a part of the negotiations on the proposed comprehensive FTA.
- Other issues:
 - Labour standards
 - Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues
 - Complex system of quotas/tariffs
 - Environmental issues

7. BREXIT

Constitutional Provision of Brexit:

- Lisbon Treaty (Article 50) provides for exit of member countries from European Union. For any country to come out of European Union, it has to negotiate a deal with EU. The deal will provide for a settlement between EU and UK.

Why the clamour for Brexit:

- Economic reasons – The primary contention was that economically, Britain loses more than what it gains.
 - Membership fees paid.
 - EU's policies were too protectionist and did not favour competitiveness to the extent that would be beneficial for the British economy.
 - Post the Sovereign Debt Crisis, EU introduced Fiscal Compact and tighter control on national budgets. Britain was not comfortable with these ideas.
 - Germany's proposal to impose taxes on financial transactions (Tobin Tax) also did not find favour with London, which is an important financial hub.
- Immigration issues
 - Job losses to migrants - Half of British legal migrants come from EU. There is this feeling that they have a negative impact on UK born workers. Since 1997, 3/4th of jobs created have been taken up by EU immigrants.
 - Refugees - EU's obligation on its members to accommodate more refugees also did not find favour with UK. Especially at a time when the refugee influx in Europe is at an all-time high in light of multiple crisis in Middle East and Africa
 - Security - There is also this perception that immigrants pose a threat to national security.
- Sovereignty Issue
 - EU has been pushing for creation of an Ever Closer Union which would accord greater decision making powers to European Parliament, while, limiting the authority of British Parliament.

Hard Brexit, Soft Brexit, 'No Deal', No Brexit

Hard Brexit?

- A hard Brexit rejects the whole idea of close alignment. The goal is to escape burdensome EU regulations and tariffs, so as to be able to draw up rules and customs arrangements of Britain's own choosing.
- In practice a hard Brexit means leaving both the single market and the customs union.
- Hard Brexiters believe that staying in either would turn Britain into a "vassal state" of the EU. They are willing to accept the short-term disruption and potentially high costs of breaking free from Brussels, because they believe that the long-term gains from better regulation and the striking of free-trade deals all round the world will do more than enough to offset them.

Soft Brexit?

- In practice a Soft Brexit means staying within both the EU's single market (like Norway) and its customs union (like Turkey). Soft Brexiters are willing to be bound by EU rules and tariffs even though Britain will lose any say in making them. They also accept the inevitable consequence that it will be hard, even impossible, for Britain to do any trade deals with third countries.
- What is the Norway model?

- The Norway model refers to countries being members of the European Economic Area (EEA), but not the European Union. Remaining in the EEA would grant Britain all the freedoms of the EU's internal market - including the free movement of goods and people.
- It means the country is bound by all the EU regulations for those areas, as well as policies on employment, the environment and consumer protection.
- But, like Norway, it means the country does not have a say in how those policies are formulated.

'No Deal'?


- If the UK and the EU cannot reach an agreement a No Deal will occur when the two-year period after the triggering of Article 50 ends.
- That would mean the UK's sudden split from the EU without a transition period.
- That in turn means the relationship would be governed by basic rules of the WTO. And it would likely result in a big jolt to the UK economy with the loss of jobs and falling GDP.

No Brexit?

- That would mean revoking Britain's withdrawal notice under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union.
- But this would require another referendum. It can only happen when the public mood across Britain starts calling for it, which seems unlikely for now. Meanwhile, Hard Brexiteers are highly against such proposition.

Geopolitical Impacts of Brexit on UK internally:

Questions over the future of **Scotland** and **Northern Ireland**. Their desire to stay in UK was preconditioned on UK remaining a part of EU. The Scots have already started demanding for a referendum on Scotland's future in UK. Even in Northern Ireland violence erupted post the Brexit vote.



To guarantee that there will be no hard **border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic**, PM Theresa May has also accepted that there must be a **"backstop" solution** that keeps Britain in a customs union and in close regulatory alignment with the EU for some years, until another way is found of avoiding any infrastructure, customs checks or associated controls on the border.

The [logic of the Irish border is forcing Britain towards a close relationship with the EU.](#)

As Mrs May keeps softening her red lines, many expect the eventual result to combine elements from both a hard and a soft Brexit. One possible answer would be to stay in a customs union and the single market for goods alone, but not for services. Like most compromises, such an outcome would please neither side. Yet both may just have to learn to live with it.

Brexit Bill becomes law (June 2018): It enshrines Brexit day in British law as March 29, 2019 — midnight Brussels time, defined by the end of the two-year Article 50 withdrawal process.

Theresa May gets Cabinet approval for Brexit plan

Soft Brexit - It will see an EU- U.K. Free Trade Area and Britain remaining closely aligned to the EU's single market on agriculture and goods via a "common rule book," though the **services sector will be excluded**.

- Even after Brexit the UK will continue to share a common rule book for all goods with the EU, including agricultural products.
- In line with Britain's aversion to the European Court of Justice, it is proposing to set up a joint institutional framework to interpret UK-EU agreements.
- In order to safeguard ties with Ireland, the borders between the UK and EU will be treated as a "combined customs territory".
- Proposing to end free movement, "giving the UK back control over how many people enter the country".

If a hard Brexit is economically unacceptable to British business and Parliament, a soft Brexit is politically unacceptable to EU leaders, and a fake Brexit (Brexit wherein actually the changes are very minimal) is unacceptable to almost everyone.

To conclude, as [George Soros](#) writes, "divorce will be a long process, probably taking more than five years – a seeming eternity in politics, especially in revolutionary times like the present. Ultimately, it is up to the British people to decide what they want to do, but it would be better if they came to a decision sooner rather than later."

Impact of Brexit on India

Key opportunities

- **Free Trade Agreement (FTA)** - After losing access to EU single market, the UK would want to develop trade relations with emerging markets from around the world. India, with its strong economic fundamentals and a large domestic market, is in a better negotiating position. Potential sectors to benefit from an FTA include textile, machinery, engineering goods, information technology and banking.
- **Service sector** - India could emerge as a major source of high tech exports for the UK. The country's BPO market could see strong growth prospects if FTA between the two countries was to foster easy visa regime and greater market access for Indian firms.
- **Easy market access** - India is the major FDI source for the UK because many Indian firms have used it as a gateway to Europe. With the UK moving out of EU, it might not be as attractive to Indian firms as before. Intuitively, the UK government would not like to miss out Indian investment and will thus try to attract Indian firms by offering more incentives such as tax breaks, easy regulations and opening up markets

- **Cheaper imports** - The UK's currency is expected to remain weaker, so it would be less expensive for Indian firms to import from their subsidiaries in the UK.
- **Education** – Educational institutes in the UK might offer more incentives, which could essentially make education in that country less expensive. In the post-Brexit world, Indian students studying in the UK might get a more level playing field compared with other EU students who were until now enjoyed an advantageous position.

Key challenges

- **Political risk** - Apart from regional uncertainty, the changing dynamics can potentially reverberate to reach Asia and thus India.
- **Global growth impact** - The potential of a significant weigh down on global growth once the new trade terms take shape is real. While India currently enjoys improved macroeconomic stability, the country cannot be isolated from the impact from global and regional subdued growth.
- **FTA challenges**: India's FTA negotiation with EU, which saw an impasse on the issue of bilateral investments, might now need a renegotiation of FTA with the union. Additionally, a separate trade agreement with the UK might also need to be worked on.
- **Immigration norms** - Companies with operations throughout EU will now have to reassess their workforce mobility, along with expansion plans and operations.
- **Currency weakness and unhedged exposure** - According to reports, deepening recession risks and unhedged exposure the British Pound on account of Brexit might impact IT demand, affecting revenues of Indian IT companies in the UK by almost 10 per cent.
- **Contingency planning** - Reports suggest that, currently, over 800 Indian companies in the UK employ over 1.1 lakh people. The top-growing Indian companies are said to have generated over GBP 26 billion in turnover in 2015. The above considerations demand a thorough assessment of evolving developments and the prioritisation of contingency planning.

8. European Union and its current challenges

[George Soros](#) in his article "[How to Save Europe](#)" writes that, there is no longer any point in ignoring the reality that a number of European Union member countries have explicitly rejected the **EU's goal of "ever closer union."** Instead of a "multi-speed Europe," where all members are still heading toward the same destination, the goal should be a "multi-track Europe" that offers member states a wider variety of choices.

Brief Overview:

Since the financial crisis of 2008, the EU seems to have lost its way. It adopted a program of fiscal retrenchment, which led to the euro crisis and transformed the Eurozone into a relationship between creditors and debtors. The creditors set the conditions that the debtors had to meet, yet could not meet. This created a relationship that was neither voluntary nor equal – the very opposite of the credo on which the EU was based.

As a result, many young people today regard the EU as an enemy that has deprived them of jobs and a secure and promising future. Populist politicians exploited the resentments and formed anti-European parties and movements.

Then came the refugee influx of 2015. At first, most people sympathized with the plight of refugees fleeing political repression or civil war, but they didn't want their everyday lives disrupted by a

breakdown in social services. And soon they became disillusioned by the failure of the authorities to cope with the crisis.

The United States, for its part, has exacerbated the EU's problems. By unilaterally withdrawing from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, President Donald Trump has effectively destroyed the transatlantic alliance. This has put additional pressure on an already beleaguered Europe. It is no longer a figure of speech to say that Europe is in existential danger; it is the harsh reality.

What are pressing problems that EU is facing? WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The EU faces three pressing problems:

- i. Refugee crisis;
- ii. Austerity policy that has hindered Europe's economic development; and
- iii. Territorial disintegration, as exemplified by Brexit.

Refugee Crisis:

The EU still lacks a unified migration policy. Each member state has its own policy, which is often at odds with the interests of other states.

Allocation of refugees within Europe should be entirely voluntary. Member states should not be forced to accept refugees they don't want, and refugees should not be forced to settle in countries where they don't want to go. This fundamental principle ought to guide Europe's migration policy.

Europe must also urgently reform the Dublin Regulation, which has put an unfair burden on Italy and other Mediterranean countries, with disastrous political consequences.

- Under the so-called Dublin Regulation, the first EU country that asylum seekers enter is responsible for examining their applications. But countries with external borders, such as Greece and Italy, naturally complain that this puts an unfair burden on them.
- Daniel Gros: The European Union's Dublin Conundrum (July 2018)
 - Despite a sharp decline in the number of asylum seekers reaching Europe, politicians continue to exploit the issue. But the real question that needs to be answered is not how to keep migrants away from Europe's borders, but rather which country should be responsible for those who have already entered EU territory.
 - The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should be made responsible for interpreting the rules for assigning refugees – deciding, for example, which country is responsible when member states disagree in individual cases. Providing financial incentives for accepting refugees – say, a lump sum for each one – would also help.
 - Strengthening EASO and boosting financial support should go some way toward alleviating today's tensions, at least until a radical reform of Europe's asylum system can be contemplated.

Proposed deal on migrants (June 2018)

Objective: To bolster the bloc's external borders and improve the solidarity among member nations to ease pressure on point-of-entry nations like Greece and Italy.

- The plan proposes screening migrants in North Africa for asylum eligibility and setting up control centers within the bloc by nations which would volunteer to have them.
- No North African countries have agreed so far to sign on to the plan, though possible EU funding that could bring billions in aid may prove persuasive.

- Italy wants concrete commitments to help managing the waves of newcomers that arrive from across the Mediterranean.
 - Eurosceptic government of Giuseppe Conte came to power with the slogan, 'Italians first'.
- Ms. Merkel, for her part, is fighting a battle at home and abroad against critics who accuse her of endangering European security with her hospitality.
- The partner in Merkel's coalition government is demanding that migrants be turned away at Germany's border with Austria. EU officials fear such a move would set off a domino effect, leading Austria to seal its border with Italy, and Italy to fully close its ports to migrants rescued at sea.

Chris Patten: The EU must work as one to strengthen its own borders, while helping, through development assistance and security cooperation, the countries from which people are fleeing. With more stability and open markets, they will be able to export their products, rather than their citizens.

Austerity policy and Europe's Economic Development

- The transformation of the Coal and Steel Community into the European Union was a top-down initiative and it worked wonders.
- But times have changed. Ordinary people feel excluded and ignored. Now we need a collaborative effort that combines the top-down approach of the European institutions with the bottom-up initiatives that are necessary to engage the electorate.

Territorial disintegration as exemplified by Brexit.

EU needs to transform itself into an organization that countries like Britain would want to join, in order to strengthen the political case.

- Such a Europe would differ from the current arrangements in two key respects.
 - First, it would clearly distinguish between the EU and the Eurozone.
 - Second, it would recognize that the euro has many unsolved problems, which must not be allowed to destroy the European project.
- The **Eurozone** is governed by outdated treaties that assert that all EU member states are expected to adopt the euro if and when they qualify. This ignores the reality that a number of EU member countries have explicitly rejected the EU's goal of "ever closer union."
- Currently, attitudes toward cooperation are negative: member states want to reassert their sovereignty rather than surrender more of it. But if cooperation produced positive results, sentiment might improve, and some objectives, like defense, that are currently best pursued by coalitions of the willing might attract universal participation.

Experts/Scholar's view on EU's institutional issues

Mark Leonard on waning influence of Germany: Are Europe's Populists Calling the Shots? (June 2018)

Less than six months after forming another grand coalition government, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is now fighting for her political life against a pan-European alliance of anti-immigration forces. But whether or not she holds on to power, it is already clear that Germany's unique influence over EU affairs is waning.

Europe is at a critical juncture. Those who favor deeper integration and openness have wasted a lot of time, while populists and nationalists have marshaled their forces.

Harold James: Europe's Hard-Core Problem - de facto Franco-German leadership (Nov. 2017)

One wonders if the EU's hard Franco-German core is becoming too hard for the rest of the bloc. If so, those who dream of "ever closer" European integration may have to settle for a modestly enlarged Franco-German axis.

- According to the traditional division of labor, France provides security and the means for Europe to project power abroad; and Germany oversees finance and economics at home.
- The EU's critics do not like the idea of coordinated foreign policies any more than they liked the idea of fiscal and monetary discipline being imposed in the middle of a recession.

Looking forward, France and Germany urgently need to develop a shared vision that transcends their own national politics and embraces genuine EU-level reform. There is already some agreement on the **need for defense coordination and tax harmonization**. But that is not enough. France and Germany still need to address many questions with respect to **fiscal centralization, sovereign-debt restructuring**, and other fundamental issues.

The rest of Europe needs to feel as though it has a seat at the table.

Harold James: Europe's Overly Complex Union (July 2018)

Despite its clear advantages, a "grand deal" covering the major issues that the EU faces has always been something of a chimera. A key problem lies in the intricacy of the EU itself, which is poorly equipped to function in times of chaos – like now.

The EU is deliberately complex, in order to allow for the coordination of a wide variety of national interests. That complexity is fine in normal times, but it is problematic at exceptional moments, when the play is frenetic. At those moments, the EU looks more like the Habsburg empire – a complex vessel of nationalities where satirists joked that the situation was desperate but not serious.

Joseph Stiglitz: Can the Euro Be Saved? (June 2018)

Book: "The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe"

The euro was a system almost designed to fail. It took away governments' main adjustment mechanisms (interest and exchange rates); and, rather than creating new institutions to help countries cope with the diverse situations in which they find themselves, it imposed new strictures – often based on discredited economic and political theories – on deficits, debt, and even structural policies.

Across the Eurozone, political leaders are entering a state of paralysis: citizens want to remain in the EU, but they also want an end to austerity and the return of prosperity. So long as Germany tells them they can't have both, there can be only one outcome: more pain, more suffering, more unemployment, and even slower growth.

The central problem in a currency area is how to correct exchange-rate misalignments like the one now affecting Italy. Germany's answer is to put the burden on the weak countries already suffering from high unemployment and low growth rates. The alternative is to shift more of the burden of adjustment on the strong countries, with higher wages and stronger demand supported by government investment programs.

9. NATO and Transatlantic relations in the times of President Trump

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between 29 North American and European countries. The organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed in 1949. NATO constitutes a system of **collective defence** whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party.

The most recent member state to be added to NATO is Montenegro in 2017. NATO currently recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia and Ukraine as aspiring members.

Recently NATO summit was held in Brussels in July 2018.

Military Spending/Budget -

- The combined military spending of all NATO members constitutes over 70% of the global total. Members have committed to reach or maintain defense spending of at least 2% of GDP by 2024.
- U.S. is traditionally the largest contributor to the NATO (22% of the total), and many U.S. presidents have tried to correct this imbalance softly. But Trump is assertively asking other countries to spend 4% of their GDP on defense annually and has even questioned their commitment to the alliance. Notably, most NATO allies are even faltering to progress towards the currently mandated 2% mark, which is to be reached by 2024.
- The U.S. on the contrast is now shelling out well over 3% of its annual GDP on security and is clearly moving towards the 4% mark.

Why did Trump single out Germany for criticism?

- Germany enjoys a big trade surplus with the U.S., an aspect that is irking the Trump administration, which is presently embracing protectionism.
- In this context, Trump has lashed out on Germany for not spending enough on defense, despite having strong economic metrics in recent years.
- Additionally, he has also targeted Germany for buying huge volumes of gas from Russia despite U.S. sanctions against the latter.
- Notably, Russia's regional ambitions and its interventions in international theaters to thwart American efforts are indicative of a new cold war.
- Adam Tooze: Germany's Great European Heist (May 2018)
 - At NATO meeting after NATO meeting, Germany would commit to spending 2% of its GDP on defense. It never delivered. Spending slumped toward 1% of GDP, with the majority going to salaries and pensions. The latest NATO data show German spending on defense equipment and on research and development running at only 0.17% of GDP in 2017, compared to 0.42% in France and 0.47% in the UK.
 - Both Germany's habit of free riding and France's tendency toward trigger-happy postcolonial forays will have to be debated. The quid pro quo that France should demand for cooperation on security policy is that Germany recognizes the same reality with regard to economic policy.
- Joschka Fischer: Waiting for Germany (April 2018)
 - The European Union's political stagnation is becoming untenable in the face of mounting economic and geopolitical risks. The post-war US security guarantee allowed Germany to take a long break from thinking about strategic threats. But now that Trump has called into

question America's commitments to its allies, Germany can no longer count on such a favorable division of labor.

Javier Solana (Former EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of NATO) July 2018

Donald Trump is not the first US president to demand that European countries spend more on their own defense, but he is the first to ignore the value of America's alliances. In fact, with NATO's European pillar recently strengthened, the US will have an even more reliable defense partner.

Trump's 2% demand is neither unfounded nor unprecedented: previous US presidents have also called on European countries to increase their defense spending. In 2014, NATO member states that were not spending 2% of their GDP on defense committed to do so by 2024. Yet, despite notable progress, it is fair to say that some countries are still far from reaching that target.

Ana Palacio - Saving NATO from Trump (July 2018)

Mutual defense commitment contained in Article 5 of the NATO Charter is the principle that an attack on one NATO member is regarded as an attack against all is crucial to the alliance. Europe has long been given a free pass on defense, but the expiration date is approaching fast. At this moment of uncertainty, it can be tempting to focus on the high-stakes politics of Article 5.

The truth is that, as important as Article 5 and the 2%-of-GDP spending requirement are, NATO's value and relevance extend far beyond these issues.

- Article 2 encourages NATO members to collaborate economically and to bring "about a better understanding of the principles upon which" their free institutions are founded.
- More important, Article 3 calls upon members to work together to build and maintain a capacity for defense, thereby boosting resilience.

Whereas Article 5 has become a source of leverage for Trump to use to pressure his allies to spend more, while impressing his domestic supporters, Articles 2 and 3 are practical and direct. With a revanchist Russia to their east and chaos to the south, Europeans can no longer afford to live in denial. They must strengthen defense at the foundations, with Articles 2 and 3 as their guides.

Carl Bildt - The End of NATO? (July 2018)

To be sure, over the past few decades, NATO's primary focus was on peacekeeping operations in distant places, rather than on its core function of territorial defense. For most European member states, the peace dividend from the alliance's operations justified cuts in domestic military spending.

But this attitude changed in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and launched secretive military incursions into Eastern Ukraine. Since then, NATO member states' defense budgets have increased by around 4% per year on average, making the 2024 target eminently achievable.

The fact is that total European defense spending is around twice what the US spends on European security, and also roughly twice what Russia spends on defense, according to estimates produced at the US National Defense University.

The problem is that while NATO's military capacity is actually improving, its political decision-making capacity is deteriorating. Imagine what would happen if a NATO member state sounded the alarm about Russia launching a secretive Crimea-style military operation within its borders. Would Trump quickly

invoke the principle of collective defense under Article 5 of the NATO treaty? Or would he hesitate, question the intelligence, belittle US allies, and validate Putin's denials?

The transatlantic alliance - US-Europe relations in times of President Trump

Mark Leonard (Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations): As US President Donald Trump continues to wage war on the American-led international order, Europeans can no longer assume that their interests are synonymous with those of the US. The time has come for the European Union to redefine its interests, and to develop a new strategy for defending them.

Javier Solana: Trump effect on overall US-Europe relations (June 2018): Trump evidently feels more comfortable when he can engage with other countries bilaterally. It is little wonder that the EU – a bastion of multilateralism – is not to his liking. But Europe and America have always been most successful when they have supported each other, while operating within a framework of institutions based on shared norms. Trump's preference for a divide-and-rule strategy produces a game that will create only losers, beginning with the West and ending with the world at large.

Dominique Moisi: The Transatlantic Rupture (June 2018)

To be sure, this is not the first time transatlantic relations have come under strain. In the early 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle rejected a key pillar of the relationship, NATO, by incrementally reducing France's military and political participation. Whereas US President John F. Kennedy presented NATO as a shared roof supported by two pillars – the US and Europe – de Gaulle viewed it as a mechanism of US hegemony. In any case, France's withdrawal from NATO did more to isolate the country than to weaken the transatlantic alliance.

The relationship was challenged again in 2003, when France and Germany, among others, refused to join the US and the United Kingdom in the (ill-advised) invasion of Iraq. But, again, the survival of the transatlantic alliance was never in doubt.

The difference today is that it is the US that is pushing back against the alliance – if not the entire Western liberal democratic model. A sheep gone astray is one thing; if the shepherd leaves, the entire herd is at risk. Yet, as "America First" becomes "America Alone," that seems to be precisely what is happening.

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India-Iran relations

Historical context and broad understanding on India-Iran relations

Amb. Rajiv Sikri, Book: Challenge and Strategy Rethinking India's Foreign Policy

Although a dominant power in the Persian Gulf, Iran itself is primarily a land power. India's contacts with Iran have been traditionally over land, not across the Arabian Sea. With the formation of Pakistan in 1947, India and Iran, or Persia as it was known till 1935, lost the geographical contiguity they had enjoyed for centuries. As a result, Indian policy-makers to some extent failed to appreciate that from a strategic perspective India has to deal with Iran as a neighbouring country.

For India, another harder and more pressing reality is that relations with Iran have a **domestic political dimension**. As the **largest Shia country** and home to some of the holiest shrines of the Shia community, Iran remains influential among India's large Shia population, which can be an important swing vote in elections.

India's position in the IAEA in September 2005 and February 2006 on transferring Iran's dossier on its nuclear programme from the IAEA to the UN Security Council, generated resentment and mistrust against India in Iran. It also polarized political and public opinion in India. India's handling of its relations with Iran has also become a litmus test of India's willingness and ability to follow an independent foreign policy.

Iran does matter greatly to India from a strategic perspective.

- i. Pakistan's neighbour and a very influential actor in the Persian Gulf.
- ii. For access to strategically important Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- iii. Strategic development of Chabahar Port.
- iv. Access to Russia - North-South Corridor that is intended to provide faster and cheaper connectivity between India and Russia via Iran and the Caspian Sea.
- v. **Energy security** - Iran is the **3rd largest producer of oil in the world** and meets about **15% of India's oil needs**. India is Iran's top Oil client after China.
 - Iran became India's second largest oil supplier ahead of Saudi Arabia in the April-June 2018, as companies took advantage of steeper discounts offered by Tehran in light of the US withdrawal from JCPOA and impending sanctions. However, it has started declining since June 2018.

From Iran's point of view, a strategic relationship with an important country like India is worthwhile because:

- Lessens Iran's isolation.
- Defence cooperation - India could also be a source of important defence equipment and technologies for Iran. Iran would like to proceed much faster and further, whereas, India is reluctant to do so. India's hesitation may be related to the sensitivities of Israel, which is a valued defence partner.
- India's relations with Iran have also significant impact on relations between India and Israel.

President Hassan Rouhani's visit to New Delhi (15-18 Feb. 2018)

Joint Statement - "**Towards prosperity through greater connectivity**"; List of MoUs signed, IE

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- On **Afghanistan**: “interests of peace and stability in the region are best served by a **strong, united, prosperous, pluralistic, democratic and independent Afghanistan while supporting the NUG in the country**”. May 2016 joint statement didn’t have the words “pluralistic” and “democratic”. Minorities in Afghanistan are feared to be under threat in a Pashtun-dominated society and are often seen to be marginalised in the power structure.
 - Both sides also called upon the “countries of the region” to come forward for enhancing regional connectivity and take steps **to do away with the “obstacles on land transit” – a clear reference to Pakistan** blocking land transit from India to Afghanistan.
- Both sides committed to “early and full operationalisation of the Shahid Beheshti Port at **Chabahar**”. Modi called it the “golden gateway” to access landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian region. With a view to fully utilize the potential of the Chabahar Port and its connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia, India conveyed its readiness to support the development of **Chabahar- Zahedan Rail line. India’s Ports Global Limited (IPGL) to take over operation of existing facilities at the Shahid Beheshti Port — Phase 1 of Chabahar — for 18 months.**
- India’s accession to **TIR Convention** and **Ashgabat Agreement** was welcomed as additional steps at enhancing regional connectivity.
- **Energy**: Agreed to move beyond traditional buyer-seller relationship and develop it into a long term strategic partnership, both sides agreed to continue and increase the pace of negotiation for reaching appropriate results on energy cooperation, including **Farzad B gas field**.
- On **JCPOA**: The Indian side reaffirmed its support for full and effective implementation of the JCPOA, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council and is crucial contribution to the non-proliferation framework and international peace, stability and security.

Amb. M K Bhadrakumar (Feb. 2018):

The India-Iran mutual understanding has matured to a point that neither side is making demands on the other’s strategic autonomy. India is free to cherry-pick – it can maintain ties with Israel and petrodollar states in the Persian Gulf, some of which are on adversarial terms with Iran. Similarly, Iran’s strong ties with China and its self-interest in steering ties with Pakistan harmoniously do not raise hackles in Delhi.

Amb. Vivek Katju (Feb. 2018):

Iran has a complex system of governance with many and often competing power centres. The elected President and government as well as the Parliament are always guided by the Supreme Leader who actually is at the apex of the clerical establishment. The Revolutionary Guards are committed to upholding the values of the Khomeini revolution and are accountable not to the President, but to the Supreme Leader.

- India has mainly dealt with the elected government while keeping its lines open with the other power centres. It has expected the President to reconcile the pulls and pressures of policy-making and come up with a consistent approach. This has been a wise way of dealing with Iran and needs to continue, especially at this stage.
- The **energy** relationship can be transformed from a simple buyer-seller matrix to one in which India can meaningfully participate in the entire energy industry.

On **Afghanistan**: On the Afghan situation where a complete shift of alignments has taken place. Iran and Russia along with Pakistan are now supporting the Taliban. This has added to the group’s intransigence and violent opposition to the Ghani/Abdullah government, apart from encouraging Pakistan to continue with its support to anti-India and anti-Afghan terrorist groups.

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[C Raja Mohan](#) (17th Feb. 2018)

Delhi's biggest current challenge in dealing with Tehran — the sharpening conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But Delhi's public discourse on relations with Iran has for long been framed in terms of Tehran's relations with Washington. That tells only one part of the story, but masks others.

Realism tells us that Delhi does not have the power to mitigate the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But Delhi can certainly encourage the emerging trends for political and social moderation in the Middle East.

- India has positively viewed the recent calls from the political leadership in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE for reclaiming Islam from violent extremists.
- India should also welcome Rouhani's emphasis on ending sectarian conflicts in the region and his praise of India as a "living museum" of peaceful religious co-existence.

While Rouhani may not have the command of Iran's politics, the moderate forces represented by him are critical for the **pursuit of three important Indian objectives in the Middle East.**

- Promotion of mutual political accommodation within the region;
- Pressing for an end to the export of destabilising ideologies from the region; and
- Construction of a coalition against violent religious extremism that has inflicted so much suffering in the Middle East and the Subcontinent.

Iran-Pakistan Relations, Saudi Arabia angle and impact on India

Iranian Foreign Minister **Javed Zarif** in his visit to Pakistan said: "Our relations with India, just like Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia, are not against Pakistan as we understand Pakistan's relations with Saudi Arabia are not against Iran."

[Vivek Katju](#) (March 2018): Pakistan-Iran ties have to bear the full weight of Saudi-Pakistan relations, and this necessarily will constrain their growth. Iranian FM's Zarif's not-so-subtle signal was to demand that Pakistan should maintain a balanced approach.

[Christophe Jaffrelot](#) (April 2018)

India-Iran rapprochement does not mean that Iran is willing to distance itself from Pakistan. In fact, Iran seems to play one country against the other in order to maximise its gains in the context of sanctions which are badly affecting its economy. Such a strategy is facilitated by Pakistan's attitude, which tries hard not to alienate Iran.

- Both countries share a 900 km-long border that cuts across Balochistan. Pakistan can hardly afford to open a third front.
- Iran and Pakistan have also a common neighbour, Afghanistan, where they could intensify a proxy war.
- Pakistan needs gas, Iran needs to sell its gas.

Iran is not comfortable with India because of its strategic partnership with the US. Iran has disapproved of the Afghan policy of the new American administration that India has applauded. Similarly, Iran cannot take lightly the **new India-Israel relations**. It is these growing affinities that have contributed in the last few months to Ali Khamenei mentioning the Kashmir issue in some of his sermons for the first time and comparing it to the injustice meted out to Palestinians.

The deepening of Iran-Pakistan relations will depend on the pressure Riyadh exerts on Islamabad. Pakistanis have made important concessions to Saudi Arabia and the GCC.

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- Pakistanis are allegedly training Syrian rebels (whereas Tehran supports the Bashar-al Asad regime).
- Raheel Sharif, was appointed the leader of the Riyadh-based Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (a coalition of Sunni countries) in 2017.
- Pakistani army and Saudi Royal Land Forces have increased their joint manoeuvres. While Pakistan has not sent troops to Yemen, its soldiers have been deployed on the other side of the border, allegedly to protect the holy cities.

Pakistan has tried not to take sides between Iran and Saudi Arabia and even attempted to mediate between the two.

The development of Chabahar is slow but so, for instance, is the finalisation of the contract regarding a gas field, Farzad-B, in which India is interested, showing that Iran is not an easy partner indeed.

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US pulls out of Iran Nuclear Deal - JCPOA (May 2018)

Press briefing by NSA Bolton on Iran: The lesson that America learned, painfully, a long time ago, but that **Dean Acheson** once said, is **we only negotiate from positions of strength**. It was a lesson that the last administration did not follow. It has impact on North Korea as well.

Mr. Pompeo has a list of 12 demands. Iran must:

- fully disclose to the IAEA the past military dimensions of its nuclear programme and abandon such work in perpetuity;
- stop enrichment and close its heavy water reactor;
- provide to the IAEA access to all the sites in the country;
- end its ballistic missiles programme;
- release U.S. and other citizens detained on spurious charges;
- end support to terror groups including to Hamas and Hezbollah;
- respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and permit the disarming of Shia militias;
- end support to the Houthis in Yemen;
- withdraw its forces from Syria;
- end support to Taliban;
- end support to terrorists around the world; and
- end threatening behavior against neighbours, many of whom are U.S. allies.

Vivek Katju: Trump reinforcing view that international system is inherently lawless (May 2018)

Like his June 2017 decision to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, this step too will reinforce the view that the international system is inherently lawless. Trump's step is a reminder of the time when strong states "did what they will and weak states suffered what they must."

India will have the messy task of seeking to move its interests in the hydrocarbons sector and in developing connectivity without giving offense to either the US or Iran. This will not be easy.

There is little doubt that India or its companies will not seek to violate US sanctions, whether in maintaining oil purchases or moving ahead with the Chabahar port. In the past, New Delhi and Tehran devised innovative ways for India to continue to purchase Iranian oil. Chabahar is a strategically important project for Afghanistan, as for India. This is evident from reports that more cargo is moving to Afghanistan through Chabahar during the past few months.

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Rakesh Sood (May 2018) - Just as it is more difficult to verify Iran's full compliance with the NPT without the JCPOA's enhanced verification provisions, it is more difficult to justify going to war with Iran when it is in full compliance with JCPOA. The U.S. decision may just have tipped the balance.

Shyam Saran: Trump's action on the Iran nuclear deal can accelerate the fragmentation of the global order (May 2018)

Significant geopolitical consequences

- US move is unilateral, and this will further erode western ascendancy in the global order.
- Global trading system - More deliberate effort to reduce dependence on the US dollar.
- Intensification of the multiple conflicts which are ravaging West Asia. E.g. proxy wars in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

In 2015, despite there being differences in interests and perceptions, major powers came together to conclude the deal. The fallout from the US exit from the deal **makes such common action among the major powers to uphold international peace and security as a shared objective, a casualty.**

Relations among major powers are likely to become more transactional and the dismantling of the post-World War II order is likely to proceed in a more hastened and disorderly manner. The risks of conflicts through miscalculation and misperception will rise. This will demand a much more nuanced and nimble diplomacy on India's part.

Collateral consequences for India as a result of the US action:

- Global oil prices may rise --> inflation, fiscal issues.
- If armed conflict erupts in West Asia - India's energy security will be affected, welfare of more the six million Indians who live and work in the Gulf.
- Difficult to continue doing business with Iran - rupee payment arrangements, use of third currencies and trade channels. Since other stakeholders are abiding by the deal, US ability to enforce the sanctions through penalties on non-US entities would be limited.

On balance, therefore, there is more to fear from political and security-related consequences than economic or commercial ones.

C Raja Mohan (May 2018)

Most analysts of Trump's decision suggest this might be less about atomic weapons and more about overthrowing the Islamic Republic. If the question was how to make the nuclear agreement tighter, critics say, Trump could have gone along with America's European allies — France, Britain and Germany — who were promising precisely that.

The emphasis on regime change does not mean embarking on direct military intervention. Trump has repeatedly affirmed that he has no interest in promoting democracy abroad or building other nations with American resources. Trump's strategy might be called "**regime change on the cheap**".

- To mount massive economic sanctions, unilateral if necessary, against Iran. Some in Washington are betting that given the mounting economic crisis in Iran, the sanctions could recall bite and push the Islamic Republic to its knees.
- To strengthen Iranian opposition groups working to oust the Iranian theocracy.
- To reinforce the regional efforts by Iran's local rivals — Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to push back against Tehran's expansionism. All three countries have welcomed Trump's decision.

Chinmaya Gharekhan (May 2018)

The goal that the U.S. administration is seeking in Iran is regime change. The U.S. is not asking for a new, revised or reformed nuclear deal. It wants to conclude a treaty that would override the JCPOA and would cover all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme as well as its missile programme.

It is not at all certain that the Europeans will leave the U.S. all alone; sooner or later, they will find ways to "cooperate" with the U.S.

The American specialist team will in all probability explain to India that if India wants to avoid being sanctioned, it must steadily and significantly reduce oil imports from Iran over the next five and a half months. Indian diplomacy will be on test, but one can expect that India will find a way to safeguard its interests without alienating its friends, old and new.

HARSH V. PANT & ABHIJANAN REJ - Beyond JCPOA: Examining the consequences of US withdrawal (July 2018)

Policy recommendations:

- i. India should seek waivers from US secondary sanctions when it comes to the purchase of crude petroleum, as well as development of its natural gas projects in Iran. Be prepared to approach the issue as *quid pro quo* with the US. One way through which this can be achieved is through issues linkages: increase in purchase of US shale oil, as well as softening India's positions on US tariffs, in return for sanctions waivers.
- ii. New Delhi should aggressively promote the cause of the Chabahar port in Washington, and link the success of the port projects with that of Trump's Afghanistan policies.
 - o To considerably reduce the influence of Pakistan.
 - o Absent India in Chabahar, Iran may be tempted to link the port with China's BRI, an outcome that is undesirable for the US and its nascent Indo-Pacific strategy.
- iii. Should Indian overtures to the US about Chabahar fail, India should look towards China in developing the port. Following the Wuhan summit in April (agreed on joint economic project in Afghanistan), India-China collaboration on Chabahar is not as farfetched as it sounds, especially given the fact that Iran being open to China as well.
- iv. Russia is the other potential partner should the US refuse to play ball with India when it comes to Iran. Russia has remained committed to the idea of promoting alternative institutional structures that undercut US and western dominance.
- v. Finally, India should be vocal in its support of the French and German positions on the JCPOA.

All said and done, if the net result of the US pull-out from the nuclear agreement is Iran eventually acquiring nuclear weapons, this changes the regional security calculus quite dramatically, and in a way that is to India's detriment. Therefore, India should be willing to partner with EU states to promote the JCPOA. However, it should also be cognizant of the realpolitik of such a stance: India should express support for the EU positions only if it is certain that the US will not make any special concessions for India when it comes to New Delhi's interests in Iran.

Prof. P R Kumaraswamy (July 2018)

For India, Iran is also a cantankerous partner. It seeks to renegotiate formal agreements, breaks off friendly understandings, raises the ante, and often irritates.

Iran has never come to terms with India's vote in the IAEA and UN Security Council over the nuclear controversy. It is not as if Iran has exercised a great deal of restraint on issues that are dear to India (e.g. Kashmir, Kulbhushan Jadhav).

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- But the Indian strategic community has also contributed to this state of affairs. By exclusively focusing on the US dimension, the strategic community has glossed over the flip side of Indo-Iranian relations.

What is the implication of the Iranian missile programme for India and its Gulf Arab friends? Can Iran use its strategic assets to intimidate its smaller and less powerful Arab neighbours? These are uncomfortable puzzles.

Geostrategic reality will ensure Iran's continued importance. But the renewal of American hostility provides India an opportunity to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Indo-Iranian relations. Yes, Iran is more than an energy supplier but it also has strategic liabilities.

Zorawar Daulet Singh - What does Iran bring to the table for India?

- Key to any meaningful Indian role in Eurasia is through Iran.
- Shaping Afghanistan,
- Accessing Central Asia and Russia,
- Reviving old trade routes etc.

Look, for example, at Chinese foreign policy - constructive ties with all players in the Middle East. India must do the same!

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India-Japan relations

PM Modi - Mutual trust and faith, understanding of each other's interests and concerns, and continuous high level interactions, this is the uniqueness of Indo-Japan relations.

Both nations share core values of democracy, peace, the rule of law, tolerance, and respect for the environment in realising pluralistic and inclusive growth of the region.

Prof. [Harsh Pant](#) writes that the relationship between India and Japan is perhaps the best it has ever been, largely because both countries have Prime Ministers who view the region and the world in very similar terms. Abe, a long-standing admirer of India, has been a strong advocate of strategic ties between New Delhi and Tokyo. He was one of the first Asian leaders to envision a "broader Asia", linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans to form the Indo-Pacific.

In a speech delivered in August 2007 by Japanese PM Shinzo Abe to the Indian Parliament, he alluded to a book by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in describing the "dynamic coupling" of the Indian and Pacific oceans as the "confluence of the two seas." Further, **Shinzo Abe** has written in his book that it wouldn't be surprising to him if in coming years India-Japan relations will overtake Japan-US and Japan-China relations. He notes that a strong India is good for Japan and vice-versa.

[C Raja Mohan](#) (Sept. 2017): That Japan was the only nation to extend public support to India during the Doklam confrontation with China is symbolic of the extraordinary transformation of relations between the two Asian powers over the last few years.

Rise of China and uncertainty over America's role in Asia has brought Japan and India closer. Modi and Abe can overcome the bureaucratic inertia that limits the relationship's possibilities.

There are institutionalised bilateral summits every year between the two leaders of the country. This shows the importance that the nations attach to the India-Japan relations.

In November 2016, PM Modi visited Japan and in September 2017 PM Abe visited India. Apart from the bilateral summits, the two nations engage in other plurilateral platforms like:

- Trilaterals with the US and Australia
- Quad - US, Japan, India, Australia
- G4 for the reforms of UN platforms - India, Japan, Germany, Brazil
- G20
- Connectivity initiatives prospects - partnership in South Asia, South-East Asia and Africa. e.g. Both jointly came out with vision document on "Asia Africa Growth Corridor".

Defence and Security Cooperation - Japan has changed its laws, lift its 50-year ban on arms exports and concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information.

- Annual Defence Ministerial Dialogue, the NSA dialogue, the "2+2" Dialogue, the Defence Policy Dialogue and Service-to-Service staff talks.
- Expansion in scale and complexity of the **MALABAR** Exercise.
- Defence equipment and technology - **Unmanned Ground Vehicles** and **Robotics**, 12 **US-2 amphibian aircraft**.

[C Raja Mohan](#) writes that languishing Defence (Military) partnership need to be given a push.

Civil Nuclear agreement:

- Apart from the Russian reactors, India's planned nuclear reactors with France and US also depend on Japanese parts.
- Moreover, GE, Westinghouse, and Areva, the companies planning reactors in India, have important ownership stakes of Japanese companies such as **Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi**, which were stopped by the Japanese government from doing business with India without a final nuclear deal.
- Signals a wider acceptance of India's status as a **responsible nuclear actor**.
- Japan has civil nuclear treaties with 13 countries, including the US, France and Russia, but this is the first with a nation that is not part of the NPT.
- **Entered into force in July 2017**. Against the backdrop of China's reluctance to support India's candidacy for NSG, the deal assumes great salience.

Trade and Economy & Infrastructure development:

Tremendous **complementarity in economy** for India-Japan ties.

- On the Japanese side are huge pension liabilities, the need to generate higher returns, and large pool of patient capital. This is a perfect complement for long gestation, capital-hungry infrastructure projects of India.

As of now **Japan-India trade is a mere 5% of Japan-China trade**. Today, India-Japan trade languishes at around \$15 billion, a quarter of trade with China while Japan-China trade is around \$300 billion.

- **India is the largest recipient of Japanese foreign aid**. Japanese have also made record investment in private equity and venture capital in India.
- Both Japan and India must aspire for two-way trade of \$100 billion, annual investment by Japan in India of \$25 billion and at least 100 joint manufacturing/research and development centres on a global scale within the next ten years.

The **Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement i.e. CEPA (2011)** between India and Japan and is one of the most comprehensive agreements concluded by India.

- Bilateral trade between India and Japan post-CEPA has increased considerably, however, trade deficit of India with respect to Japan has also increased post-CEPA.
- Huge untapped potential for Indian **Pharma industry**, coupled with the decision of Government of Japan towards attaining an 80 % share of generic medicines by 2018.

Infrastructure sector:

- Bullet Train project - ₹ 1.08 lakh crore (\$17 billion) HSR (bullet train) project. Of this 81 % is through soft loan from Japan.
- Delhi Metro rail, Next phase of Mumbai subway - funded by JICA.
- Japan is working on developing 12 Industrial townships called Japan Industrial Townships (JITs) which will operate like Little Japan with all the infrastructure to support the operations of Japanese companies.
- Delhi Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC).
- Chennai Bangalore Industrial corridor (CBIC), also a dedicated freight project in southern India.
- They are showing interests in Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, because they have the largest bathroom (toilet) manufacturing company of the world.
- In Smart City Mission: Chennai, Ahmedabad and Varanasi; to turn them into a 'smart city' with help from Kyoto.

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India has also invited Japan to invest in infrastructure projects in **India's northeastern region**, where tensions with China loom large.

Three main challenges which have constrained the Japan-India economic partnership:

- i. India's complex **regulations, red tape**, ad hoc nature of state-level interventions.
- ii. Japanese companies face considerable **logistics** challenges and non-availability of uninterrupted **power supply** constrains their manufacturing plans in India.
- iii. While India can emerge as a large market for **Japanese infrastructure system exports** (one of the core components of Abenomics), there have been **incredible delays** in the commencement of the **projects**. While there is the shining example of the Delhi Metro Rail, the **delays with DMIC, CBIC** are disappointing.

Shyam Saran (May 2017) - India has failed to take advantage of the growing trend in Japan to diversify its trade and investment links away from China.

One senses disappointment that the special relationship between both PMs have not really translated into an economic and commercial partnership comparable to what developed between Japan and China in the early phase of the latter's modernisation. It is the conviction among Japanese that there could be a quantum leap in such investment if the business climate in India provided them with a level of comfort and predictability.

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Connectivity - Prospects for India-Japan cooperation (context behind: Chinese OBOR/BRI)

There is a congruence in India's "**Act East Policy**" and Japan's "**Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy**" and "**Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI)**".

Dr. C. Raja Mohan "Connecting Asia: Prospects for India-Japan Partnership"

Chinese economic expansions in South Asia (which is inevitable, China 2nd largest economy of the world), come with Political and Security challenges. Given this condition, a partnership with Japan provides a fundamentally different approach to the question of connectivity in Asia. So Japan has the potential to become an important player in forging connectivity in this part of the world. DMIC and developing Industrial Township along these routes are ideas of 2005 itself, but has not gained the pace that is required.

Japanese PQI provides an alternative to India's interest of Internal and Trans-Border connectivity, of finding an alternative to Chinese BRI. Partnership in **South Asia, South-East Asia and Africa** holds immense potential for India-Japan relations.

Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)

A vision document on the "Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)" was released at the **AfDB** annual meeting (May 2017) in Gandhinagar. This study was jointly produced by three research institutions of India and Japan.

- **Amb. Rajiv Bhatia:** Immediately initiate a few joint pilot projects involving the companies of India, Japan and a few African countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Mozambique in identified areas such as health care, agriculture and blue economy.
- Unless results become visible in the short term, questions may arise about the credibility of their joint approach. China's substantial success needs to be matched by sustained India-Japan cooperation in Africa.

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Indo-Pacific region

Joint Statement says that there is rising importance of the Indo-Pacific region as the key driver for the prosperity of the world.

- Safeguarding and strengthening a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region.
- Strengthen trilateral cooperation frameworks with the US, Australia and other countries.

C Raja Mohan - Indo-Pacific Region (Feb. 2017)

Substantial powers of many sizes, including India, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and Singapore need to steer a path that is steady and interest-based, avoiding both complacency and panic. India-Japan need to construct effective partnerships of security, economic and political cooperation to ensure their countries can together shape the regional order and not simply accept the results of US-China competition, collision or collusion.

India-Japan-Australia

- Australia has long been another leader in building a more robust regional security architecture. Popular notions of the scale of its ties with China — its largest trading partner — overlook the concerns with which successive Australian governments have seen Chinese power and the diversification of Australia's regional relationships.
- Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra could build the first of multiple **middle power coalitions** for promoting **regional resilience**: Informal arrangements of nations cooperating with one another on strategic issues, working in self-selecting groups that do not include China or the US.
- Their mutual self-help **could span many priority areas**, to firm up the multi-polar context with which Chinese power will have to come to terms.
 - These include security dialogues, intelligence exchanges, sharing of maritime surveillance data, capacity-building of military or civilian maritime forces in smaller countries in Southeast Asia or the Indian Ocean, technology sharing, agenda-setting in regional forums like the East Asia Summit and coordinated diplomatic initiatives to influence both US and Chinese strategic calculations.

This is not about constructing an Asia without America. Nor can it seek to contain China. This is about finding ways to limit regional instability amidst the shifting dynamic between America and China.

Quadrilateral arrangement - "Quad" (US, Japan, India, Australia)

Late in 2012, in an influential article outlining his vision for 'Asia's Democratic Security Diamond', Abe argued that peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Pacific are inseparable from peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and called for the four powers to work together.

- PM Abe wrote: "*I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.*"

C Raja Mohan (Oct. 2017): Japan's plans to draw in UK, France into its alliance with India, Australia and the US will reinforce New Delhi's partnerships in Europe.

For Shinzo Abe, who first discussed the idea of a quad a little over a decade ago, the four-nation forum is, in essence, a coalition of "**maritime democracies**". Abe argued that the maritime democracies have a stake in securing a rules-based global order, liberal trading system and freedom of navigation.

Takenori Horimoto contends that 'Quad' is apparently indispensable to maintain a two-sided strategy of engagement and hedging vis-à-vis China into the foreseeable future.

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Is there a case for India-Japan "alliance"?

C Raja Mohan - The case for Alliance (Sept. 2017): Two factors are threatening to unravel the post-war order in Asia. One is the rapid rise of China and the other is the growing uncertainty over America's future role in Asia.

While they hope for an enduring American role in stabilising Asia, Delhi and Tokyo also need to insure against wild oscillations in US policy. One way of doing that is to move towards a genuine alliance between India and Japan. America may have no objections to such an alliance. It has, in fact, actively encouraged closer cooperation between Delhi and Tokyo.

A potential alliance between India and Japan can neither replace the American might nor contain China. As Beijing's neighbours, Delhi and Tokyo have a big stake in a cooperative relationship with Beijing and at the same time a strong incentive to temper some of China's unilateralism through a regional balance of power system.

While the objective case for an alliance is evident, can Delhi and Tokyo overcome their strategic inertia and take the necessary subjective decisions?

Takenori Horimoto (India-Japan relations in Emerging Asia): Relations have gone beyond the transformational stage and are poised for alliance.

Why No to Alliance and Yes to Special Strategic Partnership: Rajesh Basur - Sept. 2017

Alliances are passé and only a few continue gingerly from the Cold War era. We live in a world today driven by "strategic partnerships". States find themselves in an interdependent system where the traditional power politics of yesteryear doesn't quite fit.

- After all, every major relationship characterised by strategic tension such as U.S.-China, Japan-China, India-China is simultaneously one of economic gain.
- The U.S. and China are each other's chief trading partners, while China ranks at the top for Japan and India. Besides, India might confront China at Doklam but it also wants Chinese investment.

Strategic partnerships carry certain characteristic features falling short of alliances.

- Unlike alliances, they do not demand commitments to a partner's disputes with other countries. New Delhi does not take a strong position on Japan's territorial disputes with China and Russia. Likewise, Tokyo does not openly side with India in its quarrels with China and Pakistan.

Strategic partnership means,

- First, that both retain the flexibility to continue political engagement and economic cooperation with their common adversary.
- Second, they avoid "entrapment", or being dragged into a partner's disputes and potentially into conflict, which happened in the First World War.
- Third, regular high-level political and military interactions facilitate a collaborative approach to strategic policies over a range of economic and military activities. India and Japan, for instance, are not only moving forward on economic and defence cooperation but are also cooperating on other important issues such as civil nuclear energy and Security Council reform.

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Japan-China relations - what's been happening in recent times?

Japan's 4 major concerns with China:

- Economic interdependence and geopolitical compulsions.
- China's strategy of using surrogates (e.g. North Korea, Pak in case of India).
- Resisting UNSC entry.
- Expanding influence in high seas.

K V Kesavan - Is the US retreating from Asia, giving way to China?

Trump's "toned down" stance on the South China Sea issue, his emphasis on "America first" policy and his soft attitude towards China have made many Japanese leaders suspect that the US is retreating from Asia.

Amb. P S Raghavan (April 2018): The unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy is driving even its closest allies to hedge their options.

Japanese PM Abe and Mr. Xi are to exchange visits in the near future — a significant breakthrough in relations between two strategic rivals, who were on the verge of a military confrontation about five years ago. Japan (like India) is concerned about China's assertiveness in its neighbourhood and the geopolitical implications of its BRI. China's positive response reflects its own desire to keep in touch with a U.S. ally, in the face of conflicting U.S. signals on trade and security policies.

Japan and China agree on mechanism to avoid armed skirmishes (May 2018)

- Prof. Shin Kawashima (a China scholar at the University of Tokyo): Motivating factors on the Japanese side: an unpredictable U.S., North Korea and business interests.
- Yet, any China-Japan alignment is a tactical and provisional affair, rather than long-term and strategic, born out of the current moment in a fluid geopolitical landscape. It is more akin to a pause rather than a resolution of conflict.

Other areas of cooperation for India & Japan:

- **Science & Technology:** Artificial Intelligence, Energy, Ocean Sciences and Marine Instrumentation, High Skill Development, Big Data analytics, R&D and Bio Information. These projects include the exchange of students of both countries, training for Indian Scientists, Joint Research Programmes and Scholarships.
- Manufacturing Skill Transfer Promotion Program
- MoU between ISRO and JAXA concerning Cooperation in the field of Outer Space.
- Agriculture and Food Related Industry - food value chain networking and protecting Geographical Indication (GI) of agriculture products.
- Transport and Urban Development
 - Investment in infrastructure projects in railways & transportation; port terminals; toll roads; airport terminals; urban development; logistics etc.
 - Exploring NIIF-Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation joint fund.
- Textiles sector: to improve quality of Indian Textiles for conformity assessment for Japanese market, capacity building, Quality Control measures in line with Japanese market and technical standards.
- Field of Cultural Exchange
- Cooperation in the field of **Sports** ahead of the forthcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympics & Paralympics.
 - Exchange of sportspersons, coaches, sports experts, sports administrators etc.

India-Sri Lanka relations

India–Sri Lanka relations have been friendly, but were controversially affected by the Sri Lankan Civil War and by the failure of Indian intervention during the war.

Tamil issue

Brief overview (Shivshankar Menon, Book: Choices - Inside the making of India's Foreign Policy)

There are multiple religious and ethnic fault lines in Sri Lanka between the primarily Hindu and Christian Sri Lankan Tamils and the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese, with a sprinkling of "Burghers," who had some Dutch blood; Muslims concentrated in the capital Colombo and the Northern and Eastern Provinces; and other small communities.

While Tamil speakers of all religions were concentrated in the north and east, the areas claimed by the LTTE as Tamil Eelam, their homeland, the Sinhalese were concentrated in the south and west of the island.

For India, whatever happened in Sri Lanka directly affected the far larger population of Tamils in the Tamilnadu, the scene of an active separatist movement with considerable popular support through the 1950s and early 1960s.

With independence for Sri Lanka in 1948 came majority politics and a series of steps that disadvantaged the Tamil minority.

- The 1948 Ceylon Citizenship Act made 7 lakh Indian-origin Tamils stateless;
- The 1956 Sinhala Only Act replaced English with Sinhala as the only official language;
- In the 1970s a preferential university admissions system known as the "policy of standardization" discriminated against Tamils in recruitment to jobs and university places and institutionalized ethnic discrimination; and
- Officially sponsored colonization in the north and east by Sinhala farmers aroused Tamil resistance.

Refugee crisis in India and July 1987 Accord: The negotiations between India and Sri Lanka led to an accord in July 1987 called Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The accord attempted to address the crises in peaceful manner by providing sufficient autonomy to northern regions without splitting up the nation.

Provisions of accord:

- The northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka where Tamils were the majority would be merged into a single province.
- Substantial devolution of power to the Northern Province.
- The LTTE would be dissolved and arms surrendered in a very short time.
- The Indian army would come to the aid of the Sri Lankan government if requested by Sri Lanka.

The **13th amendment** aimed at creating provincial councils in Sri Lanka and enable Sinhalese and Tamil as national languages while preserving English as the link language. However, the accord failed to take off because the LTTE had given only reluctant consent, was not a signatory, did not trust the Sri Lankan government and refused to surrender.

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Indian Official stand (MEA website) in the aftermath of end of Civil War

The nearly three-decade long armed conflict between Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE came to an end in May 2009. During the course of the conflict, India supported the right of the Government of Sri Lanka to act against terrorist forces. At the same time, it conveyed its deep concern at the plight of the mostly Tamil civilian population, emphasizing that their rights and welfare should not get enmeshed in hostilities against the LTTE.

The need for national reconciliation through a political settlement of the ethnic issue has been reiterated by India at the highest levels. India's consistent position is in favour of a negotiated political settlement, which is acceptable to all communities within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and which is consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights.

The conclusion of the armed conflict saw the emergence of a major humanitarian challenge, with nearly 3 lakhs Tamil civilians housed in camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Government of India put in place a robust programme of assistance to help the IDPs return to normal life as quickly as possible. In recent years, there has been significant progress in implementation of developmental assistance projects for IDPs and disadvantaged sections of the population in Sri Lanka.

Shivshankar Menon (Book: *Choices*): The Sri Lankan civil war which ended in 2009 was also one of the longest civil wars in history. The Tamil sense of grievances unaddressed makes the return of separatism and radicalism in another form a matter of time. Much will depend on how politics and society develop in Tamilnadu, the true land of Tamils, in the years ahead. For the present there is declared sympathy but little real support in Tamilnadu for the causes or the methods that the LTTE adopted.

In March 2018, [Sri Lanka imposed nationwide emergency for 10 days in response to anti-Muslim violence](#).

- Ethnic clash between Sinhalese Buddhist and Muslims

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Sri Lanka formulating New Constitution

Maithripala Sirisena, who was backed by the Tamils against Mahinda Rajapaksa in the presidential election of 2015, launched the process **to formulate a new constitution** to replace the existing 1978 constitution. Drafting of new constitution is underway and the deadlines have been shifted multiple times.

The **3 constitutions Sri Lanka framed since 1948** have not involved everyone in the drafting and promulgation process. **Trust deficits** must be bridged by improving involvement.

- i. The [Soulbury Constitution \(1948\)](#) was the first constitution as an independent nation.
- ii. Sri Lankan Constitution of **1972, first republican constitution**, changed the country's name to Sri Lanka from Ceylon, and proclaimed it as an independent republic nation.
- iii. The Constitution of the [Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978](#).

The challenges before constituent assembly in drafting of new constitution involve the following goals:

- abolishing the executive presidency
- reforming the electoral system
- promoting good governance
- strengthening democratic institutions,
- a comprehensive rights regime
- substantive power-sharing arrangements involving all ethnic minorities


Fisherman Issues

Given the proximity of the territorial waters of both countries, especially in the Palk Straits and the Gulf of Mannar, incidents of straying of fishermen are common.

Problem mainly emerged only after a **maritime agreement** was signed by India and Sri Lanka in **1974**, wherein, **Kachchatheevu Island was gifted to Sri Lanka**, the Indian fishermen have been debarred from fishing around that rich fishing grounds around that Island leading to skirmishes and incidents. From the Indian fishermen point of view, historically, the contested waters belonged to India and they have every right to fish in the traditional waters.



A snapshot of Indian poaching in Sri Lankan waters.



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MEA - India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a **Joint Working Group (JWG)** on Fisheries between the concerned ministries of both the countries as the mechanism to help find a permanent solution to the fishermen issue.

- First meeting took place in December 2016 in New Delhi and second meeting in Colombo on April 07, 2017. The next round of Ministerial-level talks and JWG meetings were held during October 2017 at New Delhi.
- The Indian side assured that **bottom trawling would be phased out in a graded time-bound manner** within a practicable timeframe **keeping in mind the capacity building of the fishermen** who have to be diversified into **deep sea fishing** as well as other coastal fisheries activities including **mariculture, pearl farming, seaweed culture**, etc.

Prof. V Suryanarayan (Carnegie India) - **Key Issues and proposed solutions:**

1. Sovereignty of Kachchatheevu
 - get back the island of Kachchatheevu on “lease in perpetuity”
 - Would let Sri Lanka maintain ownership but Indian fishermen could continue to fish in and around Kachchatheevu.
 - E.g. Tin Bigha case (1974), India-Bangladesh boundary agreement gave India sovereignty over Tin Bigha, but a lease in perpetuity later enabled the Bangladeshis to use it for civilian purposes.
 - Permit licensed Indian fishermen to fish within a designated area (e.g. 5 nautical miles) of Sri Lankan waters and vice versa.
 - There is precedent in the 1976 boundary agreement, which allowed licensed Sri Lankan fishermen to fish in the Wadge Bank (a fertile fishing ground located near Kanyakumari) for a period of three years.
2. Poaching and Trawling - further limiting the days, timeframe, and location for fishing and an immediate end to bottom trawling
 - Trawlers have been referred to as the “hoovers of the shelf bottom” and “bulldozers mowing down fish and other benthic species.”
 - Indian fishermen point out that unless its government introduced **concrete steps to buy back trawlers**, it would not be possible to stop trawling operations. The government should implement a buy-back arrangement as soon as possible. There is unlikely to be much opposition from trawler owners and fishermen because they know the reality.

India must view the Palk Bay region as a common heritage of the two countries and project this vision. We can form a **Palk Bay authority**, comprising fisheries experts, marine ecologists, fishermen’s representatives, strategic specialists, and government officials.

In his effort to transform India-Pakistan relations, former Indian PM Manmohan Singh emphasized that while he cannot alter the existing borders, he can try and make them irrelevant. That vision of cooperative frontiers in the subcontinent has had broad support from PM Modi as well. This rare moment of political opportunity is too valuable to miss.

Economic Relations

- India-Sri Lanka FTA entered in to force in March 2000. According to Sri Lankan Customs, bilateral trade in 2016 amounted to US \$ 4.38 billion. However, it is mostly one-sided in favour of India.
- **Development loans and line of credit** -almost one-sixth of India's development loans go to Sri Lanka.
- There is considerable **private sector investment** from India in Sri Lanka and from Sri Lanka into India. The areas both of cooperation between both the countries are petroleum, IT, Financial Services, Real estate, telecom, hospitals, tourism, banking, food processing etc.
- Indian railways are offering special package for Sri Lankan **tourists** to come to India. India has introduced **e-visa** for Sri Lanka.
- India is the fourth biggest investor in Sri Lanka. Since 2003 we have invested about \$1 billion in Sri Lanka.
- Negotiation of proposed trade pact **Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA)** an extension over the existing FTA is underway:
 - cooperation in technical areas,
 - scientific expertise and research amongst institutions,
 - boost standards of goods and services
 - Capacity building initiatives

CHINA ANGLE

The main objective of Chinese is to ensure the security of its sea lanes, especially unhindered flow of critically-needed energy supplies from Africa and West Asia.

Sri Lanka is seen as "an important hub on the Maritime Silk Road" by China. China had voted in favour of SL in US sponsored UNHRC resolutions.

- China has displaced Japan as Sri Lanka's major aid donor with an annual package of \$1 billion.
- Bilateral trade has doubled over the last five years with China emerging as the third largest trading partner of Sri Lanka.
- China is Sri Lanka's largest foreign investor and lender. China is now supplying over half of all the construction and development loans Sri Lanka is receiving.
- First foreign nation to have an exclusive economic zone in Sri Lanka.
- Some of the important infrastructure projects developed by China in the island state include Hambantota port, Colombo Expressway, Coal Power Project, and Mattala Airport etc.
- Funding from China accounts for more than half of Sri Lanka's construction and development loans. In value terms, it is estimated at over USD 6 billion- more than any other country.

Sri Lanka paying the price of China's Debt-Trap Diplomacy (Brahma Chellany)

Several of the projects that have been completed are now bleeding money.

- Sri Lanka's Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013 near Hambantota, has been dubbed the worlds emptiest.
- Likewise, Hambantota Port remains largely idle
- For China, however, these projects are operating exactly as needed: Chinese attack submarines have twice docked at Sri Lankan ports.
- Sri Lanka formally hands over Hambantota port on 99-year lease to China (Dec. 2017)

India to operate "world's emptiest airport" - Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport in Hambantota (July 2018)

- India would operate the airport as a Sri Lanka-India joint venture. The joint venture would see India gain a major stake of the airport.

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- The only international flight operating from there was halted in May 2018 due to recurrent losses and flight safety issues. The seaport built in Hambantota has been leased to China (for 99 years) to set off Chinese loans as equity.

[New York Times report revealed that a Chinese company funded former President Mahinda Rajapaksa's 2015 election campaign](#), with \$7.6 million. China and Mr. Rajapaksa have denied the allegations. (July 2018)

C Raja Mohan: You might blame China for many things, but not for India's much-delayed regionalist epiphany.

- That China is a major economic partner for Colombo and other regional capitals can't be a surprise. After all, China is now the world's second largest economy.
- How come Delhi, despite its size and proximity, has to "compete with Beijing" in the Subcontinent?
 - India had checked out of the business of regional integration **after Independence. Delhi deliberately chose to discard economic regionalism — in the name of self-reliance.**
 - In the reform era that began at the turn of the 1990s, Delhi has surely tried to undo the damage. But the effort was too weak to overcome the political burdens that weighed down India's neighbourhood policy. Unfortunately for India, it also coincided with China's rise and the dramatic expansion of its regional commercial influence.
- **Modi's "Neighbourhood First" policy is in essence about promoting regional economic integration.** Sustained diplomacy has begun to pay off with Dhaka. Delhi might need lots of patience, much hard work and a bit of luck to produce similar economic advances with Colombo.

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India-Maldives relations

Brief Overview (Amb. **Rajiv Sikri**, Book: Challenge and Strategy - Rethinking India's Foreign Policy)

Maldives, isolated from the mainland, developed a unique national identity created out of the interplay of influences from India, Sri Lanka as well as the Persian and Arab world. But by designating Islam as the official religion and prohibiting the citizens of Maldives from practising any other religion, the 1997 constitution and former President Gayoom's policies of using religion for political purposes have created an intolerant fundamentalist society.

Over the last six decades, India has been on many occasions the decisive factor in seeking a resolution of domestic political crises in Bangladesh (1971), Sri Lanka (1987), Nepal (1950–51 and 2005–08) and Maldives (1988). The challenge for India lies in not getting drawn into situations from which there may be no safe and honourable exit, and in simultaneously pushing for national consensus that involves all the principal political actors in the country concerned.

Chronological sequence of events:

- India was among the first to recognise Maldives after its independence in 1965 and to establish diplomatic relations with the country. India established its mission at Malé in 1972.
- **Maumoon Abdul Gayoom** (half-brother of current president Abdulla Yameen) ruled Maldives as President from 1978 to 2008. In December, 1988, India foiled a coup attempt in Male' a gorilla outfit from Sri Lanka.
- **Mohammed Nasheed** succeeded through **democratic elections in 2008**. In 2008, India welcomed the democratic elections in Maldives. However, relations deteriorated when President Nasheed resigned and took shelter in Indian Embassy (Feb, 2013). Later, he was defeated in the elections in November 2013.
- **Abdulla Yameen** assumed office in November 2013.
 - During the first two months of the regime, the bilateral relations took a nose dive when the Maldivian government terminated the contract of Indian company GMR to build Male' Airport on the allegations of irregularity.
 - However, soon Yameen realised his folly and visited India in January 2014 to reassure his bigger partner of friendly relations.
 - President Yameen also participated in the swearing in ceremony of PM Modi. He paid a state visit to India in April, 2016 to reassure India of Maldives' friendly relations.
 - Yameen had said his country pursues an "**India first**" **foreign policy**, describing it as the Maldives's most important friend. But that was just after India had shielded the Yameen government from punitive action by the Commonwealth's human rights and democracy oversight body.
 - Dec. 2017: Maldives seals FTA with China.
 - Maldives became the second country in South Asia, after Pakistan, to enter into a FTA with China.
 - The haste with which the government, led by President Abdulla Yameen, decided to pass the pact — the session took barely half an hour — was perceived in India as Male trying to cosy up to China.
 - Feb. 2018: President Yameen imposed a **State of Emergency on Feb. 5, 2018** after a Supreme Court ruling quashed convictions against nine opposition leaders. The state of emergency continued for 45 days.
- **Presidential elections** will be held in the Maldives on **23rd September 2018**.

Reasons why Maldives is important for India

- i. Strategically located in the Indian Ocean, Maldives archipelago comprising 1200 coral islands lies next to key shipping lanes which ensure uninterrupted energy supplies to countries like China, Japan and India.
- ii. Since China started to send naval ships to Indian Ocean roughly 10 years ago --and right up to Gulf of Aden in the name of anti-piracy operations-- Maldives' significance has steadily grown and now it's at the heart of international geopolitics.
- iii. As the pre-eminent South Asian power and a 'net security provider' in the Indian Ocean region, India needs to cooperate with Maldives in security and defence sectors.
- iv. China's massive economic presence in Maldives is a major concern for India. With the country now said to owe 70% of its external aid to China, many believe that **Yameen has done to Maldives what Rajapaksa did to Sri Lanka.**
 - In July 2015 Maldives had passed an amendment to its constitution allowing foreign ownership of freehold land for the first time just a day after the legislation was tabled in parliament.
 - A Chinese firm has acquired "**Feydhoo Finolhu**" island on a 50 year lease for \$4 million for developing a resort near capital city Male.
 - Saudi Arabian initiative of investing \$10 billion for wholesale acquisition of **Faafu**, 19 low-lying islands 120 km south of Male.
 - When viewed in the context of the increasing footprint of radical Islam in the islands, increasing visibility of Chinese Saudi defence cooperation becomes worrying for India's strategic watchers.
- v. Under Yameen, radicalization grew rapidly and it was often said that archipelago accounted for one of the highest numbers of foreign fighters in Syria in terms of per capita. India can ill-afford a neighbour which fails to check Islamic radicalisation.

Amb. M K Bhadrakumar (Dec. 2017): A permanent solution needs to be found. Maldives floats like a butterfly and stings like a bee at our navel every now and then. In these postmodern times, the fizz has gone out of the regime-change formula. What's the certainty that Mohamed Nasheed in power in Male will behave exactly this way while in exile? Our foreign and security policy establishment should come up with something ingenious. To my mind, **why not the Diego Garcia formula?**

The Hindu Editorial on why relations have soured so badly:

- The fact that the Maldives is the only country in the neighbourhood that PM Modi hasn't visited is one reason, but there are many others.
- India's vocal protests on democratic rights in the Maldives have been at variance with the past policy of taking a more muted line in public while encouraging democracy in official conversations.
 - Mr. Gayoom also ran a near-autocracy for three decades from 1978, and India's interventions always aimed at strengthening the government there, with any misgivings conveyed only through quiet diplomacy.

State of Emergency in Maldives and Demands for India's Military Intervention

President Yameen imposed a State of Emergency on Feb. 5, 2018 after a Supreme Court ruling quashed convictions against nine opposition leaders. The state of emergency continued for 45 days.

India had, in the past, carried out military operations inside Maldives, though that was at the invitation of the Maldivian president when Gayoom sought Rajiv Gandhi's help in **1988** to stave off a mercenary threat.

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[C Raja Mohan](#) (Feb. 2018)

The crisis in Maldives drew attention to the perennial question about whether and when India should intervene in the internal politics of its neighbouring countries.

Some misconceptions about India's approach to sovereignty and intervention.

- i. One popular political myth is that New Delhi has unflinching commitment to the principle of "non-intervention". This general principle had a big exception in India's neighbourhood policy.
 - liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971,
 - the intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war in the late 1980s,
 - recent involvement in the making of Nepal's constitution.

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- ii. India certainly intervenes, but not always. Delhi's decision-makers are not perpetually plotting to shape the domestic politics of its neighbours.
- iii. China, unlike India, believes in sovereign equality with countries big or small. Like all myths, this has no empirical basis.
 - Since most countries in the Subcontinent seek a bit of autonomy from India, they find China's interventionism often quite useful. But only up to a point. Geography and interdependence with India caution them against drawing too close to Beijing, and provoking Delhi into intervention and regime change.

Delhi surely knows one thing from its past interventions. The task of fixing other people's problems is never easy. And not all consequences of intervention can really be predicted or managed.

Maldives might be tiny state with less than half a million people. With a deeply fractured political elite that has become acutely conscious of its strategic location, it will take a lot of Indian energy to repair the state of affairs in Maldives. But then that is the burden of all major powers, especially in their own regions.

Indrani Bagchi - Tread softly on Maldives: India's response to Yameen's seizure of power **must rely on smarts, not brawn.** (Feb. 2018)

Credibility of Nasheed is doubtful, as is of 80-year-old Gayoom, a quasi-autocrat himself for over 30 years.

- India should not forget Nasheed's courting of China during the Male SAARC summit, and should not be seen as putting all its weight behind the former president. Nasheed is still viewed in New Delhi as "immature" and "brash", and, officials pointed out, his MDP has not reached out sufficiently to other opposition partners.
- This means even among the few who are not in jail there exists the possibility of Maldives beyond Yameen. These forces would wilt under Indian glare – much better to create an enabling environment for them to flourish.

Former foreign secretary [Kanwal Sibal](#) warned **India must not get into the business of regime change even if it seems to serve its strategic interest.** 'Yameen is acting arbitrarily but this is still an internal matter of the Maldives. It is better for India to wait for a while and see if Yameen makes more mistakes or if people of Maldives decide to come out on streets against him. China will ensure comfort for the Maldives even if western countries decide to impose sanctions because of the stakes that Beijing has developed in that country.'

[Nitin Pai - When should India employ hard power?](#) (9th Feb);

- **Panipat School of strategic thought** — “let’s wait until the threat materialises inside our country before we concern ourselves about it”.
- **Hindukush School of thought**, where we attempt to dissipate the threat as far from our borders as possible.
 - Nuclear deterrence, for instance, is a Hindukush approach.
 - So is the dispatch of the Indian Navy to waters east of Singapore and shaping the balance of power in East Asia.
- As India becomes more developed the Panipat approach will become costlier. The United States spends a lot of money to maintain a global military presence. It does so because that is cheaper than the cost of incurring damage on the homeland. We still have a long way to go, but as per capita GDP rises, so will the need for the Hindukush strategy.

[Shyam Saran](#): In 2012, India may have taken the wrong call in not responding to Nasheed's appeal for intervention when he was being forced to resign under duress, paving the way for Yameen's capture of state power. Nasheed was the constitutionally elected head of state and an Indian intervention to prevent the coup against him would have been justified. There are occasions when safeguarding Indian interests requires swift action despite risks involved. A wait and watch approach may sometimes undermine our interests through a relentless attrition process.

[Manoj Joshi](#) (June 2018): India has maintained its primacy in the region, often through the use of soft power, by funding hospitals and educational institutions, and offering scholarships and training programmes. But it has not hesitated to militarily intervene when its interests were at stake. However, New Delhi has learnt over the years that direct intervention often comes at a price. Sometimes, it is worth playing the longer game rather than acting in haste.

Chinese presence in Maldives ([Andrew Small](#))

China has lent heavily to fund a new airport and related developments costing US\$1.25 billion, as well as a new port. As a result, the [Maldives' public debt will climb to almost 75% of GDP, almost 70% of which will be owed to China](#).

- India's **GMR** was thrown off the country's major airport expansion project in favour of the Chinese, who are also building a “friendship bridge” to connect the airport to the capital.
- Maldivian property laws were changed in July 2015 to allow foreign ownership of land, **provided** the investment was at least \$ 1 billion and 70 % was land reclaimed from the sea. With China's experience in large-scale island building through reclaimed land in the South China Sea, one need not speculate about the likely beneficiary of this new law.
 - A Chinese firm has acquired **"Feydhoo Finolhu" island** on a 50 year lease for \$4 million for developing a resort near capital city Male.
- An equally controversial FTA with China (Dec. 2017) was also rushed through last December with no opportunity for the opposition to review the terms of the lengthy document.
- Chinese and Saudi investors are developing the ambitious iHavan project on the northern island of Ihavandhippolu, not far from India.
- There are reports that China may build another port on the southern atoll of Laamu with the eventual aim of turning it into a high-end resort for Chinese tourists, who now constitute the largest number of visitors to the country.

China opened its mission in Male only as late as 2011, so this is remarkable progress indeed.

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[Shyam Saran](#) - Enter the Dragon

China repeatedly forswears any intention of setting up bases in the Maldives, but has signalled its intention to maintain a naval presence in this part of the Indian Ocean by undertaking a highly visible visit, for the first time, of three naval vessels to Male in August 2017. So the message is loud and clear: **China is determined to demonstrate its oft-repeated assertion that the Indian Ocean is not India's ocean.**

A couple of years back, a Chinese Navy journal had spelt out the country's Indian Ocean strategy in the form a **16-Chinese character guideline**:

"Select locations meticulously, make deployments discreetly, give priority to cooperative activities and penetrate gradually."

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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

The Non Aligned Movement came into being 55 years ago when leaders of 25 developing countries met at the 1961 Belgrade Conference. **17th NAM Summit** was held at Margarita Island in **Venezuela in September 2016**.

Presently **120 developing countries are members** of this Movement. The NAM Summits are among the largest gathering of countries, after the UN.

- 53 countries from Africa, 39 from Asia, 26 from Latin America and the Caribbean and 2 from Europe (Belarus, Azerbaijan).
- There are 17 countries and 10 international organizations that are Observers at NAM.

NAM's current relevance in context of India (MEA Website)

1. NAM is also an important forum for interaction with partner countries across continents, including from [Africa](#), [CARICOM](#), [Small Island Developing States \(SIDS\)](#) and [LDCs](#), with whom we have longstanding development partnerships in a spirit of [south-south cooperation](#).
2. NAM continues to represent space for action in pursuance of the [collective interests of the developing world](#), alongwith the [G-77](#), especially on subject such as the [reform](#) of the [global economic system](#) and [disarmament](#).
3. At the UN, the NAM is an influential grouping on a range of issues such as [UN peacekeeping](#) and [disarmament](#).

Vice President Hamid Ansari's address at the 17th NAM Summit (Sept. 2016)

The foundations of NAM Movement, are as relevant today as they were at the time of our first Summit.

- “**respect for sovereignty**”,
- “**peaceful settlement of disputes**” and
- “**international cooperation**”

NAM's **theme** for the next three years – “**Peace, Sovereignty and Solidarity for Development**” – is in congruence with our founding principles.

- Cooperation, and Development Cooperation, is an essential means of SDGs in the Agenda 2030.
- Peace and Sovereignty – are a pre-requisite for development.

Main Challenge: To [modernize the manner in which NAM functions](#) (a discussion already began on this at the **Cartagena Summit in 1995**). This discussion must continue and fructify so that NAM may achieve its full potential.

- In order to enhance the role of the Movement, it is essential to bolster its internal strength.
- The need to extend and enhance co-ordination and to study the possibility of holding consultations, on a regular basis through the Coordinating Bureau.
- To improve the mechanism for enhancing the role of the NAM in conformity with changes in the international situation so that the Movement is able to respond effectively and expeditiously to the current challenges.

Shyam Saran (Book: *How India Sees the World*): It is important to [make a distinction between non-alignment as a foreign policy choice for India and the Non-Aligned Movement \(NAM\)](#).

- NAM was born as a movement of developing countries that shunned military alliances and wished to jointly play a role in promoting peace, disarmament and development.

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- Leadership of the NAM also fetched India great political leverage in its relations with the superpowers and their allies, compensating to some extent its lack of significant economic and military capabilities.

While the NAM lost much of its relevance with the end of the Cold War, non-alignment as a principle governing Indian foreign policy remains relevant to this day.

C Raja Mohan: NAM - a movement in Coma

The non-aligned project **has long stopped being a foreign policy priority for its members**. The sparse attendance by heads of government or state at the Venezuela Summit, is evidence that the key developing nations have other pressing issues on their mind.

- In the previous summits, be it the Havana Summit in 2006, Sharm el-Sheikh Summit in Egypt during 2009 or Tehran summit during 2012, the **only point of interest was on bilateral between India and Pakistan**.
- While Nehru was solidly committed to non-alignment as a national strategy, he was none too enthusiastic about a movement in its name. He wondered if it made any sense to set up a third bloc when you are objecting to the very notion of blocs.
- The idea that NAM was a radical “anti-imperialist” project was really a product of the 1970s when four summits in quick succession in Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976) and Havana (1979) unveiled sweeping rhetoric about constructing a “new world order”.

It was not the end of the Cold War that made the NAM irrelevant. The movement was dysfunctional well before that. It was **never really possible to harmonise the economic and political interests of so many different countries**. If the rhetoric of the 1970s papered over the internal contradictions, the 1980s mercilessly exposed them; the NAM has not recovered since.

Although the movement has been in coma for long, few would dare to pronounce it dead, let alone call for its burial. The triennial political ritual will therefore continue. For most countries **its only diplomatic utility lies in bringing their particular national issues to the fore in a large international gathering**. It's no surprise then India was so focused on getting its concerns about cross-border terrorism from Pakistan heard at the summit.

Prof. Vijay Prasad: At the 1973 NAM meeting in **Algiers**, the member states laid out the **New International Economic Order (NIEO)**, a charter for a different way to manage political disagreements and trade across states. The NIEO proposed a new path. It had an electric effect, but it died in the rubble of the debt crisis. **A new charter for a 21st century NAM is needed. If the NAM is to be relevant, it needs to develop such a visionary document.**

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Vision of a new World Order

PM Modi: India's "strategic intent" was shaped by the "civilisational ethos" of यथार्थवाद (realism), सह-अस्तित्व (coexistence), सहयोग (cooperation) and सहभागिता (partnership)".

India's World View (Amb. Shyam Saran, Book - "How India Sees the World" (2017))

India is heir to a very rich and sophisticated tradition of statecraft and diplomatic practice, and this legacy continues to shape its current strategic culture and diplomatic behaviour. Studying the *Jambudvipa mandala* from our ancient texts, one is struck by the fact that it does not ascribe centrality and superiority to *Bharatvarsha*, which is only one among the lotus petals that make up our universe. This is the reverse of the Chinese world view, which sees the Han core as the most advanced and civilized. India will never have a 'middle kingdom complex'. It accept a world in which there are other *dvipa* or islands with their own characteristics and values. One can relate this to India's advocacy for a multipolarity in the contemporary context.

The Indian **Subcontinent** and the eastern and western reaches of the **Indian Ocean** surrounding it are reflected in the *Jambudvipa* as a single, interconnected geopolitical and geo-economic unit with a common history. Along with Independence came **partition in 1947**. The challenge for India is to transcend the political divisions in the subcontinent to restore its cohesiveness and make its borders increasingly irrelevant, drawing upon the enduring sources of affinity.

One can thus derive that India will reach out along the very same remembered pathways traced by history - extending to the eastern and western reaches of the Indian Ocean and to the Central Asian neighbourhood to the north and west - as its economic and security capabilities expand.

Shaping the Emerging World Order and India's Role (by Shyam Saran)

In his celebrated poem, '*The Passing of Arthur*', the poet **Alfred Tennyson** writes the following lines when the dying King Arthur is set on the royal barge to take him to the nether world:

*The old order changeth yielding place to new/
And God fulfils himself in many ways/
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.*

There is little doubt that the world today is at an inflection point, when the old and familiar order is crumbling but it is not clear what it is yielding place to. If history is any guide new order will emerge. The question is whether this will be born from the ashes of a debilitating war or through a gradual process of adjustment.

World Order from Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the Global Financial and Economic crisis of 2007-08

The modern state system on which an international order is built originated in the **Peace of Westphalia** which brought a debilitating thirty-year war in Europe to a close in **1648**. It inaugurated a European order based on the concepts of political sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent states and,

as a consequence, a **multipolar order** held together by a set of agreed rules of the game and a balance of power among its participants.

An attempt by any country to upset the balance and seek dominance would trigger responses from other players to restore the equilibrium of power. And this is how the system operated in subsequent decades.

After Westphalia the concept of European order received a further elaboration at the **Congress of Vienna** convened in 1815. The objective of the Congress was to restore peace in Europe by constructing a new balance among the major powers after another bout of nearly continuous warfare for almost 25 years due to French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

The Congress of Vienna may be regarded as a maturation of the concept of multipolar order, with the development of a more elaborate set of rules of engagement among sovereign state.

The Congress was followed by a series of regular meetings amongst its main participants, which became known as the **Concert of Europe** inaugurating the age of multilateral diplomacy. The Concert of Europe created the template which led to the setting up of the League of Nations after the First World War which may be considered the early precursor of the UN established in 1945 after the Second World War.

The US emerged from the ravages of the war as the most powerful economic and military power. It helped create multilateral institutions like the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the GATT but ensured that these were dominated by the West. The UN label was useful in its interventions in countries far and near but unilateralism would often be resorted to if the label was not forthcoming.

It was not until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the end of the Cold War that the US and the West in general would enjoy a brief unipolar interlude. During this interlude which lasted up until the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-08, the US was a true hegemonic power which could set aside the established multilateral structures and processes and ignore the Westphalian norms in the pursuit of an interventionist strategy dictated by its own intent. Other powers had to acquiesce either by choice or compulsion. It is this interlude which is coming to an end.

It is in Asia that the new world order is likely to be shaped.

Over the past three decades and more, the Asia-Pacific region has replaced the Atlantic as the centre of gravity of the global economy.

- Asia is home to the second and third largest economies in the world, namely, China and Japan.
- In PPP terms India is already the 3rd largest economy in the world although it still lags behind at 6th place in nominal terms. India is likely to become the 5th largest economy in nominal terms overtaking Britain next year.
- In addition there are other substantial economies in South Korea, Australia, Taiwan and the ASEAN countries as a whole.
- This cluster of major Asian powers also deploys a formidable array of security capabilities, in particular maritime capabilities, though still modest in comparison to US military presence in the region.
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- At a time when the economies of the US and Western Europe continue to be sluggish, Asia has in India and China two of the fastest growing large economies in the world. They are likely to remain the key growth drivers of the global economy.
- The major powers in Asia have managed to sustain relative political stability and social cohesion and this, too, enables them to, exert expanding influence on both regional and global affairs.

What kind of regional order is likely to emerge in Asia given these trends?

The answer to this question is important because the shape of the regional order in Asia will greatly influence the new global order precisely because Asia has now emerged as a key fulcrum of power in the world. There can be no multipolar world order without a multipolar Asia. An Asian hegemon will inevitably aspire to global hegemony.

- The US continues to be the most formidable military power in Asia. However, its economic profile in the region has diminished even as China's has grown.
- However, the Chinese economy is slowing as has been the case with every major economy in history. A simple linear projection of China's current growth rate into the future may not be realistic.
- China also remains a brittle polity and the rising insecurity within its political leadership sits uneasily with overweening arrogance of power. Its historical insularity is at odds with the cosmopolitanism that the densely interconnected contemporary world demands of any aspiring global power.

We are, in reality, neither in a China-centric Asia nor in a world destined to become China-centric. China may continue to expand its economic and military capabilities and may even become the most powerful country in the world but the world which is emerging will still be populated by a number of substantial powers both old and new. This includes Asia.

What lessons does the history of the world since the birth of the Westphalian state system hold for us?

A stable world order needs a careful balance between power and legitimacy; and legitimacy is upheld when states, no matter how powerful, observe the various established norms of behaviour and codes of conduct and act through institutions which have been accumulated and put in place over the past four centuries, layer by layer.

The Westphalian system by its very nature is multipolar in character and is based on the assumption that any attempt by a state or a group of states to gain hegemony will always invite countervailing action by other states in the system and in, extreme cases, war.

- This is what happened when Napoleon tried to bring the whole of Europe under French domination. The Napoleonic Wars ended with the restoration of balance at the Congress of Vienna.
- The balance was again sought to be upset by an ascendant Germany and this led to two debilitating world wars.
- In our own time, the period of US hegemony from 1990 to 2007-08, when the global financial and economic crisis broke out, reducing the West to prolonged and debilitating stagnation and psychological pessimism, lasted only for a generation.

Hegemony often leads to hubris which in turn leads to overextension and then to exhaustion and sometimes war through miscalculation.

The long period of European peace between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 up until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 shows that as long as all key actors generally observe mutually agreed rules of interstate relations and norms of state behaviour a stable order can be maintained.

Why the contemporary world needs a multipolar order?

- Most of the challenges we confront as an interconnected and interdependent world are cross-cutting in character and global in dimension.
- These include global warming, health, pandemics, cybercrime, drug trafficking, proliferation of WMDs and international terrorism among others. They are often cross-domain in nature with strong feedback loops.
- The emergence of new technologies with an even greater global reach and penetration makes such international collaboration a compulsion today rather than a choice. A hegemonic order can constrain other states; it will rarely be able to promote collaborative action which can be effective only if based on consent and consultation, not coercion.

Neither the Chinese version of national rejuvenation nor American hopes of revivalism are realistic, precisely because the diffusion of economic and military power and the horizontal and accelerated spread of scientific knowledge and technology point to what author **Thomas Friedman** has called the **Flat World!**

A China-US condominium is possible especially if there is some understanding, even if temporary, over their respective spheres of influence. China may be ready to accept a US-dominated Western hemisphere if it is conceded power over Asia-Pacific and Central Asia. This is what several US and even Chinese analysts suggest for avoiding the so-called Thucydides trap.

This is also the essence of what China calls the 'new type of great power relations' between China and the US in order to avoid the Thucydides trap. But by its very nature it will be unstable as there will remain zone of contestation between China and the US, and each will seek uncontested dominance.

Even during the Cold War, neither superpower was able to fully control its respective allies, and this can happen with more tragic results in the unsettled world today.

As a substantial and growing power itself, it is unlikely that India will accept junior league status in a Chinese-centric world. Therefore China faces the same dilemma as other emerging powers in history: what **Bismarck** referred to as *le cauchemar des coalitions* or the nightmare of coalitions. There will always be a countervailing coalition to constrain a rising power.

What kind of World Order is most aligned with India's interests?

- It is evident that **for India it is a multipolar order which will be most aligned with its interests.** It is an emerging power which seeks to expand its own room for manoeuvre unconstrained by either a latter-day hegemon or a return to a bipolar system dominated by two major powers.
- Its developmental challenges need a supportive, peaceful and stable international environment. Therefore India's best interests are served by its assistance in shaping a multipolar order with the support of other major powers.
- It should not hesitate in promoting and participating in a countervailing coalition to constrain any aspiring hegemon even while it expands its own economic and military capabilities.

But this cannot be the whole of India's story. India possesses the civilizational attributes which could contribute to the success of a new international order attuned to contemporary realities. Its culture is innately cosmopolitan; it embraces vast diversity and plurality and yet has an underlying sense of being part of a common humanity.

World in flux: India's choices may help manage disruptions ([Samir Saran](#), Jan. 2018)

Foreign Secretary [S. Jaishankar](#) articulated **four key disruptions**:

- i. Rise of **China**;
- ii. Choices, Posture and Behaviour of the **United States**;
- iii. Implications of **"non-market" economics**;
 - Complete control over industry by the party-state, and utilisation of markets to maximise state power and legitimacy with disregard for corporate independence form the essence of "capitalism with Chinese characteristics."
 - The advent of non-market economics and the rise of the Beijing Consensus may mark the end of a golden age of entrepreneurship, and the free flow of ideas and technology which flourished under transparent free markets for nearly three decades.
- iv. **Terrorism from governed spaces.**
 - When states use terrorism as an instrument of state policy, especially under a nuclear umbrella or the protection of sophisticated firepower, a comprehensive approach towards regional and global security becomes arduous.
 - Again, the fact that China seeks to curry favour with such states — as it has with Pakistan — and intends to build parochial relationships with these actors significantly muddies the waters.

Source Channel

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The political and cultural arrangements states and communities arrive at will be heavily implicated by the **one major transition** Dr. S. Jaishankar identified: that a rule based order is no longer limited to the developed world.

- The shifting balance of power, from the Atlantic system to the Indo-Pacific, will determine the future of the 21st century. The old order is expressing its limitations through both policy and posture. The new order, however, is far from being clear.

A part of the solution to these disruptions and transition is called "INDIA".

- A vibrant democracy, a flourishing multicultural society, a rapidly growing economy and increasingly confident on the global high table, the choices India will make implicate the future of our world.
- The remaining answers will be found in the partnerships it chooses, the success of its economic journey and the narrative it ultimately frames around its rise.

Amb Rajiv Sikri

A new balance of power is emerging, though its contours keep shifting. Where does India fit in this changing balance of power? India is undoubtedly very strategically located at the crossroads of Asia where five 'arcs' intersect. These are:

- i. The 'arc of growth and prosperity,' extending from India through South East Asia to East Asia;
- ii. The 'arc of instability and turbulence' to India's west extending from Pakistan to Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Arab world;
- iii. The 'arc of energy' extending from the Persian Gulf through the Caspian Sea to Russia's Siberian and Arctic regions;

- iv. The 'arc of communications' comprising the trade and energy SLoCs in the northern Indian Ocean region (IOR);
- v. The 'arc of uncertainty,' north of India, encompassing Nepal, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the Central Asian countries.

In the current shifting kaleidoscope, India is seeking to develop a new paradigm for India's foreign policy where India would not be a mere 'balancer' or 'swing state' but a 'leading state' that seeks a place at the global high table. This will not be easy, since power is never given, always taken. It will have to be ready to take risks and at times pursue conflicting goals. Many other countries will work to keep India down. That is why India must leverage its strengths, have diversified foreign policy options, and remain alert and flexible.

Shivshankar Menon, Book: "Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy" (2016)

I have no doubt that China wishes to be number one in the world. As patriotic Chinese, convinced that China was number one in the world order until the aberration of the last two centuries, it is natural that Chinese leaders will try to take the place of the United States as world superpower.

I do believe that "speak softly and carry a big stick" is likely to be a more productive policy for India to mobilize in dealing with the consequences of China's rise and the changes we see around us. Like China itself, and every other successful rising power in history, India too should follow a variant of Deng's Twenty-Four-Character strategy, or of the policies expounded in George Washington's farewell address, a Bismarckian policy rather than the vainglorious temptations that led Kaiser Wilhelm II stray. As **Bhishma** said in his advice to kings while dying on his bed of arrows, "He who is silent secures the following of others; the restrained one enjoys everything in life."

At the risk of disappointing those who call on India to be a "responsible" power - meaning they want us to do what they wish - and at the risk of disappointing Indians who like to dream of India as an old-fashioned superpower, I would only say, as Indira Gandhi once said, "India will be a different power" and will continue to walk its own path in the world. That is the only responsible way for us.

Henry Kissinger, Book: World Order (2014)

Britain's policy based the security of India on the British naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean; on friendly, or at least nonthreatening, regimes as far-flung as Singapore and Aden; and on a non-hostile regime at the Khyber Pass and the Himalayas. Contemporary analogues to these policies have been taken over as key elements of foreign policy of post-independence India.

They amount to a regional order for South Asia, whose lynchpin would be India, and the opposition of any country's attempts, regardless of its domestic structure, to achieve a threatening concentration of power in the neighbouring territories.

India's role in world order is complicated by structural factors related to its founding. Among the most complex will be its relations related to its closest neighbours, particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and China. No successor state has accepted the boundaries of the 1947 partition of the subcontinent in full. Treated as provisional by one party or another, the disputed borders have ever since been the cause of sporadic communal violence, military clashes, and terrorist infiltration.

Today India pursues a foreign policy in many ways similar to the quest of the former British Raj as it seeks to base a regional order on a balance of power in an arc stretching halfway across the world, from

the Middle East to Singapore, and then north to Afghanistan. Its relations with China, Japan and Southeast Asia follow a pattern akin to the 19th century European equilibrium.

With India, Japan and China all led by strong and strategically oriented administrations, the scope both for intensified rivalries and for potential bold resolutions will expand.

In any of these evolutions, India will be a fulcrum of 21st century order: an indispensable element, based on its geography, resources, and tradition of sophisticated leadership, in the strategic and ideological evolution of the regions and the concepts of order at whose intersection it stands.

What is an Asian Regional Order?

- Under contemporary conditions, essentially two balance of power are emerging: one in South Asia, the other in East Asia. Neither possesses the characteristic integral to the European balance of power: a balancer, a country capable of establishing an equilibrium by shifting its weight to the weaker side.

David Malone - Book: Does the Elephant Dance?

On Global burden-sharing: Now that India is, on the strength of its economic successes, taken quite seriously by other major global players, it will need to grapple with whether, when, how and in what proportions it can and wants to share global burdens.

Given the recent splintering of international relations into a genuinely multipolar system, India will likely organize its multilateral and even some of its bilateral diplomacy in years ahead through issue driven ad hoc coalitions and in some cases evanescent grouping of countries. While seeking to advance its interests and increase its influence globally, it is likely to continue to engage in a 'hedging strategy' as between other significant powers.

At the strategic level, India is not yet a particularly significant player beyond its own neighbourhood. International experts view only the Indian Navy as having developed both a strategy and the political support and resources to implement it in expanding India's global reach.

Time and history are on India's side as it struggles to recover from several centuries of foreign domination and its consequence. Its re-emergence, particularly if it manages its significant domestic challenges with success, will be one of the major shifts of the 21st century.

Muchkund Dubey - Working for a New World Order (Book: India's Foreign Policy: Coping with the Changing World)

An important aim of any country, including that of India, is to contribute to world peace and prosperity and play an active role in the establishment of a just, fair and equitable world order.

The world order continues to remain unjust, inequitable and unfair to the interests of the overwhelming majority of nations of the world. It continues to serve interests of the dominant powers and works inexorably against those of the weaker nations. The former group of countries are determined to maintain the status quo in the existing world order and resort to any means, including the use of force, to achieve this purpose.

It is in India's self-interest as well as its moral obligation to actively work for changing the status quo and establishing a new world order. India should not be diverted from this task by the temptation of sitting at the high table and being prematurely proclaimed as a major economic power. For, India is still at the receiving end of the present world order and is likely to remain so for quite some time to come in the foreseeable future.

The new paradigm on which the international system should be based is democratic and dynamic multilateralism, essentially underpinned by the **UN**. There is a feeling that if the decision-making process in the UN, particularly in the Security Council, is not democratized, any strengthening of the organization would prove counterproductive from the point of view of developing countries like India. The strengthened UN would be used mainly against these countries, which are more vulnerable than the permanent members and their allies. Given its bilateral problems with its neighbours, India would be particularly vulnerable to interventions by the UN.

This is one of the reasons why among the proposals for strengthening the UN, India has been almost exclusively preoccupied with the issue of the expansion of the membership of the Security Council, including an increase in the number of permanent members, as a step toward democratizing the decision-making process.

Anirban Ganguly, Book: The Modi Doctrine (2016), Chapter - Modi and India's Civilisational Quest
Panchamrit has clearly emerged as the new supporting pillar of India's foreign policy under PM Modi. 'Samman-dignity and honour; Samvad-greater engagement and dialogue; Samriddhi-shared prosperity; Suraksha-regional and global security; and Sanskriti evam Sabhyata-cultural and civilisational linkages' are the five themes.

In the current evolving geopolitical arrangement, India aspires and is working hard to emerge as a defining pole in an increasingly multi-polar world.

PM Modi has reinforced and percolated the image of India as a responsible rising power that seeks to lead through the strength of its ageless wisdom that had once radiated across most of the civilised world.

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Indo-Pacific and Quad

United States, India, Japan, and Australia (or “Quad”) form the four members of the Quad.

Historical background of 'QUAD'

- The four countries collectively launched ad hoc operations to provide relief following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.
- In Manila in 2007, the PMs of India, Japan, and Australia met with the then U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum, marking the first Quadrilateral summit.
- Later in 2007, the four countries along with Singapore held a large multilateral naval exercise, the Exercise Malabar, in the Bay of Bengal. China, which saw the exercises as part of a containment strategy, registered diplomatic protests with all four capitals.

Beijing's expression of displeasure had an immediate effect.

- In early 2008, the new government of Kevin Rudd in Australia made it clear that it would not participate in future quadrilateral activities, apparently in deference to Chinese sensitivities.
- Further, the fall of Japanese PM Shinzo Abe (who was seen as the progenitor of the concept), the end of George W. Bush's presidential tenure, and opposition from Indian PM Manmohan Singh's political allies, seemed to doom the idea of the Quad.

Late in 2012, in an influential article outlining his vision for '[Asia's Democratic Security Diamond](#)', Abe argued that peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Pacific are inseparable from peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and called for the four powers to work together.

PM Abe wrote: "*I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.*"

Quad 2.0 - First official meeting (Joint Secretary Level) in November 2017

[MEA official statement](#) on India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific (November 12, 2017) Officials agreed that a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large. The officials also exchanged views on addressing common challenges of terrorism and proliferation linkages impacting the region as well as on enhancing connectivity.

From an Indian perspective, it appears a natural evolution of our 'Look/Act East policy' as an increasingly larger share of our GDP is accounted for by external trade of which a growing proportion traverses through this region.

[Dhruva Jaishankar explains the term 'Indo-Pacific'](#) (Dec. 2017)

- In a speech delivered in August 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Indian Parliament, he alluded to a book by the Mughal prince **Dara Shikoh** in describing the “dynamic coupling” of the Indian and Pacific oceans as the “confluence of the two seas.”
- **C Raja Mohan**, in his book 2012 **Samudra Manthan**, argued that “the seas of the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean must be seen as a single integrated geopolitical theater, the ‘Indo-Pacific’.”

What **geography** is covered by the Indo-Pacific concept?

- From “the eastern shores of Africa to the western shores of the United States” is a more coherent construct because India’s security cannot be compartmentalised into an eastern and western flank.

What does the term 'Indo-Pacific' imply?

- i. It implies that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are a single, shared strategic space. What happens in one, has implications in the other. Thus the militarisation of the South China Sea directly affects India, just as developments in the Indian Ocean have immediate consequences for Japan or the US.
- ii. It suggests that **geopolitical competition in the broader region will play out primarily in the maritime domain.** By defining the region by its oceans, rather than by any continental features (e.g. Asia), it automatically elevates the maritime element of our way of thinking about the region. For India, this means thinking more seriously about maritime trade, the blue economy, and naval requirements and capabilities.
- iii. The use of the term Indo-Pacific **implicitly acknowledges India’s central role in regional security and commercial dynamics.**

Chinese acquisitions in IOR (March 2018): "acquired Gwadar for 40 yrs, Piraeus for 35 yrs, Djibouti port for 10 yrs, Hambantota for 99 years, 20% of Cambodia’s coastline for 99 yrs, the Maldives’ Feydhoo Finolhu for 50 yrs, Beijing’s pressuring Myanmar to lease the Kyaukpyu port for 99 yrs."

ISLANDS AS GAME CHANGERS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN - Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, The Cocos (Keeling) Islands (an Australian external territory), Socotra (at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden just past the Bab el Mandeb), Madagascar, Diego Garcia, La Réunion.

Andrew Shearer (Former Australian NSA to PM John Howard and Tony Abbott) - Quad redux: A new agenda for Asia's maritime democracies (Nov. 2017)

One of the problems with quadrilateral structures is that it can be hard to maintain a sufficiently strong alignment of strategic perspectives and priorities to offset countervailing pressure from Beijing, particularly in light of each country’s substantial economic and other interests in China, not to mention inevitable changes of government and foreign policy emphasis in each capital.

Until recently, New Delhi was hesitant about resuming the Quad. Its professed reason was concern that Australia may once again let the side down, although this was probably more an excuse than a reason: India has to manage its own complicated relationship with China and was likely wary of adding an extra irritant to the mix by coming out in support of the Quad.

C Raja Mohan (30/10/2017)

The fear of China’s growing unilateralism drives Asian nations to reduce the regional imbalance by banding together. But the attractions of doing business with China and the dangers of provoking it limit the impulses for collective action against Beijing.

There is no doubt that the construction of quad will face many challenges, given the deep divisions in all countries on how best to deal with China. There will be differences on setting priorities and allocating resources.

None of the four countries are interested in containment. In fact, the US, Japan and Australia have much deeper economic and political ties with China than India.

C Raja Mohan (30/10/2017): Japan's plans to draw in UK, France into its alliance with India, Australia and the US will reinforce New Delhi's partnerships in Europe.

Both France and Britain have military presence and security arrangements in the Indian Ocean.

- France has many military facilities in the Indo-Pacific, including those in Reunion, Djibouti and the UAE.
- Britain continues to control Diego Garcia. It also leads the Five Power Defence Arrangement (involving Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand) set up in 1971.

To be more effective in the vast littoral, India needs to intensify the exchange of maritime intelligence, negotiate agreements to share naval infrastructure facilities in the littoral and put in place logistical support arrangements with its European partners. Japan's plans to bring France and Britain on board the quad can only reinforce India's maritime partnerships with Europe.

Source Channel

C Raja Mohan (Nov. 2017) - A rediscovery of non-alignment

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The quad comes amidst the growing Chinese unilateralism in Asia. India did much the same when it sought to hedge against America's unipolar moment by forming a political triad with Russia and China that later became the BRICS to include Brazil and South Africa.

If the explicit purpose of the triad was to promote a "multipolar world", the quad has the big task of preventing the emergence of a "unipolar Asia" dominated by China. But compared to the BRICS, which convenes annual summits and makes such big moves as creating new international financial institutions, the quad has a long way to go.

That India is open to both the quad and triad suggests not the construction of new alliances, but Delhi's return to the original conception of non-alignment. The persistent Indian anxieties on the quad reflect the entrenched political distrust of America that expresses itself on any issue involving partnership with the US — whether it was the multilateral nuclear initiative, mini-lateral regional coordination through the quad, or the bilateral defence framework.

If the quad helps India improve its ability to defeat terrorism, improve regional connectivity and extend its naval reach, Delhi is not going to thumb its nose. If China is ready to cooperate on terrorism and stop blocking India's rise, Delhi will be happy explore the multiple possibilities with Beijing. If this is not non-alignment we really don't know what is.

Amb. Kanwal Sibal: "raise the Quad dialogue to political level, intensify naval exercise with Australia bilaterally and make the Quad Malabar a reality".

C Raja Mohan: If India discards its military isolationism, develops productive defence diplomacy, and embarks upon deeper security cooperation with its partners through bilateral, minilateral and multilateral mechanisms, the "quad talk" might generate a lot less heat than it does today.

Shyam Saran: The Quadrilateral: Is it an alliance or an alignment? (Nov. 2017) - Given its history, India will have to remain watchful but at the same time not lose an opportunity to leverage the forum to advance its interests.

The first meeting in Manila has been at the joint secretary level which points to a preference for gradual and measured evolution. There is every possibility, especially with Trump as US President, that this

second edition of the quad may once again fall prey to tactical considerations if the pay-off from the Chinese is significant, say in commercial terms or, once again, in seeking Chinese help in restraining North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

India will have to remain watchful but at the same time not lose an opportunity to leverage the forum to advance its interests. India has the opportunity to shape the regional security architecture through its role in the quad not as an ally but as a partner. The objective must remain the creation of a multi-polar Asia with multilateral processes to assure mutual security to all stake-holders.

C. Raja Mohan , Rory Medcalf , Bruno Tertrais - New Indo-Pacific axis (India, France and Australia)

(May 2018)

Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper + French President Emmanuel Macron in a far-reaching speech (2nd May 2018) at a naval base in Sydney said that what he termed "the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis" should become an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific "geo-strategic reality in the making".

Between their island territories — France's Reunion and Mayotte, Australia's Cocos and Christmas islands and India's Andaman and Nicobar islands — they possess a triangle of some of the most strategic maritime surveillance real estate in the Indian Ocean.

As President Macron said in Australia, it is in everyone's interests for other countries to form "a partnership of equals" with China, informed by principles such as freedom of navigation and overflight and the independence of all nations. This is not about rejecting China's rise but about engaging it in a system of rules and mutual respect.

Some of the recent initiatives by India:

- Strengthening of India's own tri-services command - Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)
- Seychelles - Assumption Island,
- Mauritius - Aga Lega island
- Oman - Duqm Port - MoU on military cooperation. According to Oman News Agency, it envisages the services of Duqm Port and dry-dock for maintenance for Indian military vessels.
- Sabang Port of Indonesia - "Indonesia has agreed to give India economic and military access to the strategic island of Sabang at the northern tip of Sumatra and close to the Malacca Strait." Minister Luhut: "India and Indonesia relations are important to the balance of power in Asia."
- Defence logistics agreement with **France**, just like the LEMOA with the United States.
 - French presence:
 - France's military presence in Abu Dhabi and Djibouti gives it critical access to two major chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb.
 - France also has an extensive EEZ in the Mozambique Channel (generated by its scattered islands), expanding its reach and access to the eastern coast of Africa.
 - Réunion Island
 - Indian ships and naval assets can now move across from the Pacific to Singapore, Andamans, Diego Garcia, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Djibouti, onwards to Oman

Shangri La Dialogue, PM Modi Keynote [speech](#) (June 2018)

[Rory Medcalf](#) (June 2018): Many Belts, Many Roads at the Shangri-La Dialogue

- A long game is unfolding in the region, with variants of the Indo-Pacific idea now being unfurled to contest the China-centric geo-economic and strategic narrative of One Belt and One Road. There is not, and should not be, a single Indo-Pacific doctrine, for this is a region made for multipolarity.
The Indo-Pacific will be a place of many belts and many roads.

[Ian Hall](#) (June 2018): Modi plays by the “rules” at Shangri-La

- The vision of the “rules-based order” he articulated was a patchwork of post-1945 laws and norms. At its core lie the norms of sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-interference, and respect for territorial integrity, as laid out in the UN Charter and reaffirmed in ... “Panchsheel”, first agreed between China and India in 1954.

[Dhruva Jaishankar](#) (June 2018): India and the Indo-Pacific balance at Shangri-La

- Modi clarified that for India the Indo-Pacific was neither a strategy nor an exclusive club. He described it as a “natural region” ranging “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas” and argued that it should be “free, open, and inclusive”; grounded in “rules and norms...based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few”; and characterised by respect for international law, including on the issue of freedom of navigation and overflight.
- Modi’s veiled message was directed at China, and reflected a more widespread concern about how Beijing is wielding its economic and military muscle.
- The Indo-Pacific is a multipolar region that is increasingly contesting the notion of one state’s potential hegemony.

[Zorawar Daulet Singh](#) (June 2018)

Four themes:

- i. The central theme was that at a time when the world is facing power shifts, uncertainty and competition over geopolitical ideas and political models, India would project itself as an independent power and actor across Asia. “Our friendships are not alliances of containment”; “when nations stand on the side of principles, not behind one power or the other, they earn the respect of the world and a voice in international affairs”; “strategic autonomy”. In essence meaning - India has become too big to be part of any political-military camp.
- ii. India’s role in the vast Indo-Pacific is no longer envisaged as a China-centric one. “India’s own engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region — from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas — will be inclusive... That is the foundation of our civilisational ethos — of pluralism, co-existence, openness and dialogue. The ideals of democracy that define us as a nation also shape the way we engage the world.”
- iii. “Common rules-based”, “rules and norms should be based on the consent of all, not on the power of the few”. Meaning, India’s approach to the region is not going to be a hands-off policy or one devoid of norms.
- iv. “Asia of rivalry will hold us all back. Asia of cooperation will shape this century. So, each nation must ask itself: Are its choices building a more united world, or forcing new divisions?” India not going to choose “one side of a divide or the other”. In a way urging both the US and China to manage their rivalry.

After drifting towards the U.S. for the past decade, Delhi is rediscovering a posture and policy for a multipolar world. India’s foreign policy is likely to be driven by a dual attention to the balance of power and order building in the continental and maritime environment around the subcontinent.

Shyam Saran: Quad can be the anchor for the Indo-Pacific region (June 2018)

A reference to “**ASEAN centrality**” is important because of the perception lately that ASEAN has already been rendered irrelevant by Chinese power, and that ASEAN centrality is a myth.

- Southeast Asian countries do not wish to be caught in a crossfire between the US and China, or China and India. But their wariness about China is patent.
- Reasserting ASEAN centrality is an implicit rejection of Chinese claim to centrality. In that sense, the acceptance of ASEAN centrality gives the Quadrilateral more credibility and legitimacy in the region and makes it easier for ASEAN countries to accept the Indo-Pacific construct.
- That Indonesia, as the largest country in ASEAN, has signed on to the concept will make it easier for other member countries to accept it. This is potentially an important development.

Where does the “Quadrilateral”, or the Quad, fit into the Indo-Pacific construct?

- Quad is the anchor for the Indo-Pacific.

The unpredictability and uncertainty unleashed by the Trump presidency has adversely affected the prospects for the Quad. As the most powerful of the Quad countries, the US would have to play a leading role in any Indo-Pacific strategy, but it is unclear whether the US will even maintain its forward presence in the region. As a consequence, each of the countries in the group, including India, is engaged in hedging its bets.

India has maintained various circles of engagement such as the Quad, ASEAN, BRICS, BIMSTEC and now SCO and a number of trilateral fora. These give Indian foreign policy a degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis major powers and enhance its strategic autonomy. In this period of multiple transitions this may be the best course to follow, but it is the Quad which may eventually emerge as the critical instrument to manage the China challenge.

Dr **Manpreet Sethi** contends that China's behaviour will ultimately determine the future trajectory of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad.

Takenori Horimoto, a leading Japanese scholar of IR, contends that it is apparently indispensable to maintain a two-sided strategy of engagement and hedging vis-à-vis China into the foreseeable future.

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India-Russia Relations

PM Modi invoked a Russian proverb to reaffirm India-Russia friendship in a changing world: **"An old friend is better than two new ones."**

Broad outline on current status of Russia in International Politics (by **Shyam Saran**)

Russia retains its position as one of the great powers of the world. It has rich natural resources, a long history of mastery over science and technology and a sense of its own civilisational uniqueness. It has also been nursing a grievous sense of loss and resentment over the loss of its Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

The erstwhile Soviet republics remain its 'near neighbourhood' and a target of renewed influence, if not control. This brings it into confrontation with the US and Western Europe and may eventually do so with China as well. At the same time there has been its long-standing urge to be accepted as part of the West and accorded respect as a fellow European power. When this is not forthcoming the sense of grievance is only heightened.

In its current state, however, it is unlikely that Russia will emerge as one of the key architects of the emerging world order. Its relative economic and military power has diminished, its demographics are against it and in its isolation from the West it has to acquiesce to an alignment with China, despite its anxieties over long-term Chinese penetration into its 'near neighbourhood'. However, if its relations with the US and Western Europe normalize, there could be a major shift in geopolitical alignments, constraining Chinese calculations. It is interesting to note that Russia is today one of the vocal champions of a multipolar order.

Shyam Saran in his **Book, "How India Sees the World"** writes the following:

While Russia continued to be an important partner and a significant source of advanced defence technologies and hardware, India now had to deal with the growing economic and security relationship among China and Russia. Russia was supplying the same advanced weaponry to China as it did to India. However, after 1989, neither the US nor its Western allies were supplying weapons or defence-related technologies to China.

There is also no doubt that the West is divided over how to deal with Russia. Few wish to return to the dangerous tensions of a new cold war in Europe but the apprehension over Russian intentions is a legitimate one.

For India, the Ukraine crisis has introduced a new element of discomfort as it seeks to maintain its traditional relationship with Russia without spoiling its growing partnership with the US. It is also uncomfortable over the tightening embrace between Russia and China, which can only work to India's disadvantage.

If the US under Trump removes sanctions against Russia, Europe will follow suit, boosting Russia's international profile. To the extent that the distance between Russia and China grows, these developments will suit India. However, with the recent controversy over alleged Russian interference in US presidential elections, it seems unlikely that the positive shift in US-Russia relations anticipated earlier would in fact come about.

Srinath Raghavan - The myth of idyllic Indo-Russian ties: Russian policy had always been based on **realism** and through its **prism of geopolitical competition with US and China**. The origins of this strategic relationship lay in Moscow's growing rift with Beijing from 1959. The Soviets not only refused to support China in its territorial disputes with India, but also offered MiG-21s to India.

- **Role in 1962 War:** Nikita Khrushchev, then Soviet premier, told the Chinese that there was "no place for neutrality" and put the supply of MiGs to India on hold. During the war, Moscow shared with Beijing its intelligence on India. It was the Indian turn towards the US (Nehru asking for support from Kennedy) that led Khrushchev to revert to his earlier stance.
- **Role in 1965 War:** When Lal Bahadur Shastri travelled to Moscow in May 1965, he was shocked by Khrushchev's successor Leonid Brezhnev's unwillingness to condemn the Pakistani incursion into the Rann of Kutch. At Tashkent, Russians leaned on India to revert to status quo ante and return all captured territory.
- Moscow later backed off (after **1968**) because it now **sought a treaty of friendship with India**. This desire **stemmed from the Sino-Soviet border clashes along the Ussuri river**.
- India agreed to sign the treaty only in the summer of 1971, when there was a convergence between the US, China and Pakistan on the Bangladesh crisis. Until then, Moscow had advised India not to precipitate a war. And New Delhi hoped to change the Soviet stance by inking the treaty. After the Simla agreement of 1972, they insisted that India should not hold back the 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war.
- Throughout the **1970s and 1980s**, the Soviet relationship was crucial for India because of its exclusivity. The USSR—unlike the US—would not provide military equipment or intelligence to Pakistan or China. Soviet technical and financial assistance as well as trade added layers to the strategic relationship.
- **After Cold war:** The collapse of the Soviet Union shrank Russia into a regional power with limited interests outside its periphery. The shock therapy administered to the Russian economy resulted in a disastrous free-fall. This was accompanied by a steep demographic decline, owing partly to vodka. In this context, the **Indo-Russian relationship turned from strategic to transactional—centred on military technology and spares**.

Contemporary aspects of relationship:

Recent agreements on Defence cooperation

- Joint Venture to manufacture **Kamov-226T light utility helicopters** in India.
- Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to purchase/construct **4 additional stealth frigates** through partnership between Russian and Indian shipyard.
- IGA for the procurement of **5 S-400 Air Defence System**.

Civil Nuclear Energy:

- **Kudankulam** power plant
 - Unit 1 & Unit 2 are functional
 - Construction work on Units 3 and 4 has started
 - The General Framework Agreement for the construction of the **third stage of the Kudankulam NPP (KK5 & KK6)** along with the Credit Protocol was **signed during PM Modi's visit to Russia in June 2017**. Six more units are in the pipeline.
- Eight years after India's foreign collaborations in civil nuclear energy were legitimised, **Russia remains the only foreign country involved in nuclear power production in India**.

Trade and Commercial Sector:


Bilateral trade hovers around **US\$ 8 billion**. Russia comprised just 1% of India's total trade, India accounts for a minuscule 1.2% of Russia's overall trade. Both the countries have set a target to raise bilateral trade to \$30 billion by 2025 and increase bilateral investment from \$10 billion to \$15 billion.

Russia's Economy

- The Russian economy is heavily reliant on energy export with oil and gas comprising about half of the government's revenue.
- Economic sanctions by US and EU bind only a few countries — G7 and the EU — and are specific in their application.
- Heavy military spending.
- Decline in private investment.
- Challenge in the form of **demographic decline** for Russia's growth in the long term.

How to boost Russia India Economic ties?

- **Primarily a buyer-seller relationship.** Besides, if the emphasis continues to be on sectors such as defence, hydrocarbons and nuclear power, it would result in Russia gaining more.
 - [Essar seals \\$12.9 bn deal with Rosneft](#) (August 2017).
- To ensure a balance, sectors such as IT/ITES, pharmaceuticals and healthcare — where India has considerable strength — should also be encouraged, apart from seeking Russian investments in India in areas including defence manufacturing to push the 'Make In India' programme and in infrastructure and space technology to take forward the Smart City and Digital India initiatives respectively.
- Expedite negotiations of proposed India-Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) FTA.
- Expeditious implementation of the **INSTC** project as well as the **launch of the 'Green Corridor' project for Customs facilitation** (by easing Customs norms) as what would be major steps towards better connectivity and trade facilitation.



- India acceded to the Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods under **TIR Convention**. The TIR Convention can be an instrument for movement of goods along the **INSTC Corridor** and would be helpful in boosting trade with the Central Asian Republics and other CIS, particularly using ports in Iran like the Chabahar port.
- Trading in local currencies,
- Setting up pipelines for direct gas delivery from Russia to India,
- Operationalisation of the proposed \$1-billion fund through India's NIIF and the Russian Direct Investment Fund for investment in infrastructure and technology projects.

Russia-China relations (Amb. P S Raghavan)

For Russia, there is a compelling logic for its strategic partnership with China, which has been developing since 2000. As two large neighbours with a 4000-plus km border, they have economic complementarities and political convergences. The Chinese appetite for natural resources, raw materials and military technologies match Russia's strengths. The final settlement of their long-standing border disputes in 2005 paved the way for a broader relationship.

However, as a country seeking to regain its status as a great power, Russia continues to view China as a potential strategic adversary of the future. It does not transfer the latest generation of weapons or technologies to China; it is also careful about the level of Chinese investment in its hydrocarbons industry or Chinese presence in its Far East, bordering China.

The **freeze in Russia's relations with the West** after the **annexation of Crimea** (or accession of Crimea, depending on your political allegiance) in March 2014 changed the complexion of the Russia-China relationship. Russia was locked into a tighter embrace of China than it had bargained for.

Source Channel

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

Russia's rapprochement with Pakistan

Developments in recent years:

- In **2014** Russia removed its arms embargo against Islamabad.
- In 2015, Moscow agreed to sell 4 Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan and welcomed Islamabad to join the SCO.
- In 2016, Russia announced the first-ever "mutual special drills in mountainous terrain". Russia-Pak Military Exercise "Friendship 2016" (Location shifted from Gilgit-Baltistan to Cherat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the aftermath of URI Attack).
- Agreement on a construction project to transfer LNG from Karachi to Lahore.

Harsh Pant: Vladimir Putin, intent on **viewing South Asia through the prism of Russia's geopolitical competition with the West**, may have decided that the time was right for tilting towards Pakistan. US-Pakistan ties may have hit their nadir and the new US administration, expressing isolationist tendencies, remains consumed by multiple domestic crises.

- The global arms market has become more difficult for Russia to navigate, with China deciding to produce its own weapons rather than procuring them from Russia. **Moscow needs new buyers.**
- Russia, through Pakistan, wants to gain some plot in Middle East, Gulf countries (already it has grown its influence as a major power in Syria and Iraq). Russia also had recently shown interest in the Palestinian conflict.
 - Pak has in the past also played similar roles when it acted as a conduit for US-China relations (US-China Economic ties is the largest in the world as of now, despite the strategic challenges between them)
- New equations like US-India-Afghanistan and on the other side China-Pak-Russia.
 - China-Russia closeness - Several China-Russia joint exercises in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

Implications on India-Russia relations

- **Prof. SD Muni:** It can impact only when the closeness deepens in the Strategic cooperation with Pakistan, which doesn't seem to happen in the near future as of now.
- We should not draw some long conclusions from just a military exercise or some arms sale.

C Raja Mohan - [Get Real on Russia](#) - As it draws closer to Pakistan and China, India must stop taking it for granted.

- That a sovereign has no permanent friends is part of traditional wisdom around the world. Nothing illustrates this more than the evolution of Russia's ties with China and Pakistan. Few countries in the non-Western world have done more damage to Russian interests. The Chinese alignment with the West from the 1970s and the Pakistani jihad against Moscow in the 1980s were central to the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
- Moscow now believes it can play the China card in enhancing its leverage with the US. Some in Moscow may also bet that cosying up to Pakistan would help caution India against drawing too close to America. Others in Russia might point to the unintended consequence of pushing India into the arms of the US.
- Russia has the sovereign right to choose its friends. Nor should Delhi assume that Russia's current orientation — warmth to China and hostility to the West — is a permanent one.

At a moment of great turbulence in great power relations, Russia is rightly jockeying for position. This demands that **Delhi must focus instead on reconstituting the partnership with a country that will remain a powerful force in Eurasia, on its own merits.**

Experts/Scholars viewpoints on India-Russia relations:

Amb. Rajiv Sikri on India-Russia relations:

- Russia (and earlier the Soviet Union) has been a steadfast friend and a very special and privileged partner of India for many decades. Both the Soviet Union and its successor state Russia have provided India with immense help in diverse fields like industrial development, energy, education space, atomic energy, defence equipment and so on. India benefited from **cheap Soviet credits and rupee trade**.
- **Politically**, the Soviet Union supported India at critical times on Kashmir, Goa, Sikkim and Bangladesh. India continues to get military hardware from Russia, including an aircraft carrier, nuclear submarines, and many other weapon systems and platforms that other countries simply do not offer at all. There is now growing cooperation in the energy sector.
- **Today mutual interest, not ideology or sentimentalism, drives the relationship** that, unfortunately, occupies a somewhat lower priority in the foreign policy of both countries.
- Despite some welcome course correction to stem the drift in bilateral relations, **the structural weaknesses remain**.
 - **Trade is low,**
 - **People-to-people contacts limited,**
 - **Language acts as a hindrance,** and
 - **Lack of any influential lobby pushing for closer India-Russia ties is a handicap.**
 - **Bharat Karnad:** Missing pitchmen in Moscow, and death of the Hindustani-speaking Russian Ambassador Alexander Kadakin is a big void that will be hard to fill.

Harsh Pant (March 2017): India is a challenging market for US defense exporters, and Russia has traditionally been willing to go along with “make in India” policies promoting indigenous production. For its defense matrix, India cannot afford to marginalize Russia as it still is the only country selling critical strategic technologies to India.

Shyam Saran on Way forward for India:

Reasons for growing Russia-China bonhomie:

- **Economic dependency on China:** Russia is more dependent on Chinese support as the US has put sanctions on Russia and targets it openly in Europe. The Chinese market has become progressively more significant for Russia, particularly as an importer for Russian energy resources, in an era of prolonged depression in oil prices. ([Russia signs 30-year deal worth \\$400bn to deliver gas to China in 2014.](#))
- **Confronting the West:** Russia has started to align itself more with Chinese positions on a number of regional and international issues. The outreach to Pakistan may well reflect this trend. This is not different from what happened in 1971 when the US under Richard Nixon sought to uphold Pakistan's interests, to curry favour with its new-found Chinese ally. India became collateral damage in the process.

Way forward for India:

1. We should **avoid raising Pakistan to the level of an over-riding preoccupation**, which substantively it is not. That's because this also sets us up for both our friends and adversaries using Pakistan as leverage against India.
 - **Pakistan's use of cross-border terrorism against India is an admission of its own weakness, in real power terms, against India. If Pakistan is a threat, it is so as a sub-set of the larger Chinese threat, which really should be our preoccupation.**
2. There are enough reasons for India to **remain deeply engaged with Russia**.
 - **It will remain a key source of sensitive technologies and hardware, even as we diversify our sources of supply as we must in our own interest.**
 - **It may well become a key energy partner as our own energy demand increases and Russia looks for markets outside Europe.**
3. Russia may be in a relatively vulnerable position at the moment. This compels it to mute its concerns over:
 - **Chinese inroads into its Central Asian neighbourhood, and**
 - **Chinese demographic challenge to its sparsely populated Siberian Far Eastern territories.**

In the long run these concerns will resurface. **Russia has always had a sense of itself as a great power. It is unlikely to accept as a permanent condition a junior status to an ascendant China. India should bide for that moment.**

For the same reason, Russia may welcome a higher-profile role by India in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In this context, **India should pursue the proposed FTA with the EEU and seek to play a more active role in the SCO as a member.**

[Shyam Saran - The road from St. Petersburg](#) (June 2017) - **Nostalgia may be useful, but it cannot make up for a lack of substantive drivers in India-Russia ties.**

India-Russia relations today are very different precisely because we are very different countries today and the **world is very different from the 1960-1990 phase** of the India-Soviet strategic partnership. The cordiality and mutual trust of the past may be leveraged to fashion a new relationship but they cannot substitute for a lack of substantive drivers in the relationship.

[NANDAN UNNIKRISHNAN - The enduring relevance of India-Russia relations](#) (May 2017)

India, like Russia, would not want a bipolar understanding emerging between China and the United States because that would reduce the space for strategic manoeuvrability for both India and Russia. Therefore, reinventing Indo-Russian relations is an important task facing the political leadership of both countries, who must find ways to rejuvenate the confluence of political and strategic interests if the relationship must break out of its current shackles.

P S Raghavan on India-Russia ties (June 2017)

Most analyses of India-Russia relations approach them from one of two directions.

- One is the **nostalgia stream**, which bemoans the fact that the uniqueness of the bond has been diluted.
- The other assumes that our interests have diverged to the extent that only a shell of the relationship remains today.

Both approaches are invalid. The India-Russia relationship has to be placed in the larger context of the global geopolitical environment of the 21st century, which has transformed the realities in our neighbourhood.

- Some nuances in the Russia-China relationship** need attention.
 - Contrary to a general impression, Russia has not endorsed the Chinese claims in the **South China Sea**. It declares that it is for the parties to settle the dispute among themselves. Russia supported the Chinese position on the PCA verdict on the narrow ground that a judgement delivered without hearing the views of China was not valid.
 - **OBOR/BRI**: Russia is wary of increased Chinese economic and political influence in Central Asia – historically Russia's backyard. In his speech in Beijing, **President Putin** said BRI should take into account specific national needs and should be implemented transparently – the same points as were made by India's spokesperson on BRI.
- Russia's perspectives on Afghanistan and Pakistan should be viewed through the prism of the Russia-West standoff.**
 - **Afghanistan**: Concerns of western intelligence agencies plotting to infiltrate terrorists and promote drug trafficking into Russia through the porous Tajikistan border.
 - **Taliban**: Ghani government is increasingly losing control of much of the country to the Taliban and looks incapable of retrieving it. Under the circumstances, Moscow started engaging with the Taliban as an insurance against it being used against Russia. It may be noted that **Iran**, which should have an even greater antipathy to the Sunni Taliban, openly admits its links with it and explains it as insurance against Western mischief in Iran from Afghanistan.
 - **Pakistan**: Pakistan's intermediary role could help contacts with the Taliban. Also, Pakistan's links in the Islamic world may be of some use to Russia as it takes centre-stage in various West Asia issues. Indian sensitivity was an important deterrent to such initiatives, but as India broadened its international engagement, Russia embarked on its AfPak strategy.
- Meanwhile, **Russia has strengthened its strategic partnership with Vietnam**, executing joint hydrocarbon projects which may encroach on disputed areas of the South China Sea. It also supplies advanced weapon systems to Vietnam.
- A major **initiative is also underway to rebuild bridges with Japan** – another country with prickly relations with China. Discussions are ongoing to resolve the Kuril Islands dispute and the two countries are stepping up economic cooperation as a confidence-building measure.

Our assessment of India-Russia relations has to be set in this international context. Recognizing that Russia will pursue its national interests, **we should assess, without nostalgia or value judgements, how it ties in with our interests**. Where does Russia stand on this yardstick?

- Russia remains our principal supplier of weapons systems and equipment. As President Putin said publicly, it supplies to India sensitive technologies which are not sold to any other country (read, China). It is a fact that no other country is willing to supply such technologies. This is a crucial

element in our defence preparedness which we cannot ignore. Despite our best efforts over a decade, we still cannot get cutting-edge US defence technologies.

- Russia is still the **only foreign country involved in nuclear power generation in India**. Much of the cost of the Russian collaboration plants is covered by soft loans.
- Our **hydrocarbons** investments have been mutually beneficial.
- **Security in Afghanistan**: The support expressed in the [Joint Declaration \(2017\)](#) for the **Moscow dialogue process**, involving all stakeholders, reflects India's satisfaction at Russia's present course.

Challenge of progress in economic cooperation:

- The determination to diversify trade and investments, areas of promise identified and joint ventures in prospect are permanent features, with little to show in achievement.
- Both sides recognize the **INSTC** as a strategically important project, but progress remains slow.
- The Customs Green Corridor, direct diamond trade, banking links and other such trade promotion measures **do not require complicated action, but they just do not get done**.

Broad-basing the cooperation **beyond its over-dependence on defence, nuclear energy and hydrocarbons** would enhance mutual stakes in the relationship and promote greater sensitivity to each other's core concerns.

[C Raja Mohan](#) (Jan. 2018) -

Russia's tightening embrace of China and its flirting with the Taliban and the Pakistan army are generating unease. Delhi must reimagine India's relations with Russia in 2018 and beyond on the basis of clear-eyed realism.

Three elements must constitute this pragmatic engagement.

- i. First, having long-wished and campaigned for a multipolar world, Delhi must learn to live with it. **India can't expect a veto over Russia's China policy, nor can it cede one to Moscow on India's ties with the US**. India's bilateral ties with Russia must necessarily be defined by these boundary conditions in the near term.
- ii. The second is to appreciate Russia's long-term strategy towards the West. What Putin wants is an honourable accommodation with the West that Russians feel was denied after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Putin has drawn Russia closer to China, he has no desire to play a permanent second fiddle. Moscow, which helped Mao's Beijing in the 1950s and fought with it in the 1960s and 1970s, has no illusions about a rising China. In a world of changing distribution of power, Russia is aware that it can't reinvent a duopoly with America. **Putin wants to make Russia a "swing state" in the global balance of power marked by the rise of China and the uncertain evolution of America**.
- iii. Third, if Russia is conscious of its limitations, **Delhi's strategic community seems hesitant to acknowledge India's strengths**. Consider the fact that India's GDP today, at \$2.6 trillion, is nearly twice that of Russia. Many in Delhi's foreign policy establishment are unprepared for a relationship that is more in tune with the changed circumstances in which India is emerging as a power in its own right.

As middle powers, there is much that Delhi and Moscow can do with each other. In the new circumstances, **Delhi and Moscow must move towards a practical relationship that focuses on give and take wherever possible**. The two sides must also carefully manage the inevitable differences that arise. For the foreign policy conservatives in Delhi, this sounds "transactional". But in the dynamic world that confronts India and Russia, **"transactional" is any day better than "sentimental"**.

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Amb. P S Raghavan (Feb. 2018)

Each side should continue to respect the **core strategic concerns and political sensitivities of the other**. For India, these include Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chinese actions that impinge on their interests. Whereas for Russia, they include its strategic interests in Crimea and in West Asia, particularly Syria. And although asymmetry exists in every bilateral relationship, the ambassador cautioned against the tendency to over or under-estimate it. For example, there is a need for wider recognition in Russia of the fact that India has acquired an international political and economic presence that has enhanced its room for strategic manoeuvring. It is equally important for India to recognise the range and strength of Russia's global profile.

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
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SAARC

SAARC was **founded in 1985**.
Secretariat - Kathmandu, Nepal.

Member states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Afghanistan joined SAARC in 2007.



Courtesy: www.mapsofworld.com

Journey so far

- **South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)** - Signed in 2004 during 12th SAARC Summit held in Islamabad. The Agreement entered into force on 1 January 2006.
 - Bring their duties down to 20% by 2009, which is yet to be implemented.
 - **Intra-SAARC trade** amounts to **1% of SAARC's GDP**, in contrast, in **ASEAN - 10% of its GDP**.
- SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme
- South Asian University
- SAARC Disaster Management Centre
- "SAARC Chamber" of Commerce & Industry
- South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (**SAPTA**): Signed in April 1993 and entered into force in December 1995 to enhance mutual economic cooperation in the region.
- South Asia Initiative to End Violence against Children (SAIEVAC)

Recent Developments

- South Asia Satellite
 - "Pakistan has decided to opt-out of the satellite project. So it cannot be called a SAARC satellite. It will be a **South Asia satellite**"
- Framework agreement in power sector - Electricity trading through grid connectivity.
- India Business Card for SAARC trade: "India Business Card" to be given to businessmen of high repute in SAARC countries.

Reasons for failure:

- Weak **Cultural** Identities - The pursuit of maintaining distinct cultural identity by every country.
- Rivalry between India and **Pakistan**, the two largest members of SAARC.
- The region still faces many **unresolved border and maritime issues**.
- SAARC Charter Article X (2): mandates decisions only on the basis of **unanimity**.
- The **trust deficit** among the countries in the region.
- Fear of India's **Big Brotherly** attitude.
- **India's apprehension**: Such an organisation might be used by her smaller neighbours to extract undue concessions by expressing their fear of being bullied by India.

Way Forward

- Focus on developing our **South Asian identity**.
- Develop **physical** and **soft connectivity**.
- **Trade integration** needs to be expedited through faster implementation of **SAFTA**.

The **19th SAARC summit**, scheduled to be held in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 2016 was postponed due to Uri attack and yet has not been held.

Amb. Rajiv Sikri: "A **fundamental problem** is that **South Asia's political borders are artificial**. India's neighbours deliberately downplay the interdependence, complementarities and commonalities of the region. All of India's neighbours implicitly recognize that India is South Asia's natural leader. However, India cannot take leadership for granted; it has to earn it."

Shivshankar Menon: South Asia May Be Politically Divided But It Faces Common Security Challenges. Nation-building is still a work in progress in southern Asia, and state sovereignties are still new and fiercely defended.

Shyam Saran: Regional connectivity in South Asia should be a strategic priority for India.

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India-US relations

Historical context of India-US Relations ([Dr. S Jaishankar](#), Aug. 2018)

Historically, the US made an ambivalent approach to the growth of India's power.

- On the one hand, it valued Indian stability and promoted those aspects that served its larger interests. That explains the US's generosity when it came to development programs at a time when our political relations were not at their best. When there were serious challenges such as in 1962, American policy makers were actually anxious about our future.
- But on the other hand, they worked overtime to neutralize our regional dominance strove particularly hard to ensure some parity with Pakistan.

This policy started changing during the Kargil conflict and has gathered momentum over successive administrations. It has been driven by numerous factors, among them our growing economic and technology relationship, new geo-politics arising from the rise of China, and some commonality of interest on terrorism. The diaspora has been a big factor in this process.

Among the changes that reflect this new relationship are the **India-US Civil Nuclear Deal** and also the closer **defence cooperation**. Clearly an India that has substantial economic relationship, serious military ties, greater convergence in strategic interests and an influential diaspora connect, has to approach the US very differently.

We cannot continue on autopilot. For good reason of History the old Indian mindset *vis-a-vis* the US is defensive, even suspicious. But today, a stronger and more capable India is perfectly capable of a strategy of leveraging the US (e.g. [India-US nuclear deal example of India leveraging great power to get ahead](#)). Keeping a distance from another country cannot be a primary yardstick of policy independence of a confident power. On the contrary, we can make the pursuit of our own global goals and interests much harder. A clear eyed view of our national interests encourages us to work with the US when required and differ with it when necessary.

Newer normal in world politics - **Economic Nationalism** in the US has already made trade more central to relationships than ever before. The recalibration in American global posture have repercussions that are yet to be felt.

There could be differences as well on third party relationships (e.g. **Iran**), but at a time when we are still harvesting the gains of improved India-US ties, it is important not to lose focus. **The structural basis of this relationship has never been stronger.**

Certainly, there will be the give and take of International Politics, and now increasingly on International Trade, but it is not that as if we don't have cards to play. The less rigid global architecture allows for more freedom of manoeuvre (hinting at China, Russia ties for leveraging ties with the US). Abandoning prejudices and making decisions on merits would itself be doing foreign policy very differently.

Shivshankar Menon in his **Book "Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy"**, writes that there has been a conviction that a true India-US strategic partnership would serve our national interests in the changed geopolitical situation. While both countries have always fought shy of saying that their partnership is to balance China, it is clear that the rise of China was one of the major spurs. There is a creative tension at the heart of India-U.S. relations. India clearly needs U.S. technology, markets, and support to transform itself and create the stable and peaceful environment that the

country needs to grow. The US finds a stronger and more active India useful since there is a clear strategic congruence between the two countries' goals in the Indo-Pacific. But India is also an awkward partner since its strategic interests in West Asia diverge from those of the U.S., and India's present stage of development, so different from that of the U.S., leads India to make economic demands that strain U.S. preferences.

Today India and the United States are victims of the civil nuclear initiative's success. The emotional impact of the Civil Nuclear Initiative raised the level of ambition in the relationship so high that expectations on both sides have become hard to fulfill.

While India's ties with the United States are better than ever and continue to expand, in public discourse the search continues for the next big thing, the next civil nuclear initiative. I have no doubt that having surprised the world once in July 2005, India and the United States can certainly do so again in the future.

India US Defence Ties – Defence Framework Pact and DTTI

Defence cooperation has been the most visible aspect of this evolving relationship over the last one-and-a-half decade. The US has in fact emerged as the **top arms supplier to India** and currently **India conducts more military exercises with the US than with any other country**.

- January 1995: **Defence Policy Group (DPG)** (apex institutional dialogue mechanism for Defence Cooperation)
- June 2005: a New **Defence Framework Agreement**, focused on defence trade, joint exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter piracy operations, exchanges between each of the Services, etc.
 - **Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)** (is not a Treaty or Law), **2012**:
 - To strengthen defence cooperation by facilitating the Indian companies to collaborate with US partners in defense co-production, where the US provides **technology and guidance for building modern weapon systems**.
 - **Co-development and co-production under DTTI** may become the hallmark of the Modi government's '**Make-in-India**' initiative.
- **2015: renewed this Defence Framework Agreement for the next 10 years.**
 - four key "**pathfinder projects**" for joint development and production under the **DTTI**
 - Intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance modules for C-130J Super Hercules aircraft
 - Mobile electric hybrid power sources
 - Chemical, biological warfare protection gear for soldiers
- India is among eight countries where US defense exports are not restricted.
- June **2016**: The recognition of India as a "**Major Defence Partner**".
- August **2018**: Strategic Trade Authorisation - **STA-1 status to India**

Military Joint Exercises:

1. Naval exercise **MALABAR** with Japan,
 - When the 2007 edition of this bilateral exercise, held off Okinawa, was enlarged to accommodate Australia, Singapore and Japan, China issued a shrill demarche, conveying its fear and displeasure. It took another eight years before Japan was formally admitted to make Malabar a tri-lateral.
2. India's participation in the Rim-of-the-Pacific (**RIMPAC**) Exercise in Hawaii,
3. **Red Flag** Air Force Exercise in Alaska,
4. **YUDH ABHYAS** Army exercise.

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Four 'Foundational pacts' that US wanted India to sign since 2002, are:

1. **End User Verification Agreement** (which the US and India had **already signed**).
2. Logistics Support Agreement (**LSA**), signed as India specific **LEMOA**.
3. Communications Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (**CISMOA**).
 - **June 2018: Draft Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement ([COMCASA](#)) changed from CISMOA to reflect its India-specific nature.**
4. Basic Exchange & Cooperation Agreement on geo-spatial services (**BECA**).

What is **LEMOA**?

- Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), a modified version of Logistics Support Agreement (LSA).
- Would enable mutual exchange of **logistics support, supplies and services (LSSS)** between the defense forces of both countries.
- India did not had such agreements with any nation due to apprehensions that it would lead us progressively towards a form of informal alliance (Which has political sensitivities). Earlier, whenever any ship from any country visited our ports or airbases, it goes through a long process of clearances through MEA, MoD and other agencies. This foundational agreement facilitates cutting short of those agreements.
- Simplifies procedures for berthing, refuelling, repairing, supplying food stores etc., it's not a bad deal.
- **Why LEMOA and not LSA?**
 - For specific situations such as joint military exercises, interventions in disaster relief and any other situation mutually agreed upon.
 - **No automaticity that it would apply in all situations and India would have discretionary powers** to grant such permissions.
 - However, refusing their requests (hypothetically supposing in some war between US and some other country, say Iran, which is friendly to us) on case-to-case basis might create a political controversial thing.
- Agreement mentions specifically to allay concerns of being seen as a too close a US military ally , "The Agreement does not create any obligations on either Party to carry out any joint activity. It does not provide for the establishment of any bases or basing arrangements."

What is CISMOA?

- CISMOA stands for **Communication [Interoperability](#) and Security Memorandum Agreement**.
- Would allow the **interoperability of equipments**, meaning that there would be **access to encrypted and secret technologies or communications**.
- So far **US has blocked sale of some of the advanced technologies and sensitive equipments** (generally installed on US procured systems only) to India on account of non-signing this agreement.
- Could also be important for **multinational operations related to rescue, disaster relief etc.**

June 2018 - [Draft Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement \(\[COMCASA\]\(#\)\)](#); [Sushant Singh - COMCASA: Why US, India can't connect](#) (June 2018)

- Provides a **legal framework for the transfer of communication security equipment** from the US to India that would facilitate "interoperability" between Indian and US forces — and potentially with other militaries that use US-origin systems for secure data links.
- To facilitate the **use of high-end secured communication equipment to be installed on military platforms being sold to India**. India's military, they argue, is currently dependent on commercially

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available and less secure communication systems on high-end American platforms like C-130Js and the P8I maritime surveillance aircraft.

- **US says** signing COMCASA becomes mandatory if India is to get the armed version of the Sea Guardian drones from Washington.

India's concerns:

- i. **Defence ministry officials fear** American intrusive access to Indian military communication systems
- ii. Violation of Indian sovereignty due to visits by US inspectors to Indian bases to inspect the COMCASA-safeguarded equipment.
- iii. They also fear that a large quantity of Russian-origin and indigenous Indian military platforms may not be compatible with COMCASA.
- iv. It is also a politically sensitive issue in India. Moving into an election year, with India-US relations on a somewhat less strong footing, the government may be hesitant to sign the agreement now.

What kind of assurances India demands? (Aug. 2018)

- [India's demand for a clause which explicitly states that Indian sovereign law takes precedence over COMCASA](#). Indian officials argue that such a clause was part of the India-US nuclear deal negotiated by the UPA government and there is no reason why Americans can't make the same concession now.
- Assurance that the American side won't use the access it gets to the military communications system for spying on India.
- About the misuse of control equipment, as it is part of proprietary American network, which can be used by US military against Indian forces.
- The US government should not switch the whole equipment off or shut the Indian military network down as part of a policy decision.

US's new National Security Strategy (Dec. 2017)

Indo-Pacific:

- We welcome India's emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.
- We will expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support India's growing relationships throughout the region.

South Asia: The United States continues to face threats from transnational terrorists and militants operating from within Pakistan. [The prospect for an Indo-Pakistani military conflict that could lead to a nuclear exchange remains a key concern](#) requiring consistent diplomatic attention.

U.S. interests in the region include countering terrorist threats that impact the security of the U.S. homeland and our allies, preventing cross-border terrorism that raises the prospect of military and nuclear tensions, and preventing nuclear weapons, technology, and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.

Political:

- We will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.
- We will press Pakistan to intensify its counterterrorism efforts, since no partnership can survive a country's support for militants and terrorists who target a partner's own service members and officials. The United States will also encourage Pakistan to continue demonstrating that it is a responsible steward of its nuclear assets.
- We will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.

Economic:

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- We will encourage India to increase its economic assistance in the region. In Pakistan, we will build trade and investment ties as security improves and as Pakistan demonstrates that it will assist the United States in our counterterrorism goals.

Military and Security:

- We will bolster the fighting strength of the Afghan security forces to convince the Taliban that they cannot win on the battlefield and to set the conditions for diplomatic efforts to achieve enduring peace. We will insist that Pakistan take decisive action against militant and terrorist groups operating from its soil.

Trade and Commercial Sector

- High levels of bilateral trade and highest ever **FDI inflows** to India in 2016-17, especially from the US. In **2017** calendar year, India-U.S. bilateral trade in goods and services reached **\$140 billion**
- “**Silicon Valley comes to India**” program which will have experts from USA coming to India to interact with start-ups and provide the required momentum to Indian entrepreneurial eco-system.
- Travel and Tourism as a new work stream for future collaboration.
- Infrastructure and Smart Cities collaboration - to tap the opportunity of India’s infrastructure projects through mechanisms like the “National Infrastructure and Investment Fund”
- Issues in areas of **standards, Intellectual Property**
- Co-hosted the **2017 Global Entrepreneurship Summit** in India.
- **April 2018** - The [Office of the USTR would review the Generalised System of Preferences \(GSP\) eligibility of India](#), Indonesia, and Kazakhstan. The U.S. GSP programme was established by the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, and promotes economic development by eliminating duties on thousands of products when imported from one of the 129 designated beneficiary countries and territories.

Shyam Saran on US obstructing India's entry into the APEC:

- Our argument: If India becomes the member of APEC, US won't have a pressure to try and negotiate on trade related issues, it would have comfort level because of this. It could then conform over a period of time to the higher standards and would help India in becoming part and parcel of what US says as a 'higher standards trading arrangements'.
- Even this argument is being opposed by US, wherein other countries support India for its membership. Now this kind of approach US cannot continue to have and yet believe that US-India can develop a strong political and security partnership.

One leg of the US-India cooperation in terms of security relationship is growing very well but the other leg of economic and trade cooperation is highly infected and not sustainable in the long term for overall growth of relations.

What is Indo – US’s WTO problem?

Agriculture

- AoA of Uruguay round negotiations is heavily tilted in favor of developed world.
- Current quest of India as part of G-33 is towards achieving permanent solution. This has impact on our PDS system at administered prices.

Intellectual Property

- As part of Doha Development Agenda, developing countries managed to tweak ‘Agreement on TRIPS in favor of developing countries by allowing **compulsory licensing** in certain circumstances.
 - e.g. NATCO for ‘**nexavar**’ drug produced originally by **German firm Bayer AG**.

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- US not only want this concept to be done away with, it also wants a liberal IPR regime which allows evergreening of patents.
- **Indian Patent Act** allows protection of both product and process, but it **allows patent only when there is enhanced efficacy of the substance**.

Visa problem

- India is the largest user of H1B visas (67.4% of the total H1B visas issued in FY14 went to Indians) and is also among the largest users of L1 visas (Indians received 28.2% of the total L1 visas issued in FY14). India is likely to pursue bilateral discussions over the issue, but as last resort it may head to WTO if nothing comes out.
 - **What is H-1B visa: a non-immigrant visa** that allows US companies to employ foreign workers in specialty occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise in specialized fields such as in architecture, engineering, mathematics, science, and medicine for up to six years.
 - [Why do H-1B visa woes continue?](#) The Hindu
- [Shyam Saran:](#)
 - Since issuance of visas is considered to be **an immigration issue** and **not a trade issue**, one cannot take the suspension to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. What we can do is to **highlight the fact that** this is a partnership in which both parties gain.
 - Indian IT services contribute to enhancing the global competitiveness of U.S. companies,
 - Indian IT companies are providing significant employment in their operations to U.S. citizens, and
 - U.S. tech companies in India are some of the most profitable in the world.
 - Furthermore, in negotiating with the U.S. on this issue, we should **leverage** the fact that India is a growing market for U.S. products and services, in particular for defence hardware and technology. There should be some element of trade-off.
 - Indian IT companies should also adapt to the changed situation by diversifying markets away from the heavy dependence on the U.S.
- A newly released [World Bank report on global migration shows - In skilled migration worldwide, busiest route is India to US](#). Nearly 12 lakh skilled migrants from India to the US in 2010, compared to nearly 3 lakh from the Philippines to Canada. (July 2018)

Source Channel

<https://t.me/visionpt3652019>

[C Raja Mohan](#) on challenges in Trade relations under Trump Administration (May 2018):

- Amidst Trump's growing challenges to India on trade and immigration issues, Delhi's claims that it is in 'compliance with the WTO' or its insistence on 'free movement of labour' into America appear utterly innocent of the new dynamics shaping Trump's demand for rewriting the trade rules and opposition to open borders.
- At Wuhan, China has shown it is taking Trump seriously and finding ways to manage the multiple uncertainties generated by him. India appears miles away from constructing a coherent strategic response that will take advantage from some of Trump's policies while limiting the damage from others.

Trump administration - Impact on India-US relations:

C Raja Mohan: Smart money, in Delhi, should be on significant change rather than continuity in Washington. There is **probably only one guidance to understanding Trump's America: the past is not a good guide for the future.**

PM Modi's June 2017 visit to USA.

Joint Statements: [2017](#), [2016](#)

- Democratic Stalwarts in the **Indo-Pacific Region** - a close partnership between the US and India is central to peace and stability in the region:
 - Respecting freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce throughout the region;
 - To resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law (read UNCLOS);
 - Bolstering regional economic **connectivity** through the **transparent** development of infrastructure and the use of **responsible debt financing** practices, while ensuring respect for **sovereignty and territorial integrity**, the **rule of law**, and the **environment**; and call on other nations (read China) in the region to adhere to these principles.
- Increase tangible collaboration with partners in the **Middle East**.
- A new para on **DPRK** - to work together to counter the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction programs.
- **Counter-Terrorism:**
 - Called on **Pakistan** to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries, to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups.
 - Expanding **intelligence-sharing and operational-level counterterrorism cooperation**.
 - Support to UN CCIT, reinforce the message that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism.
- **Defence:** Proposed sale of **Sea Guardian drones (non-weaponized, surveillance purposes)** for **Indian Navy** - the **first non-NATO country to be offered** these.
 - **But India, looking for possible weaponized systems** is yet to commit to a purchase from America. The **\$2 billion deal could go a long way in boosting jobs in the US and certainly ties in with Trump's "America First" policy**, but might be less attractive to India than it appears at first glance.
- **Nuclear:** Both looked forward to conclusion of contractual agreements between Westinghouse and the NPCIL for six nuclear reactors in India and also related project financing.
 - **April 2018:** The two sides reaffirm their strong commitment to early and full implementation of our civil nuclear partnership, including the Westinghouse civil nuclear project at Kovvada.
- **U.S. energy exports** so that more **natural gas, clean coal, and renewable resources and technologies** are available to fuel India's economic growth and inclusive development. To expand energy and innovation linkages, including on more **efficient fossil fuel technologies, smart grids, and energy storage**. Both Financing of energy projects, including clean coal projects, by Multilateral Development Banks to promote universal access to affordable and reliable energy.
 - **April 2018: India-US Strategy Energy Partnership Joint Statement**
 - Four primary pillars of cooperation: (1) Oil and Gas; (2) Power and Energy Efficiency; (3) Renewable Energy and Sustainable Growth; and (4) Coal. Both parties may consider establishing additional pillars of cooperation based on mutual agreement.
- **India's formal entry into the International Expedited Traveler Initiative (Global Entry program)** in order to facilitate closer business and educational ties between the citizens of India and the United States. In 2016, there was a MoU for this.

Expert's/Scholar's views:

Shyam Saran (May 2017): The present government has invested heavily in building a stronger strategic partnership with the US. This was based on the assumption that even with its geopolitical pre-dominance diminished, the US remained **a formidable military power and an unmatched source of technological innovation and excellence**. It **shared India's interest in preventing a China-dominated Asia and the world**. It would, therefore, be an indispensable partner in India's trajectory towards great power status.

Trump's preoccupations at home mean that the US will be less engaged with regional and global issues and this adds another layer of complexity in dealing with the China challenge and in navigating an even more treacherous international landscape.

However, the strengths of the US are likely to be enduring and India should not dilute the relationship because of immediate concerns such as the issue of visas to our IT professionals.

FS S Jaishankar (July 2017): "The United States is, generally speaking, reframing its terms of engagement with the world. **Let us be clear what is not happening: the US is not withdrawing from the world. On the contrary, it is seeking to get what it hopes to be a better deal from the rest of the world.**

It is important not to jump to conclusions. The continued presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific is an important factor in the calculations of all nations. Developing a nuanced understanding of the unfolding situation is a must for policy makers, as well as analysts."

"Don't demonize Trump, Analyse Trump."

Pratap Mehta (Oct 2017) - The new Asian game - An authoritarian, assertive China is a challenge for India. But it is premature to conclude that US will be its saviour.

C Raja Mohan (Oct 2017) - India should resist the temptation for an endless debate on whether America can move away from China and Pakistan and be India's reliable partner. Delhi should **focus, instead, on strengthening practical cooperation wherever possible with Trump's Washington**.

Delhi must seek to:

- stiffen America's resolve to confront the **Pakistan Army's** sponsorship of terror,
- encourage him to discard the residual **bureaucratic hesitations in Washington** about supporting India's rise, and
- delineate the pathways for constructing a stable balance of power system in the Indo-Pacific.

C Raja Mohan (Nov. 2017) - **Xi, Trump, Asian disorder**.

The new complexities driving Asian politics.

- These include America's demands for "fair" rather than "free trade" with Asia and the problem of accommodating China's rise without abandoning its long-standing allies and friends in the region.

Xi insisted that Beijing and Washington need to "jointly" promote peace and stability in Asia. This is one of Xi's core demands on Trump — to share the leadership of Asia on Beijing's terms. Trump, or any other US president, will have a hard time ceding America's long-standing primacy in Asia.

Three things stand out:

- i. America and China will continue to jockey for political primacy in Asia;
- ii. the tension between Washington's traditional commitment to economic globalisation and Trump's "America First" policies is unlikely to be resolved any time soon; and
- iii. most countries in the region are beginning to diversify their security partnerships.

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The rise of China and the turbulence in American domestic politics have created great disorder under the heavens. But they have also opened up much room for creative Indian diplomacy in Asia.

Alyssa Ayres: US policies toward India and Asia need strategic coherence (Nov. 2017)

- US should call explicitly for APEC to offer membership to India. Asia's third largest economy deserves to have a seat at the table, and it will help India to be more embedded in the premier regime focused on free and open trade in Asia.
- To address the urgent need for infrastructure funding in the Asian region—to offer a real alternative to the Belt and Road loans.
- In economic dialogues with India, the administration needs to keep its gaze on the strategic and not get buried in the transactional. A narrow focus on the \$24 billion trade deficit with India (compared to more than \$300 billion with China), should not distract from this larger goal. Of course, we and India need to sort out market access problems and our difficulties with Indian IPR policies, but these questions are not strategic in nature.
- A strong, stable, democratic India committed to a rules-based order will indeed be a “bookend” for the region. Washington will have to alter its economic focus to get there.

Nisha Biswal - (Oct. 2017) - The geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific are as important as the region's geopolitics.

A fully realised US-India economic partnership is necessary to accomplish the shared goals and shape the destiny of the Indo-Pacific region.

C Raja Mohan - How India can negotiate Trump's world (Dec. 2017)

If President George W. Bush affirmed that Washington will support India's rise, Trump is welcoming India's “emergence as a leading global power”. If presidents Bush and Obama stopped seeing India through the constricting prism of South Asia, Trump is betting on a larger role for Delhi in stabilising the Indo-Pacific.

Delhi has to look at one of the key propositions in Trump's NSS: “Economic security is national security”. Aligning India's economic strategy with the changes unfolding in Trump's America is the key to an enduring and productive bilateral partnership. Central to that approach is the revitalization of India's high-technology partnership with America.

- India's real opportunity with Trump's America, therefore, lies in building on the expansive linkages between Bengaluru and Silicon Valley and demonstrating that the two nations could simultaneously prosper.

Harsh Pant: Responding to Donald Trump's disruption (May 2018): The challenge for India is to use its convergence with Russia and China on global issues to bring a semblance of balance to American capriciousness on the global stage.

C Raja Mohan: India's diplomacy, Trump effect (May 2018)

As Trump demands reciprocity in commercial relationships to redress America's massive trade imbalance with the rest of the world, most of America's partners are eager to make bilateral deals with Washington. As Trump questions the costs and benefits of alliances, America's traditional partners in Europe and Asia have been compelled to consider the logic of strategic autonomy from the U S. Neither Trump's allies nor his adversaries can now afford to take Washington for granted.

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India's positive political relations with the US have been complemented by the new challenges of managing the problems on the trade and immigration fronts. If Sino-US tensions have opened up space for India, those between Washington and Moscow shrink Delhi's room for manoeuvre. Modi's informal summits in Wuhan with Xi and Sochi with Putin are part of the new **nimble footed Indian diplomacy towards major powers**.

Delhi's weak defence industrial base and tentative military diplomacy have prevented it from measuring up to its own claim on being a "regional security provider".

Suhasini Haider (June 2018)

- U.S. new law called **Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)** - India's plans to acquire the Russian S-400 missile system.
 - July 2018 - **US Congress exempts India, Vietnam, & Indonesia from sanctions under CAATSA** on Russian weaponry purchases.
- In the past year, more than 30 key administration officials have quit or have been sacked — they have had to deal with three National Security Advisers, two Chiefs of Staff, as well as two Secretaries of State as interlocutors.
- **"2+2" dialogue** (Foreign and Commerce ministers) - **Postponed to Sept. 2018**.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta - Trump's Disruptions (June 2018)

Trump's disruptions signify three mutually reinforcing trends.

- i. Signalled "end of the west" as a coherent ideological and geo-political entity by disrupting the G-7.
- ii. Making it clear that America does not want to sustain Pax Americana. It is not willing to pay the price for it in terms of troops or financial commitments.
- iii. Putting America first, and in rhetoric, rolling back on post-Cold War globalisation.
 - There is surprise that it is Trump not China that is disrupting the global trading order. Growing inequality, wage stagnation and deindustrialisation is being blamed on globalisation.

Alyssa Ayres (July 2018): (**Context: Tariff retaliation, CAATSA sanctions Russian S-400, JCPOA Iran sanctions impact on India's Oil trade and Chabahar, postponement of 2+2 dialogue for third time**) Put simply, the Trump foreign policy can zero in on an arbitrarily-chosen economic metric, fixate on it, and no strategic concern or history of alliance strength can compensate.

Ashley Tellis (July 2018): In U.S.' zeal to mount frontal assault on Iran, India has become an inadvertent casualty.

On PM Modi's informal summits with China and Russia:

- A tactical adjustment, partly in the context of India's own electoral calendar (cannot afford new crises on his frontiers). Furthermore, India has a traditional relationship with Russia that it cannot jettison in a hurry. Nor can it afford to have a deeply confrontational relationship with China either.
- I don't think India has made any fundamental strategic shift against the United States. Polygamous strategic partnerships have been the norm since the Cold War and will be the norm going forward.

Samir Saran - India-US relationship: Is the top-down structure sustainable? (July 2018)

It is time to enquire if the US can continue to unilaterally set the priorities for this relationship — and strong-arm India into accommodating its preferred posture on key issues such as **Pakistan and Iran**.

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- The fact is that India's economic growth will see its GDP surpass the US before the middle of this century on real terms and well before in PPP terms.
- This reality implies that New Delhi will increasingly set its own priorities and will retain independent beneficial relationships with countries like Iran and chart its own course with its neighbours.

How will the US establishment come to terms with the fact that for the better part of the 21st century, India will be the larger economic partner? More importantly, has Delhi realised the potential and consequences of this shift?

C Raja Mohan: India and Trump's world (July 2018)

Context: Trump's outburst against EU, NATO, G7, accusing Germany of being "totally controlled by Russia", undermining the so-called special relationship between America and Britain, determined to enhance the engagement with Putin's Russia

- India will need a more transactional — a pejorative word in India's diplomatic lexicon — approach to deal with the Trump effect. Claiming that it is "WTO compliant" is a poor strategy when the big boys are changing the trading rules. Delhi needs a flexible negotiating strategy founded in a more ambitious internal reform agenda.
- In Trump's world, the contradictions within the West are becoming sharper than ever before. Obsession with "strategic autonomy" makes little sense when the post-War geopolitical categories are breaking down. As in the economic domain, so in the political, India's diplomatic emphasis must be transactional.
- Delhi must avoid conflict with the powers with which it has serious disputes. It also needs to lift self-imposed limits on security cooperation with the powers that are ready to boost India's material power. In these troubled times, transactional diplomacy, and not political posturing, holds the key to achieving India's ambitious national goals.

Richard Verma and **N Menon Rao** report on US-India relations - [Joshua White](#) summarizes the contents of the report (Jan. 2018):

- (a) **"Strategic Advantage Initiative"** focused on bolstering India's defense capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
- (b) **Creating a U.S.-India Indo-Pacific HADR cell** to "plan and jointly train for coordinated response to natural disasters in the Indian Ocean region."
- (c) **Encourages India to improve its defense procurement process**, and its sometimes myopic rubric for evaluating overall cost. (U.S. defense companies highlight that U.S. systems often provide the best the value over the lifetime of a system.)
- (d) Finally, the report recommends a **"joint defense implementation agreement."** An umbrella arrangement that bundles a number of specific and often technical cooperative agreements.

Russia question in India-US relations (Context: India negotiating for Russian S-400 missile system and US CAATSA)

The Russia question continues to vex the foreign policy establishment in both countries.

- While India's dependence on Russia for defence products reduces, the fact is that it will remain a key security partner for many years to come. At the same time, Moscow will increasingly become an important actor for India's political, connectivity and energy projects in Eurasia. To sustain a long-term India-US partnership, it is now time for both countries to adopt a mutually accommodative position on Russia.

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- The US, for its part, must be flexible and account for the important role Russia plays in India's security objectives. New Delhi, on the other hand, must invest diplomatic energy in convincing Washington to shed its cold war mentality towards Moscow and embrace an 'entente cordiale' with this superpower, especially as both countries begin to recalibrate their approach to China. Neither India nor the US would benefit from Russia being in the Chinese corner.

[Jeff Smith](#) (June 2018)

- India should be encouraged to continue weaning itself off Russian hardware. But no credible expert thinks it's reasonable to demand that India halt defense trade with Russia immediately and indefinitely. None believes India could do so without seriously undermining its national security.
- At a time Delhi and Moscow have grown increasingly estranged, Russia would like nothing more than to drive a wedge between the two democracies.

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